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CHAPTER I. A THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION TO 
THE PROBLEM OF DESCRIPTION 
Every theory of knowledge must start from 
knowledge as a given sociological fact. The 
system of knowledge as it has been built up by 
generations of thinkers, the methods of acquir­
ing knowledge used in former times or used in 
our day, the aims of knowledge as they are ex­
pressed by the procedure of scientific inquiry, 
the language in which knowledge is expressed— 
all are given to us in the same way as any other 
sociological fact, such as social cus';oms or re­
ligious habits or'political institutions. The 
basis available for the philosopher does not dif­
fer from the basis of the sociologist or psy­
chologist; this follows from the fact that, if 
knowledge were not incorporated in books and 
speeches and human actions, we never would know 
it. Knowledge, therefore, is a very concrete 
thing; and the examination into its properties 
means studying the features of a sociological 
phenomenon. 
Hans Reichenbach (1938:3) 
Some Preliminary Remarks 
In order to understand this dissertation one must first 
be cognizant of the fact that this work is meant to reflect 
two fundamental purposes. First, it is meant to serve as a 
basic record of my thoughts, however insufficient they might 
be, at one point in my continuing intellectual development; 
a public statement of what I feel to be true as a result of 
the particular sequence of experiences that I have encoun­
tered throughout my educational career. Secondly, this dis­
sertation is meant to be an expression of an antecedent per­
sonal commitment to two areas of substantive focus; and to 
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my overarching commitment to the principle that there is 
much to be gained from their conjoint investigation and 
theoretical integration. These areas are the sociology of 
language and.the methodology of sociology. 
In light of these two purposes, the aims of this in­
troductory chapter are threefold. First, it is necessary 
that I outline the core aspects of my approach to these two 
areas and state why I feel that these areas might be of 
critical interest in contemporary sociology. Secondly, I 
wish to articulate the manner in which these two areas seem 
to naturally converge. At this point of convergence lies 
the value of their theoretical integration; a point at which 
we can employ knowledge in one area to better comprehend the 
nature of the problems existing in the other area. Finally, 
I wish to propose the manner by which I feel that the neces­
sary integration can begin. 
One last point should be noted, however. This thesis 
is a methodological one and is, to that extent, somewhat 
asymmetrical with respect to the direction of integration. 
In the context of this dissertation the sociology of lan­
guage is primarily meant to provide a vantage point from 
which a key problem in the methodology of sociology might 
be viewed—the problem of description. Thus, T^ le I may 
discourse on the sociology of language (SOL), the goal is 
not to simply inform the reader about SOL as a substantive 
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area, "but rather to "construct" the necessary vantage point. 
From such a vantage point we may more clearly view the core 
problem of description; observe the elements of the logic of 
description; and begin to more effectively determine the 
role of descriptive systems in "inductive" modes of socio­
logical theorizing (cf., Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
I am, of course, very cognizant of the fact, even given 
the fundamental asymmetry of the theoretical development 
commented on earlier, that this dissertation is only a mea­
ger beginning with respect to the valued integration. At a 
later point, when the problem itself is more clearly 
grasped, the upper bounds of this work (i.e., the extent to 
which it is delimited) will be defined more precisely. In 
part, I can only hope to show the value of such an endeavor 
and point out one direction in which it might extend. 
The Methodology of Sociology and SOL: 
Toward a Cybernating Sociology 
Percy ¥. Bridgeman (1959^ 1) once noted that the problem 
of understanding was two-fold in nature. First, "there was 
the problem of understanding the world around us" and sec­
ondly, "there was the problem of understanding the process 
of understanding, that is, the problem of understanding the 
nature of the intellectual tools with which we attempt to 
understand the world around us." For the sociologist the 
h 
first of these problems translates Into the problem of under­
standing the social facts lAlch confront him, ordering them, 
interrelating them, and by the means at his disposal, fitting 
them into the broader context of the societal complex from 
which they were felt to derive. These are all critical as­
pects of understanding that entity we term "society." Com­
plementing this problem, and corresponding to Bridgeman's 
second problem of imderstandlng, is the concern for the 
tools vith vhleh ve confront such sbci]^facts; a concern 
for their quality, validity, optative principles, and so 
on. Alfred Horth Idhltehead (1971:3), a man of incredible 
insight Into the problems of scientific knowledge, addressed 
the first of these problems as being concerned with "think-
Ing 'homogeneously* about nature". With respect to the 
second problem he noted, "Of cowse it is pysslble to think 
of nature in conjunction with bought about the fact that 
nature is thought about. In such a case I sli&ll say that 
we are thinking *heterogeneousXy^ijBtoaii^fcjiature" (Whitehead, 
1971:3). It is the task, of the methodd^à^si .to think 
heterogeneously about nature; to keep onKeye on the task 
and one eye on the tools. It is this task ,to which I cur-
rently aspire. 
For the most part this dissertation arose out of a 
concern for the role of measurement and stochastic modeling 
in the production of meaningful and usable sociological 
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knowledge. Soon, however, I found that I had to broaden 
my methodological horizons. The rate of development of new 
techniques in the areas of ethnography, sociolinguistics, 
social ecology, social geography and many other areas (plus 
their obvious utility in many applied settings) led me to 
believe that the task of the methodologist was an ever ex­
panding one. There was a definite need for an "encompassing" 
methodological perspective. After some two years of di­
rected study, however, I found that the traditional "text­
book" approaches to these topics, particularly as repre­
sented by contemporary texts of sociological "theory con­
struction", did not seem to provide a sufficient basis for 
the generation of a generic methodology, ultimately an 
epistemology, which could be used in an assertive and cre­
ative manner by students of society. A multitude of con­
siderations led me to believe that such a methodology must 
display several characteristics. 
First, cognizant of the diversity of perspectives in 
contemporary sociology (and of the intrinsic validity of 
the principle of the autonomy of inquiry; Kaplan, 196^ :3), 
any such methodological perspective must be an integrative 
one; capable of articulating, in a nontrivial way, the 
close-knit kinsnip of the entire gamut of existing meth­
odological techniques. It must strive toward a systematic 
apology within which the apparent, or "surface" variety of 
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methodological techniques can assume their appropriate 
places: a surface variety as given in the multitude of 
techniques in mathematics and statistics; the ethnographic 
techniques of contrastive analysis (Conklin, 1968:^ 1^ -^ 33) 
and discourse analysis (Schegloff, 1972:75-119j Labov, 
1972:120-169); and the classical method of ideal differences 
or the Gendankenexperiment (Isajiw, 1968:^ 3)* All of these 
are valuable tools which are available to the working 
sociologist. If he is to have full access to them, and 
the insights they can bring, they must be placed in some 
appropriate perspective. It is this perspective idiich an 
integrative methodology would seek to create. 
By nontrivial I mean that such a perspective must be 
more than simply an apology. It must accomplish more than 
the construction of a classification system for- pidgeon-
holing particule methodological techniques. Such en­
deavors only preserve and reify current distinctions where 
it might be more useful to notice continuity and structural 
isomorphy; they maintain the methodological status quo when 
meaningful change might be required. Further, because of 
their reliance on existing techniques as "data", such sys­
tems have a two-fold destiny: 1) they have increasingly 
Procrustean effects upon user's perspectives during the 
period of the systems application, and 2) they are doomed 
to obsolescence., _ — 
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The existence of an integrative, nontrivial method­
ology must make a difference; it must have consequences. 
Placed in the pure pragmatic context, we can put any such 
methodology to the following ideal test. We can imagine 
two states of affairs, one in which the methodology exists 
and one in which it does not. If methodological activity 
is indifferent to these two states of affairs, then the 
methodology proposed is a pragmatically trivial one; its 
existence makes no difference. 
Secondly, an integrative methodology must be cognizant 
of the fact that, from beginning to end, empirical socio­
logical research is a sequence of decisions; theoretical, 
observational, and inferential. Hans Reichenbach (1938: 
9-16) has pointed out that such decisions are of three 
sorts: 
1. Conventions. or choices between alternative 
means of accomplishing the same end, 
2. Volitional bifurcations which lead to di­
vergent perspectives and practices, and 
3. Entailed decisions, or decisions which are 
made, or implied by some set of predecessor 
decisions. "The system of knowledge is 
inter-connected in such a way that some de­
cisions are bound together; one decision 
then, involves another, and though we are 
free in choosing the first one, we are no 
longer free with respect to those following" 
(Reichenbach, 1938:13). 
Following the pragmatic theme of the earlier discussion, _a 
nontrlvial methodology must display consequences at points 
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of decision; it must make an input. 
Following up on this last point, then, we may note a 
third and final characteristic of an integrative methodology; 
namely, that it must be of a normative nature. In essence, 
this means that as members of a scientific community, some 
decisions are entailed by the very fact of our membership. 
This does not mean the reduction of all research behavior 
to ritualized modes of inquiry; that is if "ritual" is 
understood as an unthinking and personally meaningless act. 
On the contrary, the emphasis is on developing the creative 
potential of the sociological community. We must begin to 
realize that there are many ways in ^ daich the collective 
sociological enterprise extends beyond the individuals who 
comprise it. The import of this consideration becomes most 
clear lAien we come to questions of the "meaning" of re­
search; for at this point the "we" of the scientific com­
munity partitions into "researcher" and "peers". Meaning 
is a public possession (see Geertz, 1973:12) and even a 
superficial awareness of this fact can simplify many other­
wise complex decisions. 
Having now established a set of criteria by vHalch such 
a methodology can be judged, we must now seek a positive 
course towards its accomplishment. This is where SOL makes 
a great contribution. If asked vhj a student of methodology 
should find interest in the area of SOL, I should have to 
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offer the following reasons: 
1. The scientific community is, perhaps, the single 
greatest consimer of man's symbolic capacities. That this 
is so has been pointed out by such eminent social scien­
tists as G. A. Lundberg (19640, Harry Alpert (1938:855-861) 
and Robert McGinnis (1970:37-38), as well as being the main 
thrust of the logical positivist and pragmatic movements in 
scientific philosophy. 
2. Through the study of SOL the student of methodology 
stands to gain a sense of proportion from an increased aware­
ness of the role of symbolic systems in the larger context 
of society; the context from which the scientific community 
draws its human, organizational and symbolic roots. In 
terms of this increased awareness, then, the student of 
methodology stands to gain a sense of perspective concern­
ing the role of symbolic systems in the scientific com­
munity. The reader may wish to note that Chapter I is con­
cerned with the development of these first two items. The 
following items will be dealt with in later chapters. 
3. Through the study of SOL the student of methodology 
stands to gain an increased sense of awareness concerning 
the relation of the specialized symbolic systems used in the 
scientific community to the natural language systems used in 
the larger societal complex. There has been an unfortunate 
tendency for this distinction to be overdrawn, particularly 
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by groups on either side of the qualitative/quantitative 
issue. A major task of this dissertation is to show that 
this distinction has been overdrawn, structurally, func­
tionally, and without recognition of their basic inter­
dependence (that is, structurally with respect to their 
syntactic/semantic composition, functionally with respect 
to their pragmatic setting, and with respect to the asym­
metric dependence of the specialized upon the natural sys­
tem). 
Through the study of SOL the student of methodology 
stands to increase his own capacity for the rational use of 
the symbolic systems in research endeavors; develop clear 
understandings of the role of symbolic tools in concrete 
areas of research application; and develop a stronger ap­
preciation of his responsibilities in their use. Since the 
methodologist stands in a critical relation to the rest of 
the social scientific conmunity, his awareness of these 
factors is strategic and vital. 
In summary the use of symbolic systems can either pro­
vide us with blinders or it can open and extend our hori­
zons. Language is our central tool in the scientific com­
munity Tire must neither take it for granted nor be in­
ordinately awed by it. The effectiveness of a tool is de­
fined in terms of its use and is determined by its user. 
If the tool is to be used more effectively—if the tool 
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itself is to be improved—then increasing the user's aware­
ness of its nature must be the first order of business. The 
study of SOL is superbly suited to this end. 
The intent of the following section, and its various 
components, is to begin to construct the SOL vantage point 
that will be required throughout the rest of the thesis. 
This will be accomplished in three stages; each stage pro­
viding information for its sequel, and each successively 
focused with respect to its role as a means to the ends of 
this dissertation. Figure 1.1 has been constructed to show 
the conceptual flow of Chapter I. Here each section is 
given both sequential and conceptual coordinates and an 
attempt is made to graphically represent points of con­
vergence. 
The Sociology of Language: 
Constructing the Vantage Point 
The contemporary student of society can find a myriad 
of reasons, intellectually "pure" and intellectually "ap­
plied" , for pursuing the study of human language systems. 
In this section I will attempt to outline, in brief, three 
broad and sequentially nested areas of interest to sociolo­
gists today. The first three, being introductory with 
respect to the substantive area, seeks to provide a broad 
outline of the field, noting its internal diversity. 
i> The Sociology 
of Language 
The Sociology of Language: Constructing 
the Vantage Point 
{Language as an , 
••Area of General• 
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Cognition: Notes on) 
the Order of Experi-» 
ence in Society i 
rd 
The Methodology 
w of Sociology 
Objectives: 
Focus and 
Plan , 
Some 
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Figure 1.1. 
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academically, theoretically and in application. In the 
second and third areas we will begin to focus on areas of 
direct interest in this dissertation. The second, having 
to do with the actual and potential impacts of the study of 
linguistics upon the study of society, seeks to provide some 
key concepts with which we may pursue the third and final 
area of interest; language and social cognition. 
Area I: Language as an area of general interest 
For understandable reasons few aspects of human con­
duct have engendered as much intrigue as the human capacity 
for language acquisition and use. As Beechhold and Behling 
(1972:76) have noted, "Although linguistics as a science is 
relatively new, man's interest in the nature and origin of 
language date back at least as far as antiquity," Logicians 
and philosophers, of course, have always had an intense 
interest in language and its impact on human reason. Aris­
totle's Metaphysics and Plato's Cratylus attest to the 
longevity of this concern, while the more recent works of 
Rudolf Carnap (1937: 1967), Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (1964), Hans 
Reichenbach (1966), Jaakko Hintikka (1970a:3-27, 1970b:263-
297), and Jack Kaminsky (1966) display the vigor with which 
contemporary logic has proceeded into the detailed study of 
linguistic systems; often engaging in analysis of a defini­
tively sociological"interest (see Searle, 1965:221-239; 
1>+ 
Austin, 1962). Today the study of the various aspects of 
human language systems is progressing at an unprecedented 
rate (largely spurred by practical concerns) and seems to 
be transcending all academic boundaries. Beyond the in­
terests expressed by philosophers and logicians, a great 
deal of research is being pursued by physicists, biolo­
gists, psychologists, anthropologists (who have probably 
played a larger role in shaping the nature of contemporary 
linguistics than any other group) and engineers. 
The need for sociolinguistic research On the ap­
plied side of linguistics the need for a comprehensive 
theory of human language is expressed by groups equally as 
diverse as those who study language. Most importantly, 
however, almost all these needs reflect the necessity of a 
sociolinguistic approach. The concern for the improvement 
of reading and speaklzsg skills, as well as the concern for 
the development of more capable and rationally creative 
individuals, has led educators in modern societies, such as 
Postman and Weingarten (1966; 1969), Beechhold and Behling 
(1972) and others, to a strong conviction concerning the 
central position of linguistic teaching in modern education. 
In the less developed countries of the world, educa­
tors and politicians alike are facing problems in language 
planning with almost a total absence of usable knowledge of 
the mechanisms of language (see Pishman, 1968:3-16). Most 
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of these countries, particularly in Africa and Asia, con­
front the problem of modernizing linguistically (and, cul­
turally) heterogeneous populations. This is their legacy, 
as Jyotirindra Das Gupta (1968:17-25) and John H. Kautsky 
(1973:113-118) have pointed out, from a previous experi­
ence under colonialism. 
The long drawn succession of developmental 
sequences, which brought different social problems 
to prominence at different times in European his­
tory, is largely absent in Asia and Africa. In 
these areas the challenge of modernization re­
quires the telescoping of several stages of de­
velopment into one single stage. In addition, 
few countries belonging to these areas had es­
caped the imposition of artificial colonial 
boundaries whereby diverse cultures, languages, 
religions, and social forms were lumped to­
gether under colonially convenient administra­
tions . 
(Die logic of colonial convenience was ob­
viously unconnected with the logic of cultural. 
linguistic, or social congruence of the arti­
ficially juxtaposed groups. And yet many of 
these new nations are continuations of these 
artificially administered units (Das Gupta, 
1968:18). 
Faced with the problem of such linguistically and 
culturally diverse population elements, politicians and 
planners are confronting the two-fold task of creating both 
"nationism" (or the creation of conditions which lead to 
simple national viability; ecological, economic, social and 
political) and "nationalism" (as a feeling of national 
identity); with nationalism basically being viewed as the 
means toward nationism (Fishman, 1968:3-16, 39-51» Das Gupta 
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1968:17-26; Rustow, 1968:87-106). Towards this end na­
tional language policies and plans have been developed which 
have generally encouraged three processes in language plan­
ning (Ferguson, 1968:27-35): 
1. Linguistic Standardization or the selection 
and reinforcement of a particular language (or 
dialect) as the national language and as a 
symbol of national unity, 
2. Linguistic Grachlzation. or the creation of 
written linguistic forms, generally phonetic 
alphabets, which may then be used to produce 
a "literate" populace,^  and 
3. Linguistic Modernization. or the creation of 
specialized subvocabularies and standardiza­
tion of forms of discourse (such as mail 
correspondence). 
These three•processes interact to support and reify 
each other; theoretically that is (cf., Sapir, 19^ 9:1^ 7-170). 
Beyond the rather protot-ypic nature of these endeavors, and 
the lack of usable knowledge concerning these processes 
(Neustupny, 1968:285-29^ ), it is generally the case that the 
educational institution becomes the major device for imple­
menting language policy in less developed countries. This 
presents problems for the education planners involved, which 
far exceed those experienced by educators in modern soci­
eties. A broad range of questions must be asked before the 
In this regard it is interesting to note that develop­
ing nations face not only the problem of producing literacy, 
but also of choosing the language in which literacy is to be 
pursued. 
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efficacy of such programs can be fully evaluated; such as 
the relation language to culture and ecological adaptivity; 
such as the impact of populaces on the flow of information, 
and subsequently on the diffusion of modernizing concepts; 
and, finally, of the impact of graphization itself upon the 
basic mechanisms of cultural continuity (Goody and Watt, 
1973:311-357). Language is instrumentally linked to cul­
ture, and culture to adaptive capacity. Culture is an 
ecological device (Wilkinson, 1973j Cohen, 1968:^ 0-60) 
deeply rooted in human institutions and collective patterns. 
The question is whether such language planning can be pur­
sued without creating more institutional trauma and popu­
lace peripherization than is already occurring. All of 
these point to the need for. a stronger development in the 
area of the sociology of language. Unfortunately, however, 
the development needs of less developed countries are im­
mediate and we must face the truth of Durkheim's (1965-^ 79) 
statement that 
Science is fragmentary and incomplete; it 
advances slowly and is never finished; but life 
cannot wait. The theories which are destined to 
make men live and act are therefore obliged to 
pass science and complete it prematurely. They 
are possible only when the practical exigencies 
and the vital necessities which we feel without 
distinctly conceiving them push in advance, be­
yond that vriiich science permits us to affirm 
(Durkheim, 196^ :4-79). 
Other areas of possible application of knowledge of 
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sociolinguistic origins are in the areas of: translation, 
the creation of writing systems (graphization), the design 
of "himanized" architectural facilities, etc. Anyone 
doubting the breadth of interest or application of lin­
guistic theory and research should consult Colin Cherry's 
(1970) integrative work, On Human Communication: A Review, 
â Survey and a Criticism. I will of course, be specifying 
another area of application very shortly. 
Theoretical directions in SOL As Dell Hymes (19?^ ) 
pointed out in his tezt, Foundations in Sociolinguistics: 
An Ethnosra-phic ADproach. the development of modern SOL has 
been that of an interdisciplinary hybrid, essentially arising 
out of reactions to the various myopias produced by aca­
demic specialization; myopias which become critical at points 
of application. The result of this form of theoretical de­
velopment is a very loose and diverse conceptual system with 
little theoretical integration. Such conceptualization and 
integration is the next step. Several rather traditional 
distinctions in the field can be noted here which may be 
fruitful later. 
The first of these distinctions is merely a considera­
tion of the role of time, or process, in language study. It 
is traditional, following Hertzler (1965:12-13) and de 
Saussure (1966:79-81) to distinguish between those studies 
which are "static" in perspective and those which are dynamic 
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or "historical". Presumably a static perspective is one 
•which looks at language phenomena at one point in time, 
along the "axis of simultaneities", or as involving "the 
relation of coexisting things" (Hertzler, 196^ :12). A 
historical perspective, on the other hand, would take into 
account a succession of linguistic forms along the "axis of 
succession" (Hertzler, 196^ :12). More realistically, how­
ever, we may find two types of perspectives which do ap­
proach language statically. First, there are those studies 
which in fact, examine a language at one point of time. 
Secondly, there are those studies which seek those attri­
butes of languages in vdaich time is presumably not a fac­
tor; these often termed the "universais of language" (Green-
berg, 1968). The classic works in linguistics and logic may 
be seen to fall into this category (see Karninsky, 1969:3-16J-
The approach taken, however, is to a large extent determined 
by which aspect of language one is studying. For instance, 
studies in phonetics and lexicography are somewhat bound to 
historical perspectives; often searching for that Edward 
Sapir (19^ 9:1^ 7-170) has termed linguistic "drift". Studies 
in grammar and syntax (of which logic would be a special con­
cern), by comparison, are more prone to studying their phe­
nomena as relatively static and resistent to change 
(Hertzler, 1965:1^ 0-176). 
Another distinction which has been made in linguistics 
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is between those perspectives which concentrate on the 
"internal" aspects of linguistic phenomena, and those which 
deal with them "externally". Internal linguistics, static . 
or historical, is concerned with the internal structure of 
language only; the major concern being syntactic or the re­
lations and patterns that hold between the basic components 
of the language system. On the side of externalistic lin­
guistics we have those studies which consider the relation 
of the language to factors outside the language system. For 
matters of convenience we may further distinguish between 
those externalistic approaches to language which deal with 
traditional semantics, or the classical question of meaning, 
and those which deal with the relation of language to a 
broader "extralinguistic" environment. 
In this last category we may further identify those 
approaches lAiich are of an "ecological" perspective (largely 
examining the relation of language, and its components, to 
a larger physical setting ir -viiich it is found) and those 
which are of a "pragmatic" perspective; those lAich take the 
language users into account. At the intersection of the 
ecological and pragmatic perspectives lies the foundation of 
sociological and anthropological interests in language. Here 
we find the key studies in communication networks, and the 
study of regional and situational distribution of linguistic 
varieties (the former being geographical linguistics). Also, 
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at this point we find the intriguing studies into the area 
of diglossia in multilingual speech community (Fishman, 
1972:91-106; Valdman, 1968:313-326). 
More importantly, however, it is at this critical in­
tersection, with a critical emphasis upon the pragmatic con­
text of language, that we meet the most theoretically 
salient distinction in SOL; that between speech, as a human 
activity embedded in a site and situation (Nystuen, 1968:40), 
and language as an independent system transcending particu­
lar speech acts and embeddings. This critical distinction 
was most prominently made in the works of the French scholar 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-191^ ); particularly in his clas­
sic text, Course in General Linguistics (1966). Drawing much 
inspiration for his theoretical program from the work of 
Emile Durkheim (see Douglas, 1973:11), de Saussure went on 
to make the tri par ate distinction between langage as the term 
covering all aspects of human linguistic communicative ac­
tivity; langue as the system of symbols used in communica­
tion (the medium) «"nd existing independent of the voliti-
tion of the individual speakers; and parole as the individual 
act employing the langue for communicative purposes. I will 
discuss these concepts in greater detail in later sections. 
As Hertzler (1965:11) has noted, these terms have, in the 
process of their translation into English, been merged into 
the two: language and speech. Although, as both Douglas 
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(1973-11) and Byrnes (197^ :6) have noted, most linguistic 
scholars have long since deviated from the Durkheimian in­
tent of de Saussure»s theoretical program (the development 
of a comprehensive semiological theory), there is no doubt 
of the impact of this distinction in modern linguistics. 
For instance, it finds a fundamental reflection in Noam 
Chomsky's distinction between linguistic "competence" and 
linguistic "performance" (Ch<%zisky, 196?:^ ). For the most 
part we may also note that this is a key distinction in the 
works of modern students of SOL; the concern being, not 
primarily for language communities, but for speech com­
munities (%mies, 197^ ). 
In this section I have attempted to introduce some key 
"sensitizing" concepts upon which future studf^ nts of SOL 
will build, and also to specify the general directions from 
\âiich the sociology of language has come. Indeed, one may 
already spot some salient trends in modern linguistics which 
shows the impact of sociological considerations. The first 
is the increasing tendency to note the impossibility of 
studying human language systems from a solely internalistic 
perspective (Oiler, 1971:18-23). The second trend is towards 
a marriage of the three components of the externalistic per­
spective defined earlier. This is well illustrated in the 
following example from Hymes (1974). 
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Scane divorce linguistic form from context 
and function. An old but apt illustration is 
found in Bloomfield's often cited remark that, 
if a beggar says "I'm hungry" to obtain food, 
and a child says "I'm hungry" to avoid going to 
bed. then linguistics is concerned just with 
what is the same in the two acts. It abstracts, 
in other words, from context. In contrast, an 
influential book has characterized pragmatics in 
a way exactly complementary as "all those as­
pects which serve to distinguish one communica­
tion event from any other where the sign types 
may be the same" (Cherry, 1961:225). It ab­
stracts. in other words, from linguistic form 
CHymes, 197^ :5^ ). 
At further points in this dissertation, we shall pursue 
another area of integration necessary for the comprehension 
of the function of language and speech: namely that every 
act of speech has two systematically interrelated components 
to its semantic environment; a linguistic environment find­
ing only an implicit realization in the speech act, and an 
extralinguistic (traditional semantic, ecological and prag­
matic) environment. both of which are essential to its 
interpretation. 
SOL is a distinctly interdisciplinary endeavor at this 
time, and this serves to enhance its already intriguing na­
ture. However, in terms of the practical and theoretical 
challenges which are manifesting themselves in this arena, 
it is clear that a greater amount of conceptual and theo­
retical -development is going to have to be produced. Soci­
ologists must increasingly bring their theoretical expertise 
(particularly at the "macro" level) to this substantive area. 
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Area II: Linguistics and sociology: Some conceptual 
interfaces 
Some fifty years ago Marcel Mauss, a nephew and intel­
lectual colleague of Emile Durkheim,^  wrote: "Sociology 
would certainly have progressed much further if it had 
everywhere followed %ie lead of the linguist..." (Mauss as 
quoted in Levi-Strauss, 1963:31-32). In a similar vein 
the social anthropologist, Claude Levi-Strauss noted: 
Linguistics occupies a special place among 
the social sciences, to whose ranks it unques­
tionably "belongs. It is not merely a social 
science like the others, but rather, the one in 
v^ ch by far the greatest progress had been 
made. It is probably the only one which can 
truly claim to be a science and which has 
achieved both the formulation of an empirical 
method and an understanding of the nature of the 
data submitted to its analysis. The linguist 
will often find scientists from related but 
different disciplines drawing inspiration from 
his example and trying to follow his lead 
(Levi-Strauss, 1963:31)* 
Both these quotes are very suggestive; yet they leave the 
issue open as to how sociology might benefit from linguistic 
works. In this section we will briefly explore some con­
ceptual interfaces that are apparent in the two disciplines. 
This will be accomplished by first examining two social 
scientists who have adopted strategies from linguistics, 
Although Durkheim and. Mauss. wrote ..various articles 
together, perhaps their most classic joint endeavor is 
incorporated, in Primitive Classification (1972), a work 
originally published in 1903. 
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and then attempt to draw some conclusions of our own. 
Simultaneously, we will introduce some concepts which 
will be useful throughout the rest of this manuscript. 
One reason for examining scholars who have "been in­
fluenced by linguistic theory is simply that linguistic 
theory is not a homogeneous entity. Theoretical develop­
ment in linguistics has been marked by "prominent schools" 
at different stages of its evolution and the choice of 
school will certainly have an impact on the interface to 
be exploited. In order to facilitate the explication of 
this point, we shall briefly examine the works of the 
anthropologist Levi-Strauss and compare them to the works 
of the sociologist Aaron V. Cicourel. In choosing these 
two scholars, I have, of course, omitted many other works 
which might also have served. Examples are; the monu­
mental work of Kenneth Pike's (1967) text, Language in 
Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human 
Behavior ; the work of Philip Bock (1968:212-222; 1969), and 
others (for instance, see Alf Ross', Directives and Norms. 
1968). The two works chosen, however, are strategic in 
their differences, and the clarity with which their dif­
ferences may be portrayed. 
Levi-Strauss and structural linguistics In his 
text. Structural Anthropology (1963), the text from which 
the proceeding quotations were extracted, Levi-Strauss 
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begins the development of an anthropological perspective 
based on linguistic theory; structural linguistics to be 
exact, in the tradition of N. Troubetzkoy (see Levi-Strauss, 
1963:33); Leonard Bloomfield (1933) and the methodical 
Zellig Harris (1951)» A critical aspect of the structural­
ist doctrine (linguistic that is) was the elimination of 
meaning as a central facet of linguistic analysis. In­
stead, the emphasis was placed upon strict sentential anal­
ysis characterized by "Immediate Constituent" analysis (a 
mode of analysis running parallel to the search for 
"quarks" in modern atomic physics) and bracketing or tree 
diagram approaches to sentence structure. In essence this 
meant the assignment of "structural descriptions" to ob­
served sentence forms. Sentences were broken down into 
their "immediate constituents", i.e.. 
Sentence 
Noun phrase 
De-cerminan-G aoun Auxaxiary 
: ! I 
I ! Tense Verb 
vero pnrase 
Determinant Noun 
' I • & » ; 
The patrolman PAST arrested the boy 
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Reading such diagrams downward, sentences were broken down 
into noun phrases and. predicate phrases; noun phrases were 
broken down into nouns, adjectives determiners, etc. At a 
lower level the "word" lost its place as the atom of lan­
guage. In the structuralist program words which could be 
divided were broken down into smaller components termed 
"morphemes". Such morphemes could be further analyzed into 
"free" morphemes, "bound" morphemes. Similar tactics were 
applied at the level of phonation. The "sounds" of a lan­
guage were analyzed into minimal units termed phonemes. 
Noting that certain characteristics of phonemes were modified 
by their placement in a phonemic chain, each phoneme was 
accorded certain allophemes and so on, seemingly ad 
infinitum (see Denes and Pinson, 1973). 
"Ascending" reading of such diagrams, however, gave 
the analyst a quite different interpretation, a sense of 
repetition and structure in the face of sentential diversity 
and thus lent themselves well to the analysis of the struc­
tures of languages from which the latter were gathered. (It 
should be noted here that the above illustration is repre­
sentative of English sentence structure.) Thus, balancing 
the componential aspect of the structuralist approach was 
the concern for "systemsness" and simplicity at higher levels 
of analysis. 
The structuralist doctrine found a definitive and 
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knowledgeable reflection in the anthropological formulation 
set forth by Levi-Strauss. Consider the following statement 
relative to one strategic aspect of social organization. 
In the study of kinship problems (and. no 
doubt, the study of other problems as well), 
the anthropologist finds himself in a situation 
vdiich formally resembles that of the structural 
linguist. Like phonemes, kinship terms are ele­
ments of meaning; like phonemes, they acquire 
meaning only if they are integrated into systems. 
"Kinship systems", like "phonemic systems", are 
built by the mind on the level of unconscious 
thought. Finally, the recurrence of kinship 
patterns, marriage rules, similar prescribed at­
titudes between certain types of relatives, and 
so forth, in scattered regions of the globe and 
in fundamentally different societies, leads us 
to believe that, in the case of kinship as well 
as linguistics, the observable phenomena result 
from the action of laws which are general but 
implicit. The problem can therefore be re­
formulated as follows : Although they belong 
to another order of reality, kinship phenomena 
are of the same type as linguistic phenomena 
( L e v i - B t r a u s s  ^  1 9 ^ 3 )  = 
Thus, in the Levi-Strauss anthropological formulation,^  
the structuralist doctrine found its reflection in the 
search for social constituents, structural description, and 
most importantly, a reconsideration of the role of the un­
conscious manifestations of culture as contained in the 
organization of basic social institutions. 
It should be noted that the impact of structuralist 
linguistics upon anthropological writings was felt prior to 
the Levi-Strauss formulation. Indeed, more "pure type" ex­
amples of adoption from the structuralist doctrine can be 
found in Kingsley Davis and W. Lloj^  Warner (1937:291-313) 
and Ward H. Goodenough (1956:195-216). 
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Cicourel and cartesian linguistics Structural lin­
guistics, after a long reign as the prominent school in lin­
guistics, was to eventually be displaced by a new school, 
the groundwork of which was laid by a former Bloomfieldian, 
Noam Chomsky. 
. . . Chomskyian linguistics rejects both the 
anti-mentalistic dogma of the structuralists and 
their insistence on rigorous, "objective" dis­
covery procedures. Consideration of meaning are 
brought into linguistic proper, and conclusions 
about language operations may be arrived at by 
any means (including intuition and guesswork), 
their soundness determined not by the type of 
discovery procedures used, but by whether they 
"work". Language now will be studied as process 
rather than state (Beechhold and Behling, 1972: 
91). 
Perhaps the most important aspect of Chomskyian theory 
(which Hymes, 197^ :121, notes as being a first step towards 
a sociolinguistic approach) is the two-fold emphasis upon 
pragmatics (i.e., constructed into Chomsky's theory is the 
notion of a speaker/hearer complex, both with certain com­
petence attributes) and semantics, as is reflected in the 
deep structure/surface structure aspect of this "trans-
formalist" perspective. 
The phonological component of a grammar de­
termines the phonetic form of a sentence gen­
erated by the syntactic rules. That is, it re­
lates a structure generated by the syntactic 
component to a phonetically represented signal. 
The semantic component determines the semantic 
interpretation of a sentence. That is, it re­
lates a structure generated by the syntactic 
component to a certain semantic representation. 
Both the phonological and semantic components 
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are purely interpretive. .Each utilizes infor­
mation provided by the syntactic component con­
cerning formative s, their inherent properties, 
and their interrelations in a given sentence. 
Consequently, the syntactic component of a 
grammar must specify, for each sentence, a deep 
structure that determines its semantic interpre­
tation and a surface structure that determines 
its phonetic interpretation. The first of these 
is interpreted by the semantic component; the 
second by the phonological component (Chomsky, 
1965:16). 
Further, with respect to the structuralist school of 
linguistics, Chomsky (196)^ 16-17) has made the following 
comments. 
It might be supposed that surface structure 
and deep structure will always be identical. In 
fact, one might briefly characterize the syn­
tactic theories that have arisen in modern 
structural (taxonomic) linguistics as based on 
the assumption that deep and surface structures 
are actually the same (of., Postal, 1964a; 
Chomsky, 1964). 
The central Idea of transformational grammar 
is that they are, in general, distinct and that 
the surface structure is determined by repeated 
application of certain formal operations called 
"grammatical transformations" to objects of a 
more elementary sort. If this is true (as I 
assume, henceforth), then the syntactic com­
ponent must generate deep and surface structures 
for each sentence and must interrelate them. 
This idea has been clarified substantially in 
recent work, in ways that will be described 
later .... For the moment, it is sufficient 
to observe that although immediate constituent 
analysis (labeled bracketing) of an actual 
string of format!ves may be adequate as an ac­
count of surface structure, it is certainly not 
adequate as an account of deep structure 
(Chomsky, 1965:16-17). 
Reflecting these Chomskyian tez^ encles in modern 
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"Cartesian" linguistics (Chomsky, 1966)^  in modern sociol­
ogy is the work of Aaron V. Cicourel. In his recent text, 
Cognitive Sociology: Language and Meaning in Social Inter­
action. Cicourel outlines a theory of social interaction 
which has basic theoretical parallels relative to Chomsky's 
transformationalist grammar. Of particular importance is 
Cicourel's distinction, paralleling the distinction be­
tween deep and surface structure, between interpretative 
rules (deep structure rules) and normative rules (surface 
structure rules) for role enactment in the context of given 
situations. 
The actor must be endowed with mechanisms 
or basic procedures that permit him to identify 
settings lAiich would lead to 'appropriate' in­
vocation of norms, where the norms would be sur­
face rules and nox; basic to how the actor makes 
inferences about taking or making roles. Ttie 
basic or interpretive procedures are like deep 
structure grammatical rules; they enable the 
actor to generate appropriate (usually innovative) 
responses in changing situated settings (Cicourel, 
1973:26). 
The distinction between interpretive pro­
cedures and norms is tied to the difference be­
tween consensus or shared agreement and a sense 
"The leading view of the nature of linguistic compe­
tence and creativity has been dubbed 'Cartesian linguistics' 
(Chomsky. 1966), not as an historically exact label, but in 
recognition of a direction given to theory of language in 
the period following Descartes by an emphasis on the native 
of the mind as prior to experience and an analytic, uni­
versalizing, reconstituting methodology" (Symes, 1974^ 120). 
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of social structure. Interpretive procedures 
provide the actor with a developmentally changing 
sense of social structure that enables him to 
assign meaning or relevance to an environment of 
objects. Normative or surface rules enable the 
actor to link his view of the world to that of 
others in .concerted social,action, and.to presume 
that consensus or shared agreement governs inter­
action. The shared agreement would include con­
sensus about the existence of conflict or dif­
ference in normative rules (Cicourel, 197^ s30). 
In addition, corresponding to Chomsky's notion of lin­
guistic competence, Cicourel has introduced the ramified 
notion of interactional competence. 
In stressing what Katz calls the epistemol-
ogy of linguistic descriptions and a theory of 
language, rather that performance (viewed as 
falling within psychology), Chomsky (1965:10) 
relies heavily upon * acceptable utterances', or 
what I will call a 'normal form' of everyday 
usage, or 'utterances that are perfectly natural 
and immediately comprehensible without paper and 
pencil analysis, and in no way bizarre or out­
landish.' zne sociologist, however, must be 
interested in competence and performance that 
is essential for understanding everyday activ­
ities. Imputaticais of competence by members 
to each other and the recognition of this 
competence are integral elements of projected 
and 'successful' social action. Normal form 
social behavior is comparable to the notion of 
'acceptable utterances' (Cicourel, 197^ :44). 
Other notions in Cicourel's cognitive sociology, parallel­
ing those of the transformationalist (Cartesian) linguist, 
are the rather undeveloped concern for transformational 
rules (a component of syntax in Chomsky's theory) which 
would relate the interpretive structure (the deep structure) 
to the normative structure (the surface structure), and a 
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general concern for the "generative" or dynamic "construc­
tive" aspects of ongoing social interaction (cf. Goffman, 
1959). 
(inmmAntp and conclusions concerning conceptual inter­
faces We have now briefly touched upon the works of 
two scholars who are similarly convinced of the value of 
the ramification of linguistic type theories into areas of 
sociological concern. What is of most interest at this 
point is the impact of the chosen linguistic theory for 
the developing social science extension. To better high­
light these consequences a brief contrast among the pre­
viously studied "adopters" might be of value. 
As an initial point of comparison we might first look 
at ;Aat each author has chosen as the subject of his in­
vestigation. Levi-Strauss has concerned himself with in­
stitutions (in this case the relational patterns evolving 
around problems of kinship) within societies, while Cicoure 
has dealt with actors and actions within situational con­
texts. While this can be partially viewed as a "surface" 
distinction, it is not entirely unconnected with other 
"deeper" points of contrast. A particularly salient point 
of contrast, here, is the role of the "conscious" in the 
various aspects of social structure (for both levi-Strauss 
and Cicourel are concerned with the structural aspects of 
their respective subject matters). 
3^  
On the one hand, Levi-Strauss encourages the reader 
to suppress the importance of consciousness in social 
structure, and there are many excellent precedents in the 
linguistic analog ^ diich would lead him in this direction. 
Most of us continually engage in the use of our language 
without the slightest conception of the multitude of pho­
netic and syntactic "rules" we unconsciously observe 
(Bock, 1969:23-46). As psychologist Charles E. Osgood 
(1968:190) has noted, "It would be safe to say that the 
lay user of a language is almost never aware of its gram­
matical structure, could not possibly describe its laws, 
and yet follows than faithfully." As a somewhat meta-
I&orical extension into the Levi-Strauss schema, insti­
tutional structure is viewed as a phenomena lAich can best 
be described independent of individual will and volition."^  
Bach society is perceived as generating a particular in­
stitutional structure from among those wiiich are analytically 
«». a:: ii «ronrsmiu'iiutf» f»r l.hl:; hi Vf: 'i 
comparative, inlersociety, approach is adopted as meth­
odologically appropriate. 
It is interesting to note, in this regard, that Levi-
Strauss (1963:281-283) was fond of discussing the concept of 
a "collective unconscious" as distinct from the Durkheimian 
concern for the "collective conscious" (particularly in 
Durkheim's earlier writings). 
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In the approach of Cicourel, on the other hand, the 
actor (as this very term connotes) is a "wide-awake, 
grown-up man" (Schutz, 1973:206), planning and construct­
ing acts in "interpreted" contexts. The actor is viewed 
as generating surface level activity from a deep level, 
"interpretive" base. Here again there are compelling 
linguistic precedents for adopting this approach. For 
while a good portion of speech, at the level of phonation 
and syntax, is at a low level of consciousness, another 
portion, at the level of semantics and pragmatics, does 
indeed rely upon the constructive and volitional aspects 
of individual existence. In this perspective Levi-Strauss 
would be said to be concerned with surface level manifesta­
tions of structure only. Finally, we may note that the 
method employed by Cicourel is that of the verstehen ap- . 
proach; or the method of sympathetic understanding (Schutz, 
1973:48-66). 
Now, employing our conceptual interface to the fullest, 
we may contrast these two approaches in the following way. 
For Levi-Strauss the social analog of the sentence (the 
object of analysis for both structural and Cartesian lin­
guistics) is the institution and its author is society. 
This is quite in line with the methods of structural lin­
guistics where every "well-formed" sentence is essentially 
viewed as being authored by the language in which it is 
36 
couched. Here the sentence is thoroughly abstracted from 
its pragmatic setting. For Cicourel, on the other hand, 
the sentence is action and its author is the actor; choosing 
and constructing within an interpreted setting. 
Now, the results of this contrast can be viewed in 
many ways. First, however, let us return to the question 
of the impact of chosen linguistic perspective upon the 
developed sociological extension. It should be obvious 
that the choice from among the structuralist or Cartesian 
perspective does generate points of divergence in their 
ramified form. Given that a plethora of linguistic theories 
are currently being generated by a number of competent 
scholars, each with its own strengths and weaknesses, the 
choice of the theoretical analog becomes someiAat prob­
lematic. 
This naturally leads us to consider the following 
point. Is sociological theory to be viewed as a mere ex­
tension of linguistic theory, or is linguistic theory a 
special case of a more general sociological concern? I 
believe the latter to be the case. 
A linguistic code is a normative structure 
parallel to t^ t composed of societal values and 
norms—indeed, it is properly considered as a 
special case of the norm if one allows for its 
cultural as distinct from a social, focus 
(Parsons, 1969:23). 
There is much to be learned from linguistic theorists, 
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however, in terms of; the rigor of their analysis; the 
success with which they have formalized their perspectives 
(for instance, see Chomsky, 1965j Hopcroft and Ullman, 1969); 
the extent to which they have successfully employed com­
puter technology; and most critically, the manner in which 
they have come to formulate the nature of their core 
phenomena; the speech act. 
This brings us to a more substantial problem; one re­
flected in the strength of divergence of the two approaches 
contrasted earlier. This problem is in the relation be­
tween society and the individuals who (in living, repro­
ducing, transmitting, and dying) compose that society. For 
approaches like that of Levi-Strauss, there is little room 
for the individual as an acting, volitional being. The in­
dividual and his activity are essentially crushed out of 
existence by something called society. In Cicourel's ap­
proach, on the other hand, one has to fight one's way.out 
of situational contexts, or make rather giant "leaps of 
faith" to find society. To a large extent, society is 
only a twinkle in the actor's eye.^  The disconcerting 
T^his perspective, that of society having only noumenal 
essence in an "ego-relative" or "ego-centered" world, is a 
particularly pervasive perspective in sociology; especially 
since Weber's work (see, in particular, Weber. 1964:102-103). 
Its presence has almost uniformly been connected with dif­
ficulties in bridging the gap between the actions of in­
dividuals comprising the societal population and the society 
itself. This "strain" is particularly noticeable in the 
rather "partial" continuity existing in the transition from 
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question, then (a traditionally troublesome one) is whether 
or not the individual and societal "twains" will ever meet? 
It is at this point, I believe, that a careful study of 
linguistic formulations may one day provide a suggestive 
new starting point for the study of society. Unfortunately 
that day may be some time away. It does seem, however, that 
there are some "concrete" places in linguistic analysis 
where sociologists may begin their search. 
It seems that an appropriate place to begin is the act 
of speech itself; the use of language. The act of speech 
is, to use a Durkheimian phrase, a "social fact" par 
excellence; perhaps the clearest example of the abstract 
Parson's symbolic interactionist phase to his more "macro" 
AGIL perspective Csss, for ssampls, Scott, 1963:716-735; 
Dubin, 1960:^ 5^ -466; Parsons, 1960:467-48j). It is also 
rather well embodied in the formalization of the "macro vs 
micro" distinction itself, which seems to stand more as a 
tribute to the analytical problem than to any social real­
ity (witness the various "fallacies" generated under this 
distinction). It seems that the ego-relative schema is a 
necessary one for sociology but it needs to be balanced by 
a more realistic assessment of the "sui generis" realities 
of society itsslf, Perhaps the only author in wiiich aoy 
attempt to balance these perspectives is in the work of 
Alfred Schutz (1973). Unfortunately, his work remains 
highly incomplete aâi very few of his "followers" have 
pursued his "transindividual" perspectives of society (see, 
in particular, Schutz, 1973:10-19). 
"^A social fact is every way of acting, fixed or not, 
capable of exercising on the individual an external con­
straint; or again, every way of acting which is general 
throughout a given society, -viiile at the same time existing 
in its own right independent of its individual manifesta­
tions" (Durkheim, 1966:13). 
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interface which bonds the human organism to the society of 
•which it is a part. The act of speech is, at each point, 
an act of construction; the basic data which contemy/orary 
"Cartesian" scholars such as Erving Goffman (1959) and 
Aaron Cicourel (197^ ) use to illustrate the dynamic, on­
going, volitional and problematic aspects of social inter­
action. 
Yet. simultaneously, the act of speech displays the 
nature of the constraints that societies place upon their 
members. One may say, with the security of a mathematician, 
that the more we speak, the greater the constraint. For 
example, in the simple act of phonation any language 
"recognizes" (or "authors" in the structuralist perspective) 
only a small segment of those sounds, or phonemes, of which 
a human organism is biologically capable of making. Fur­
ther, given that a language recognizes a basic set of 
phonemes, then, at the level of syllabification, any human 
language recognizes only a small segment of all com-
binatorially possible syllables which might have been con­
structed from the "given" phonemic basis. By the time we 
have reached the level of the simple spoken sentence, the 
constraints imposed by one's natural language are of 
staggering proportions (see Oiler, 1971:38-19). 
These constraints, as primarily syntactic and phonetic, 
operate at the more or less unconscious level of social 
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behavior. When we move into the "conscious" area of 
semantics and pragmatics (i.e., the speech act, as dis-
tinct from the act of speech ) we find constraint heaped 
upon constraint. Hot all messages carry the same meaning 
and the same message will not carry the same meaning to 
all audiences. One may sit in wonder, as Chomsky (1965; 
1966; 1972) has done, at the "generative" aspects of lan­
guage use; yet the socio-intellectual dual of Chomsky's 
"Cartesian amazement" should be the awesome awareness of 
the social constraint that the simple act of speech por­
trays. It is at this point that we meet one of the most 
puzzling conditions of human existence in society; at the 
intersection of volition and constraint. Here we can become 
aware that an individual in society cannot even verbally 
proclaim his individuality from that society witaiout first 
proclaiming (perhaps only subconsciously) his dependence on 
the key instrument of social solidarity, i.e., language. 
Language is, to a large extent, the society in the indi-
vidual. And like society, language (and its use) is both 
T^his distinction will be made more forcefully at a 
later point. For now let us suffice to note that the act 
of speech is one of articulation, whereas the speech act is 
one of communication. 
Relative to this point Erich Kahler (1968:1^ ) has 
noted that . .we cannot sharply separate one level from 
another, we cannot confine ourselves to considering one 
level strictly apart from its subjacent and overlying ones. 
We do not live as individuals in society or ^  a nation as 
the source of, and limits to, individual freedom. 
Moreover, the concept of language itself epitomizes 
the notion of a social fact to an even greater extent. 
Language, it is obvious, is a way of speaking. Language, 
as opposed to the individual acts of speech which are com­
posed in it, is the protot-ypic social institution as 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1966:10) and Joyce 0. Hertzler 
(1965:69-99) have cogently pointed out. Through an aware­
ness of this basic isomorphy between language and other 
social institutions, sociology may one day be able to move 
from its contemporary emphasis on social statics to a more 
definitive statement of social dynamics. 
But this recognition, of the speech act as a social 
fact (and a social act) par excellence, along with an aware­
ness of the prototypic nature of language as a social in­
stitution,^  only brings us back to the original question 
within an overarching, delimitable space. We are this so­
ciety, this nation to a large degree; we form part of it, 
and it forms part of us, down indeed to our physical being. 
We are, all of us, any entity or being is, existing on dif­
ferent levels at "Che same time. Existence is a multilevel 
affair." 
E^ere I concur with Bock (1969-vii) \riio notes that 
"there are valid and important analogies between the struc­
ture of language and that of the rest of human culture-
analogies which follow from the fact that language is one 
of several cultural subsystems, all of which share the same 
fundamental characteristics. My attitude is not that lin­
guistics will solve all problems. But I do believe that a 
careful examination of the relationship between language and 
culture will point the way to a conceptual framework capable 
of embracing all forms of customary human behavior." 
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of Tdàiether the gap between the individual and society can 
ever he more adequately bridged. Understanding the act of 
speech in its institutional setting would provide only 
partial insights into the problem. Here is the point where 
SOL, with its conjoint concern for the ecological and 
pragmatic factors constraining linguistic phenomena, can 
make its contribution. 
In concluding this section several remarks are in or­
der. In the final pages of this section I introduced the 
reader to two perspectives in linguistics; structural lin­
guistics and Cartesian linguistics. I have attempted to 
show the truths that each of these contain and noted that 
they appear to be reflected in society. In the next sec­
tion a third perspective will be introduced which Dell 
Hymes (1974:120) has termed "Herderian linguistics." This 
perspective, he has noted, is best understood "not as a 
historically exact label, but in recognition of a direction 
given to theory of language in the period following Herder 
(1744-1801) by an emphasis on language as constituting 
cultural identity . , that is, as an expression of the 
essential (and trans-individual) constitution of the com­
munity of that language's use. Some notable scholars ap­
proaching the study of language in the Herderian tradition 
are Wilhelm von Kumbolt (originally 1836; 1971), Franz Boas 
(1911)5 Benjamin Lee Whorf (1970), Edward Sapir (originally 
3^ 
1921; 1949) and Ernst Cassirer (1953a). A rather prominent 
sociologist also falling into this category is Emile Durk-
heim; particularly in his period at the 6orbonne (see 
Parsons, 1968:311-313). Durkheim's perspectives have come 
to be a particularly pervasive influence upon this dis­
sertation. 
An examination of the Herderian perspective is vital 
in two senses. First, it will allow us to examine the 
third and final area of interest; the impact of language 
upon cognition and experience within the context of society. 
Here I would like to show how the Carte sianism discussed 
in this last section can be "embedded" into the conceptual 
structure of the Herderian perspective to provide a more 
balanced approach to the study of SOL (cf. Hymes, 1974-: 
121-124) and to escape the confines the ego-centered per­
spective as discussed earlier. Hopefully this might sug­
gest some new directions that could be pursued in SQL, 
and within which SOL might contribute to the general theory 
of society. 
Secondly, as was graphically presented in Figure 1.1, 
this section represents the final stage of my "descent" 
into the area of the methodology of sociology, and hope­
fully nests the forthcoming sections in such a manner that 
the reader can feel some conceptual comfort in dealing 
with them. Whether or not I have succeeded in "setting the 
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stage" for the methodological perspectives to be offered 
later will soon be a matter of record. 
Area III; Language, speech and cognition; Notes on the 
order of exiperience in society 
As was just mentioned, it is perhaps the most character­
istic feature of Herderian linguistics that it views the 
individual as being a precipitant of some greater univer­
sal (Hymes, 1974:122); particularly as represented by the 
sociocultural complex in which the individual is a member, 
and of which he is an expression. Society, within the 
Herderian framework, is viewed as constituting a reality, 
sui generis, and the individual is viewed as its extension. 
Language in this perspective (one reflected in modern 
ethnoscienceÎ see Frake^  1962:72-85; Sturtevant. 1964:99-
131), is viewed as a sociocultural index, a record of 
what the society has found to be impwtant, and a de­
terminant force in the experience of that society. In 
short, the language of the group is said to contain an 
expression of that society's world view, or weltanschauimg 
The content, form and uses of the language 
of each commtmity mirror its pl^ sical setting, 
what its members are aware of smd concerned 
aboutJ and idiat their vicissitudes and successes 
with it have been, including especially the level 
of technological development achieved. In fact, 
the language carries the .defi,ni tion. of all sit­
uations; it is the dissecting agent by wiich the 
5^ 
structures, functions, processes, relations 
and factors of the general and particular world 
are laid hare. By means of it, all environments 
are objectified, and all the actions of the 
group or society are carried on (Hertzler, 196$': 
35)* 
By far the most misunderstood and controversial aspect 
of Herderian linguistics is concerned with the manner by 
which this societal Weltanschauung is articulated with 
elements of individual experience and cognition. This 
concern has been formalized into the issues of "linguistic 
determinism" and "linguistic relativity" (see Cole and 
Scribner, 197^ :^ 1). Since sociologists tend to have some 
familiarity with the works of Benjamin Lee Whorf, it is both 
fitting and strategic that we start our investigation of 
this topic with a consideration of his most frequently 
quoted (and distorted) statementc 
We dissect nature along lines laid down by 
our native languages. The categories and types 
that we isolate from the world of phenomena we 
do not find there because they stare every ob­
server in the face: on the contrary, the world 
is presented in a kaleidoscope flux of impres­
sions which has to be organized by our minds— 
and this means largely by the linguistic systems 
in our minds. We cut nature up, organize it into 
concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, 
largely because we are parties to an agreement 
to organize it in this way—an agreement that 
holds throughout our speech community and is 
codified in the patterns of our language. This 
agreement is, of course, an implicit and unstated 
one, BUT ITS TERMS ARE ABSOLUTELY OBLIGATORY: 
we cannot talk at all except by subscribing to 
the organization and classification of data which 
the agreement decrees (Whorf, 1970:213-21^ ). 
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This is a strategic quote for many reasons. Most 
importantly, however, is the fact that, in this perspective, 
the institution of language is not merely a device of soli­
darity which bonds the members of a societal community to­
gether (and is thus a societal prerequisite as Parsons has 
noted, 1966; 1969:6-7). Language does much more than this. 
It bonds the societal community to its fragment of the phys­
ical universe and provides a key ecological tool for so­
cietal adaptation. Indeed, language to a large degree de­
fines the "societal environment"; it operates as an en­
vironmental strategy with roots extending into instrumental 
forms of human activity. 
Yet, how is this bond established? Through vrtiat 
mechanisms's are the "terms" of Whorf's agreement reached? 
Perhaps society constructs, from the substrate foundations 
of human plasticity, the cognitive "template" of which 
psychologists have been so fond (Neisser, 1967:46-52). 
Perhaps I It is apparent that many students of "Whorf have 
adopted this interpretation; that of linguistic determinism 
(for excellent reviews see, Ervin and Miller, 1968:86-93; 
Fishman, 1972:155-170; Cole and Schribner, 197^ :36-60; 
Brooks, 1971:31-60). I believe, however, that there is a 
much simpler, empirically more accessible, and theoretically 
more suggestive nature to the Whorfian agreement; namely 
the fact of the sociologically and physiologically determined 
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necessity of linguistically shared experience within the 
context of human societies, as entities extended in space 
and time. For only a small segment of any individual ' s 
knowledge originates within his personal experience 
(Durkheim, 1965:29-33; Schutz, 1973:13); ttie majority of 
our experience is linguistically vicarious, "brought to us 
through the socially constructed conceptual filter which 
language provides. In a complementary fashion each indi­
vidual in a society constantly finds himself linguistically 
"distributing" aspects of his personal experiences to other 
members of that society. What is important, however, is 
that this ongoing distribution and redistribution of a 
posteriori forms of knowledge occurs in a highly organized 
fashion and within a well-defined system of constraints. 
These shall be discussed shortly. 
Before proceeding, however, the point must be stressed 
that it is not language per se which constructs the world 
for the members of a speech community, but its use. Prop­
erly stated, given two members of such a community, A and 
B, the question is not how language structures the ex­
periences of A and B. More properly the question is how A 
uses available linguistic resources to structure B«s ex­
perience of the world (and B, A's experience) in the absence 
of ostended availability. Our pragmatic obligation to the 
Whorfian agreement is by no means mysterious then. In the 
course of sharing experiences which are not ostensively 
available to "all parties", we either honor the terms of 
our linguistic contract or fail to meet our obligations. 
Whorf himself made this point clear. The impact of language 
upon human cognition does "not depend so much upon ANY ONE 
SYSTEM (e.g., tense, or nouns) within the grammar", he 
notes, "as upon ways of analyzing and reporting experience 
which have become fixed in the language as integrated 
'fashions of speaking' . . . (Whorf, 1970:158). "We can­
not TAIK at all except by subscribing to the organization 
and classification of data which the agreement decrees" 
(emphasis added; Whorf, 1970:214). 
This brings us to a very strategic point with regard 
to the nature of the interface between the societal 
Weltanshauung and individual experience. This interface 
is mediated by, of all things, individual acts; the seat 
of volition in society. At the heart of the Whorfian agree­
ment lies the very core of Cartesian interest; the speech 
act. or as we shall call it in this informative function, 
the descriptive act. This variant of the speech act (as 
both a social act and a social fact) is viewed as lying at 
the conceptual intersection of Cartesian linguistics (with 
its concern for creative, generative and competence aspects 
of language use), and Herderian linguistics (with its con­
cern for the manner by lAiich the language institution comes 
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to impose the essence of society upon individual behavior 
and knowledge). This key conceptual intersection is por­
trayed in Figure 1.2. 
To give sociological significance to this intersection, 
however, and to help find society in the midst of all these 
acts of volition (see page 38), we need to explore the sys­
tem of constraints which operate upon such acts. To better 
understand the nature of these constraints we might first 
break the setting of the descriptive act down into a number 
of basic components: 
1. The parties to the act, including a speaker and 
a hearer, 
2. An experience to which the speaker only has 
access (i.e., which is differentially distributed 
among the parties) and lAiich was antecedent to 
the act, and 
3. The linguistic resources to be used to "construct-
the description to be shared. These resources 
would include a lexical stock, a syntax according 
to which expressions could be constructed from the 
terms of the lexical stock, etc. 
The descriptive act itself may be further analyzed into two 
component acts and a product; i.e., the act of description 
(as the speaker's role), the act of interpretation (as the 
hearer's role), and the produced description. These notions 
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will be formalized and given detail later in Chapter II. 
For the moment, however, they provide some strategic points 
at which we may begin to study the system of constraints 
within which the descriptive act occurs and the manner in 
which these constraints take us beyond the individual act 
to society. 
The first of these constraint systems operates with 
regard to the structure of the "parties to the act"; or 
from the perspective of the speaker; the problem the dis­
tribution of experience. As members of a broader societal 
complex each of the parties to the descriptive act finds 
himself having a position in a broader causal-functional 
system (Sorokin, 1937:13-18) "ràiich includes the functionally 
differentiated behavior of other members of the societal 
population, correlated aspects of material culture, and 
those aspects of the physical setting within and upon which 
the causal-functional system operates. A key factor in the 
organization of the distribution of a posteriori forms of 
experience, then, is determined by their "functional sig­
nificance" to the causal-functional system, and the avail­
ability of those who are "functionally responsible". 
Related to this first constraint system, and implied 
in the notion of "functional responsibility", are the con­
straints operative upon the access to the experience itself. 
A fact of modern life seems to be differential access to 
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experiences, or at least a differential sensitivity to 
them. Also, fundamentally conditioned by placement within 
the causal-functional system of society, is the particular 
aspect of a given experience which is likely to catch the 
attention of a given member of that system. For instance, 
an auto mechanic, a pedestrian, an automobile owner and a 
highway patrolman are all likely to have interests in the 
automobile» Which aspect of the machine and its operation 
they are sensitive to, however, is strongly mediated by 
their position in the causal-functional complex. 
The third system of constraints operates at a level of 
the linguistic resources available to the act. It is this 
system of constraints which strikingly articulates the 
nature of the societal Weltanschauung and the sui generis 
aspects of society. One aspect of this constraint system 
has already been "briefly discussed (see pages 38^ 1^) and 
may be simplified if we momentarily focus upon the lin­
guistic resources available to the speaker, or the "con­
structor" of the description: Nov "Ôie linguistic resources 
available to the speaker stand in a relation to the act of 
description precisely paralleling the relation between 
language and acts of speech in general. These resources 
exist prior to, and independent of, any particular act of 
speech produced by the speaker. Similarly, as resources 
for the construction of descriptions, they exist prior to 
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and independently of any particular act of description. 
What is more critical, however, is that they must exist 
prior to and independently of the experiences they will be 
used to describe. In this sense, given that we know the 
lexical resources available to a given member of a societal 
population, as well as the syntactical rules by which he 
concatonates these basic formatives into expressions, then 
we might quite easily view this linguistic resource base 
as representing the individual's capacity to "re-present" 
matters which find their original "presentations" within 
his personally isolated experiences. 
This system of constraints itself, working as it does 
with a socially provided resource base, is an intriguing 
social fact and should itself merit the attention of 
sociologists. More intriguing, however, is the fact that 
such linguistic resources (particularly lexical) are them­
selves differentially distributed in society and that this 
differential distribution is itself highly organized about 
the causal-functional system.^  !Ehus, in a like manner, we 
I^n the context of an earlier section discussing the 
role of language planning in less developed countries, the 
process of "linguistic modernization" was discussed (see 
page 17). It should be apparent to the reader that this 
distributional effect is precisely that which the process of 
linguistic modernization aims to produce. It is a critical 
social process. Yet these three distributional effects (the 
differential distribution of experience to individuals, the 
differential distribution of lexical and other linguistic 
may speak of the "differential distribution of the capacity 
for re-presenting matters of experience". Further, we may 
now begin to meaningfully discuss a re-presentational sys­
tem -which, formed from a kind of linguistic mosaic, is 
uniquely a feature of society and of no individual. It is 
this broader capacity that Emile Durkheim referred to as 
the collective representation^  and lAich formed the basis 
for the theory of knowledge which was so distinctively 
Durkheimian. Such "representations convey" Durldieim (1966: 
XliX) notes, "the way in which the group conceives itself 
in its relation to objects which affect it." Further, 
Durkbeim notes that . • it is unquestionable that lan­
guage, and the system of concepts which it translates, is 
the product of a collective elaboration. Tdhat it expresses 
is the manner in wich society as a nôxole represents the 
facts of experience. The ideas which correspond to the 
resources, and the differential distribution of descriptions 
into the societal population) have all been sorely ignored 
by a number of parties who should have been interested; in­
cluding students of the sociology of imowledge and the 
sociology of language. 
The greatest portion of Durkheim* s work on this topic 
may be found in three sources: The Rules of Sociological 
Method (originally 1895; 1966:XIi-IViii), an article en-
. titled "Individual and Collective Representations" (origi­
nally 1898; now included in DurMieim, 197^ ; 1-3^ )» and his 
last major work. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life 
(originally 1912; 1965). The last noted work is by far the 
most sophisticated of Durkheinf s discussion of this basic 
notion and I will rely heavily upon this work for my own 
"neo-Durkheinian" presentation. 
COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATION —a use of 
construction 
Act of Description ——a case of 
sharing and distribution 
1 
Descriptive Act—————a case of 
HJINGUAGE 
construction 
1 
»Act of Speech 
sharing and distribution 
1 
> Speech Act 
Figure 1.3. The collective re-presentation and language: Some basic 
relationships 
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diverse elements of language are thus collective repre­
sentations (Durkheim, 1965:^ 82). The notion of collective 
representation and its theoretical position relative to 
previously encountered notions is displayed in Figure 1.3* 
Returning to an approach more akin to that offered by 
Sorokin, we may note that this differential distribution of 
the capacity for re-presentation (as given in the dif­
ferential distribution of linguistic resources), and the 
individual's containment in it, marks the manner in -which 
the individual participates in another component of the 
societal complex; the loeico-meaningful system (Sorokin, 
1937:18-21).^  If we restrict the Durkheimian notion of 
1 Corresponding to Sorokin's analysis of society into 
its causal functional and logico-meaningful components, was 
A & 1" ^ TL I f j y» '  * *" ' W" w w •— — 
society (Durkheim, 1965:^ 70). It is important to note that 
in neither case are these conceptual pairs thought of as 
oppositions or types of societies. (such as was the case in 
the Durkheimian opposites of Mechanical and Organic). They 
are part and parcel of the same societal phenomena. Durk­
heim stated this explicitly. 
A society can neither create itself nor re­
create itself without at the same time creating 
an ideal. This creation is not a sort of work of 
supererogation for it, by which it would complete 
itself, being already formed; it is the act by 
vàiich it is periodically made and remade. There­
fore, when some oppose the ideal society to the 
real society, like two antagonists which would 
lead us in opposite directions, they materialize 
and oppose abstractions. The ideal society is not 
outside of the real society; it is a part of it. 
Far from being divided between them as between 
poles which mutually repel each other, we cannot 
hold to one without holding to the otner. For 
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collective representation to problems of re-presenting 
experiences encountered in the pt^ sical setting only 
(that is, to the exclusion of matters "internal to the 
society), then the collective representation may be 
viewed as a functional specialization of a broader 
logico-meaningful system. It is predominantly through 
this ideal system, and the descriptive acts which real­
ize one aspect of it,^  that the society maps its causal-
functional system onto its physical setting. Attempting 
to articulate the manner in ;Aich the causal functional 
and logico-meaningful systems interrelate, however, is 
at this point difficult at best. There are a few things 
vâiich can, and should, be noted however* 
The first of these is that it is the logico-mean­
ingful system (as a system lAich the individual partakes 
a society is not made up merely of the mass of 
individuals ybo compose it, the ground %hich they 
occupy, the things which tney use and the move­
ments which they perform, but above all is the 
idea «hich it SOPMB of itself (Durkheim, 1965^  
470). 
B^eing that the descriptive act is a physical one (at 
least in part) it is best seen as a part of the causal-
functional system. The potential for re-presentation from 
•vôiich it was drawn for actualization, however, is a part of 
the logico-meaningful system (a sort of deep structure base 
as Chomsky might note). As we shall see, the oausal-
functional system is a victim of reality and actual occur­
rence. It exists in current and historical forms of actual 
behavior, xne logico-meaningful system is not so bound. 
58 
of but never exhausts) which allows the structuring and 
distribution of "meaningful orientations toward . . . the 
physical world, organisms, personalities, and social sys­
tems" (Parsons, 1969:10). Through meaningfully constrained 
and coordinated acts of description, for instance, the 
logico-meaningful system brings into the society (in a 
distributionally organized manner) a conceptually reduced 
version of its physical setting; one to vdiich the community 
can relate through "action" and about vûiich it can plan and 
organize. 
Secondly, it is the logico-meaningful system which al­
lows the transformation from behavior (as individually 
purposive movement) to action (as behavior to \jfaich others 
can attribute purpose). It breaks down behavior into units 
which can be subject to communications and are recognizable. 
(A key example here, is the phonemic base of a given lan­
guage community. The members of such a community have to 
learn the nature of the distinctive features vdaich separate 
and distinguish phonemic units; thus, allowing them to de­
compose the rather continuous stream of speech into units 
idiich can be bearers of meaning. One of the first tasks of 
any person attempting to learn another language is to gain 
the ability to recognize such distinctive features.) In 
doing so it provides the "deep structural" base for the 
generation of meaningful action; it allows the community 
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to plan, direct and organize "future'? states of affairs; 
to project alternative courses of action, compare them, 
and select for enactment those judged best suited for con­
tinued societal adaptation. From the ^ thropological 
perspective the logico-meaningful system provides an "emic" 
base (Sturtevant, 196^ :99-131) by means of which it in­
terprets its physical setting into an environment, and 
engages in behavior towards that environment which has 
meaning to the participants; i.e., action. 
Thirdly, there is a logical independence between these 
two systems (see Geertz, 1973:1^ 2-169), that is either one 
may change without substantial changes in the other. For 
example, in areas of functional specialization, about "en­
vironmental" problems, we will usually find that segment 
of the societal population dealing with the given area (and 
at a given moment) as carriers of rather specialized lin­
guistic resources. As was noted earlier this collective 
linguistic resource base defines a collective capacity for 
the re-presestation of experience which again may extend 
beyond the specialized capacity of any one actor. This 
functionally separable re-presentational capacity defines 
a functionally separable domain.of discourse within which 
that societal subpopulation operates. OSiis societal sub-
population may increase in size without any necessary change 
in the complexity of the domain itself (as might be indicated 
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by the size of the lexical resource base). On the other 
hand, the domain of discourse may proliferate with no in­
crease in the size of the population base carrying the 
domain. This is an area of needed research. In conjec­
ture, however, it seems quite likely that, given the finite 
lexical retention capacities of individual members of the 
societal population (Chomsky, 1965^ 3-15) Miller and Chomsky, 
1963), massive increase in the domain would necessitate an 
increase in the size of sub population carrying that base. 
Since the size of the domain sets real limitations on the 
subsystems capacity for representing this seems like a 
likely meeting ground for students of population dynamics 
and students of the sociology of knowledge. At any rate, 
numerous intriguing questions arise at points such as this 
one which are beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Finally, we must note, that it is through the causal-
functional system that an observer has access to the logico-
meaningful system. A directly parallel here is that between 
a language community and a speech community. We really only 
have access to the a priori system of language through a 
posteriori contacts with acts of speech. In fact, and this 
is directly in line with the Herederian perspective, lan­
guage in its various forms of use, the patterns in which 
that use occurs, and so on, is the best single index of the 
"deep structure", logico-meaningful system. Here it is 
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appropriate to recall Hertzler's (1965^ 35) comment that 
"language carries the definition of all situations, it is 
the dissecting agent by which the structures, functions, 
processes, relations and factors of the general and par­
ticular world are laid bare." Some basic relations are 
displayed in Figure 1.4. 
In sum, then, the processes by which language struc­
tures the experiences of the members of societal commun­
ities should now be more obvious. We need not even consider 
the "cognitive template" perspective to know that it does. 
For the manner in which language structures experience is 
not so much through "the minds eye" as through use and com­
munication—ac+s of volition. Fundamental among such acts, 
as ve have discovered, is the descriptive act; its com­
ponents, the choices and volition they represent, and the 
constraint systems within iirfiich they exist. This act is a 
key one for an additional reason. Recalling Figure 1.1 the 
descriptive act brings us to a crucial point of convergence 
between the interests of SOL and those of the methodology 
of sociology. 
A priori uncertainty structures in language: Intro­
ductory notes on the constrained "Cartesian" environment of 
the descriptive act As was noted in the previous section, 
the causal-functional system operates in the past and the 
present; it is concerned with actual occurrences—cognitively 
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available (differentially) as a form of a %osteriori knowl­
edge. Knowledge of this direct, cognitive form will be. re­
ferred to as knowledge C-a posteriori. As was also, noted 
in the previous section (and displayed in Figure 1.4), the 
logico-meanlngful system.participates in the ongoing processes 
of this empirical system of activities and operations by 
providing an ideal system (language) by means of which C-a 
posteriori knowledge forms can be distributed beyond the 
limitations of ostended availability. Such linguistically 
mediated forms of 2 "Posteriori knowledge will now be referred 
to as L-a posteriori. 
A society, however, does not exist simply, in the past 
or present. The human propensity for planning and the pur­
suit of goals has brought mankind face-to-face with the 
future as well. Unlike the present and the past the future 
is unknown and unavailable in any cognitive sense; it pre­
sents mankind with uncertainty^  (Dewey, I960; Bridgeman, 
It must be made clear that by the term "uncertainty" 
I do not ïïisan any sort of emotional of psychological state 
such as the "tension or imbalance" of lundberg* s behavior-
istic ïûailosophy (1964). Rather, we are dealing with a simple 
relation between an unrealized future and •vdaat can be "said" 
or known about it. In this sense"the concept of uncertainty, 
as used here, is more closely related to the notion as it is 
used in the "semantic information" theories of Hintikka (1970a: 
3-17) and Bar-Hillel ( 1964:221-312). However, just as these 
theories were meant to be a generalization of the statistical 
information theories of Shannon and Kinchkin, the work de­
veloping here is meant to be a generalization of the "semantic 
information" perspective. 
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1959; Lewis, 1971). The human tendency to cooperate and con­
front the future by means of social vehicles has led mankind 
to formalize these uncertainties in the semantic, syntactic 
and (most importantly) the pragmatic structure of its language 
institutions ; an uncertainty structure embracing all com­
ponents of the causal-functional system—including language 
use (see page 51 )• The manner in vdaich this uncertainty 
structure finds its expression in linguistic structure is a 
complex and semantically multifaceted affair. There is 
nothing very mysterious about it, yet its existence is not a 
fact immediately available to common sense or intuition. In 
terms of language use it seems to form a part of vrtiat 
Chomsky (1965:27) and Michael Polanyi (1964) have termed 
our "tacit knowledge" of our language. It generally remains 
uoarticulated. Yet, upon inspection, its existence is as 
obdurant a fact as one could hope to find in any science. 
The search for such linguistic uncertainty structures 
is an intriguing one. For the structure of uncertainty in a 
natural language is manifested neither in acts of description 
(as Cartesian "outcomes" participating in the causal-func­
tional system), nor in the existentially prior (and dif­
ferentially distributed) capacities for re-presentation from 
which they emerged and by which they were constrained. Rather, 
as we shall explore in detail in later chapters, this a priori 
linguistic uncertainty structure finds its existence in the 
65 
emergence itself; i.e., in the relation "between these two . 
epistemologically heterogeneous entities, and in their, im­
plications for the structure of the reality from which C-a 
posteriori forms of knowledge-are drawn (their ontological 
implications^ ). It finds its .existence in the fact that a 
given re-presentation does not exhaust the re-presentational 
capacities of the speaker, nor the interpretive capacities 
of the hearer. But most of all it finds its existence in the 
relation between what is expressed and vâaat is expressible; 
in the relation "between the constrained, Cartesian outcome 
which the descriptive act represents (see Figure 1.2) and 
its "Cartesian" environment^  •sdaich is drawn from the in­
dividual* s broader capacities for re-presentation and general 
we discuss the cntclogical implications of sueh 
linguistic structures we are simply referring to the manner 
in which that system leads us to expect the existence of cer­
tain kinds of objects and structure in the cognitively avail­
able world (cf. Kaminsky, 1969)» Since, in the act of in­
terpretation, we find ourselves drawing out these implica­
tions, the notion of ontology is an important one. 
T^he notions of "cartesian environment" and "linguistic 
uncertainty structure" are refe'rentially related but 
not synonomous means of discussing the same general phenomena. 
"When I discuss a "linguistic" uncertainty structure" I have 
in mind an institutional component existing quite independ­
ently of any act "ràiich might realize it. When I discuss the 
"Cartesian environment", on the other hand. I am discussing 
a linguistic structure relative to some act of re-presenta­
tion \diich draws upon it and bears certain relationships to 
it. These notions will become clearer as we proceed. 
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communication. A major concern for this dissertation will 
be to examine complexities of this relationship, at the 
physical, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic levels. Although 
we can show that each act of re-presentation does concretely 
imply the existence of an â Priori Cartesian environment 
(indeed, language would not be of much use if it did not 
provide such structures), it is not always the case that such 
environments can be given a definitive form. This point, 
however, brings us to the next topic. 
Language and experience in the scientific community 
As was mentioned at the end of a previous section, the de­
scriptive act represents a critical point of convergence be­
tween the interests of the student of SOL and the interests 
of the student of the methodology of sociology (as one who 
thinks "heterogeneously" about nature). In both the scien­
tific community, and the broader societal context from which 
it draws its human, organizational and symbolic roots, the 
ability to linguistically "re-present" (and thus distribute) 
matters which find their original presentation in individual 
experience, plays a functional role in the maintenance of the 
basis of community. Yet in the scientific community the need 
to consider the nature of this act must be felt with a greater 
intensity. For in the scientific community more than any 
other segment of society, experience is an intensely coopera­
tive activity (cf., Russell, 1948:3-8; Lundberg, 196^ :1-5). 
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Indeed, the experience of the individual-scientist can achieve 
no scientific significance until it can become a distributable, 
public experience; a sharable, transpersonal "fact" or 
"datum" (see Dewey, 1960:99; 1958:166-207; Campbell, 1952: 
27-30). Science, it seems, is not so much impersonal as it 
is interpersonal. Ultimately, as we shall see, the space of 
all scientific (as opposed to personal) experience has its 
points and coordinates provided by the social institution 
of language; for it is through the descriptive act and thus, 
by means of language that any personally isolated exper­
ience will achieve idaat Saile Durkheim might have termed 
its "collective re-presentation" Ca "social metric" as it 
were). 
Physicist, biologist, ethnologist, historian, and even 
the linguist ; the members of the scientific community and 
its various enclaves, are in the most fundamental manner, 
dependent upon the social institution of language^ —a 
Numerous works on "scientific language" do exist, 
particularly as generated by the fusdaaental epistemcrlogieal 
movement of empiricism (including reactions to empiricism) 
and its derivative movements, logical empiricism, pragmatism, 
and operationalism. All these movements have essentially been 
pragmatic movements (in the linguistic sense of that term). 
For an extensive bibliograpJ:^  see A. J. Ayer <1966:38l-Vf6). 
For a partial list of works that have been influential in my 
own research consider the following: JohnLocke (1959a,b: Vols. 
I- II (II in particular))-, G. W. Leibniz (1951), Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1974-; 1968), Richard von Mises (1951), Hans 
Reichenbach (1938; 1966), îttcl^ el Polanyi (1964), Bertrand 
Russell (19^ ), C. I. Lewis (1971), Rudolf Carnap (1967), 
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dependence the scientific community has been aware of in only 
limited detail, a dependence even more acutely neglected 
in contemporary sociology. This is somewhat understandable, 
however, in light of the fact that the majority of the 
W. V. Quine (1963), John Dewey (1916, 1958), William James 
(1970), Ernst Cassirer (19^ 3a;, Percy W. Bridgeman (1959), 
L. E. J. Brouwer (1913) and Benjamin Lee Whorf (1970). 
The concern for the language of science, howeverj as 
manifested in these movements, is not (in my opinion) indica­
tive of a corresponding awareness among "working scientists". 
By-and-in-large these works do not filter down into the 
"popular philosophy" encountered in academic traini^ —nor 
in many cases, does it seem necessary. Neophyte scientists 
are generally sufficiently preoccupied with being en-
culturated into their own specific disciplines to become 
involved in a detailed analysis of their relation to their 
language. I feel the case is different for sociology. Others 
feel the need is more general. Whorf (1970:246) in particular 
has said: 
It needs but half an eye to see in these lat­
ter days that science, the Grand Revelator of 
modern Western culture, has reached, without hav=-
ing intended to, a frontier. Either it must bury 
its dead, close its ranks, and go forward into a 
landscape of increasing strangeness, replete with 
things shocking to a culture-trameled understand­
ing, or it must become, in Claude Houghton's ex­
pressive phrase, the plagiarist of its own past. 
The frontier was foreseen in principle very long 
ago, and given a name that has descended to our 
day clouded with myth. That name is Babel. For 
science's long and heroic effort to be strictly 
factual has at last brought it into entanglement 
with the unsuspected facts of the linguist order. 
These facts the older classical science has never 
admitted, confronted, or understood as facts. In­
stead they had entered its house by the back door 
and had been taken for the substance of Reason 
itself (Whorf, 1970:246). 
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members of the scientific community are engaged in 
1 
"Homogeneous" thought about nature. . 
Now the study of the linguistic and distributional 
Some works that have dealt With the role of language in 
sociology (although in quite limited detail) are: C. Wright 
Mills (1953)3 Charles Horton Cooley (1922:^ 9-79), Abraham 
Kaplan (1964). and Alvin W. Gouldner (1970). Other works of 
a more intensive nature are: George A. Lundberg (1964). H. 
Alpert (1938:855-861), Eugene J. Meehan (1968), John Madge 
(1965), Peter Abell (1971), and Aaron Cicourel (1964), It 
has been characteristic, however, that works which deal with 
the critical use of language in scientific research and 
theory have not been widely received. G. A. Lundberg was 
apparently cognizant of this fact vàien he wrote: 
Nothing is so likely to give offense as an 
inquiry into the meaning of the eloquent ïùrase 
in which social scientists today for the most 
part attempt to communicate. Thé linguistic 
noises to which we have become emotionally con­
ditioned seem .a peculiarly personal and private 
possession upon lAich we rely to a great extent 
for the projection of our personalities. To sub­
mit a person's language to ruthless analysis is 
quite generally regarded as a personal attack 
through the medium of sympathetic magic or other­
wise. "Hair splitting", "garbling", "distortion" 
are favorite epithets for those who meddle with 
other people's language. Still more general is 
the feeling that "fine" points in linguistic tools 
do not matter, and are merely a way by which 
"smart alecks" call attention to themselves. This 
may be the case, of course, Never-^ ieless. we 
shall here take the view that a careful scrutiny 
of the fitness of our linguistic tools is perhaps 
of greater importance than a loquacious use of 
them (Lundberg, 1964:51). 
Works having a superficial interest in the role of language 
(and in a more "popular philosophy" vain) are: Jack P. Gibbs 
(1972). Hans L. Zetterberg (1965), Nicholas C. Mullins (1971), 
Jerald Hage (1972), and Hubert M. Blalock (1964; 1969). 
These texts represent the upsurge in the popular interest in 
"theory construction" that is evident in contemporary soci­
ology. îîany of these works have stemmed from a legitimate 
concern with the lack of rigor of sociological theory and, 
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systems of the scientific community presents the student of 
SOL with a variety of opportunities idiich may allow him to 
better understand human communication systems in general. 
Several factors contribute to this. The first reason is 
that the history of the scientific community, the manner in 
which it uses its linguistic resources, and the concerns 
the community has had about language (a concern \^ ch is 
itself differentially distributed in the scientific com­
munity) down through the ages, are all well preserved and 
documented. There is no lack of "data" for study; indeed, 
the amount of material is overwhelming. 
to the extent that people have become more conscious of the 
process of theory formulation^  these books have probably 
been beneficial. For many reasons, however, these texts 
seem to obscure more problems than they clarify. Hopefully 
the sources of disagreement ^ Aiich differentiate their ap­
proach to sociological knowledge from mine will become more 
apparent during the course of this dissertation. In prin­
ciple, however, I feel that these attempts at "cookbook" 
theory construction have been more "honorific" than actually 
useful. When they should have made students of science more 
reflexively aware of the intrinsically human, social, and 
volitional process of theory construction, they were rather 
reifying the belief in the existence of the Scientific 
Method ; the belief that there are rituals, which lAien en­
acted somehow ensure the validity of the results; "an invo­
cation to the laresiding deities of scientific method, serv­
ing to ensure an appropriately 'scientific' status for what 
follows, and avowing the proper concern with meeting stand­
ards of scientific acceptability" (Kaplan, 1964:19-20). 
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Secondly, the scientific community has evolved 
exceptually well institutionalized systems for the re-pre-
sentation and distribution of a posteriori forms of knowl­
edge. These would include journals, professional meetings, 
seminars, etc.. Belatedly many disciplines have ,fairly well 
standardized their linguistic resources bases and, through 
specialization, have distributed these resources in markedly 
visible ways. We may also note that the "mechanisms" of 
the distribution of linguistic resources are also relatively 
well defined. 
Thirdly, there are very few systems in lAich .the 
mechanisms for sharing (and thus distributing) a posteriori 
knowledge are as simple as they are in the scientific com­
munity. Karl Popper (1968:18) made the following comment 
of difect relevance here. 
The problem of epistemology may be ap­
proached from two sides: (1) as the problem of 
ordinary of eogmon-sense knowledge. or (2) as 
the problem of scientific knowledge. Those 
philosophers \âio favor the first approach think 
rightly, that scientific knowledge can be only 
an extension of common-sense knowledge, and they 
also think wjrongly, that cvmmon— sense knowledge 
is the easier of the two to analyze (Popper, 
1968:18). 
Later, referring to Kant, lhew6lli"Hlll, Peirce, Duhem, 
Poineare, Meyer son, Russell and Whit'eGiéâaf (1968 ) ' 
noted that ' 
Most of those %Aio beloxig to this group would 
agree that scientific knowledge is the result of 
the growth of common-sense knowledge. But all of 
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them discovered that scientific knowledge can be 
more easily studied than common-sense knowledge. 
For it is common-sense knowledge writ large, as 
it were. Its very problems are enlargements of 
common-sense knowledge (Popper, 1968:22). 
Popper's comments are equally valid ^ en placed within the 
sociological context as has been developed here. 
Quite in line with Popper's observations, there are 
few places where the pragmatic principles of language use 
are quite so clear. The specialized languages of the 
scientific community, embedded as they are in a meta­
linguistic "explicative" structure (Carnap, 1967), are a 
reflection of the community's endeavors to adapt the natural 
language resources which were at hand, to the rigors of 
cooperative experience (i.e., to the fact that the founda­
tions of scientific knowledge are provided by L-a posteriori, 
rather than C-a posteriori forms). They reflect what the 
concerns of the community have been in its attempts to 
"write large" the problems of common sense—linguistically 
mediated—knowledge. Relative to the interests of the 
student of the methodology of sociology, I assert that, if 
properly viewed, the real drives of the scientific community, 
given its dependence on L-a posterior forms, has historically 
been, not towards quantification, but towards the reduction 
of the amount of indetermi in lingui sticallv mediated 
uncertainty structures (Mises, 1951)* These endeavors (par­
ticularly as viewed in the works of the seventeenth century 
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pihilosoidiers such as Locke, Leibniz, Kevton and other—who 
laid the yet unshaken foundations of modern science) have 
had a bifurcated intent. The first intent has been the pro­
duction of uncertainty structures with known, properties and 
definitive symbolic forms. Such formalized or "explicated" 
structures we shall refer to as "re-presentational systems". 
Such re-presentational systems provide a definitive Cartesian 
environment for attempts at their use. The second intent, 
and this is often misunderstood, has been to control (not 
erradicate) the ontological consequences of the natural 
languages upon which such endeavors ultimately relied. . 
Quantification was only a by-product of these endeavors. . 
We shall return to this point in the next section. By 
understanding the foundations of such re-presentational 
systems the student of SOL may acquire more information 
about the nature and operatic of the uncertainty structures 
of the natural languages from wich they were derived. 
Of related interest here is the fact that a idienomena 
occurs in the scientific community lAich rarely occurs in 
the broader society and more; impoverished languages. By 
an impoverished language I mean one In lAich there are few 
terms and few alternative ways of expressing a given thought. 
This is highly related to Berstein's notion of a "restricted 
code" (Bernstein, 1973). In the context of .the scientific 
community this occurs by convention, in the form of primitive 
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(or undefined) terms, atomic propositions, etc. This 
strategy has met with little success in the social sciences, 
however, and this differential survival of impoverished 
forms may allow student of SOL to determine the conditions 
under which such forms can successfully exist. 
Now, given all the benefits that could accrue from the 
study of language and its use in the scientific community, 
that fact that it has not occurred, except in philosophy, 
raises some very interesting questions concerning the rea­
sons for this lacuna. I believe two key reasons exist. The 
first is that the members of the scientific community are 
extremely ethnocentric and "seem" to be resistant to out­
siders studying their language habits (cf. Lundberg, 1964: 
51). Whether or not this resistance is one which would 
actually manifest itself in research situations, it is gen­
erally impressed upon students of society that there are no 
greater authorities than the scientific community and its 
traditions. As derived from their experience in the broader 
social context, such students are aware that "one" does not 
inquire to deeply about authorities. A second factor, here, 
is that a number of otherwise qualified students of the 
sociology of language, find themselves in ethical and 
ontological conflict with the "Scientific Method" that they 
feel to be operative in the scientific community, and which 
they feel to be encroaching on their own subject matter. 
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Consequently, an area of potential value to theoretical en­
deavors in the sociology of language goes undeveloped; in 
particular, the ethnography of mathematics in use. Such 
studies could both make a contribution to SOL, and be of 
great value to the student of the methodoloigy of sociology. 
Methodology and Re-presentation: The 
Problem and Its Paradigmatic Properties 
A brief review 
Throughout this chapter I have jjuysued. a. very brief 
and purposively limited study of the sociology of language. 
This vas accomplished through three nested stages; each 
stage dependent upon those prior to it and each more 
focused with regard to the basic issue of this dissertation^  
!(y intention in pursuing this particular course, as was 
specified in the initial sections (see pages 1-10), vas of 
a three-fold nature. First, by developing a basic con­
ceptual platform, I sought to inquire into the nature of the 
institution of language and its role in the context of 
society. Secondly, it vas hoped that, by.doing so, students 
of the methodology of sociology, mi^ t acquire a more, real­
istic feeling for the role of language in the scientific 
community and begin to realize that basic functional iso­
mer phy ^ Aich exists between 1 arigua^ e .use patterns in both 
these social contexts. Thirdly, by accomplishing these first 
I 
! 
I 
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two objectives, it was my ultimate goal to produce a SOL 
vantage point from lAiich a core problem in the methodology 
of sociology might be viewed; the problem of description. 
The reader should now sense the direction in which this 
problem will be pursued throughout the remainder of this 
thesis. We can begin this "pursuit" by noting the following. 
Sociology and the L-a posteriori: Making the adjustment 
Like the rest of the scientific community (and its 
larger societal context) the sociological community is most 
constructively viewed as an ongoing system designed for the 
acquisition, construction, and distribution of L-a posteriori 
forms of knowledge. At its most primitive base the socio­
logical community is a complex system for re-presentation. 
Of course it does have "higher" functions, such as the pro­
duction of theoretical forms of knowledge, but if it cannot 
successfully accomplish its more primitive function it will 
not succeed in anything more elaborate. As I shall propose 
later, these higher functions operate within the context 
provided by the lower order, L-a posteriori system. It is 
characteristic of contemporary approaches to sociological 
theory construction that, with respect to these functions, 
they have an inverted sense of the nature of scientific 
activity. In the course of this inversion they have con­
voluted the very philosophy of science which they rely upon 
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for justification, and continue to create a false sense of 
disparity between theory and research. 
Like the rest of the scientific community, the 
sociological community must ultimately rely upon the natural 
language resources it has at its collective command. It 
too will be faced with the necessity of adjusting this 
resource base (and the capacity for re-presentation it 
represents) to the rigors of cooperative experience; i.e., 
to the fact that the least form of scientific experience is, 
by nature, L-a posteriori. If it is to successfully ac­
complish this it must have a more accurate conception of 
the manner in which other disciplines have succeeded in 
their efforts.^  
The necessity of adjusting to the fact that the least 
form of scientific experience is L-a posteriori has had, and 
will continue to have, serious repercussions throughout the 
scientific community. It is precisely such adjustments which 
form the basis of Thomas Kuhn's "scientific revolutions" 
(Kuhn, 1974) which Kuhn discusses in terms of changes in 
world views of Weltanschauung. In certain quarters, such as 
in the physical sciences, there has been a great deal of 
success in coming to terms with this fact; although the 
"theory of relativity" and "quantum theory" do reflect major 
discontinuities (Whitehead. 1969%, 1971; Cassirer, 1953a; 
Dewey, I960). Other scientific endeavors, however, par­
ticularly in the behavioral sciences, have experienced much 
less success and it is quite likely that their problems will 
persist; indeed it has only been on rare occasions that 
the fact itself has been directly confronted in these quar­
ters. As philosopher-linguist Whorf (1970:246) pointed out, 
they are the victims of an "entanglement with the unsus­
pected facts of the linguistic order", or more appropriately, 
of the sociolinguistic order. 
78 
Factors complicating the ad.iustment 
Linguistic vulnerability Unlike the rest of the 
scientific community, however, the sociological community 
has a number of characteristics which will continue to 
amplify its difficulties in adjusting to this fact. In 
the first place, by the very nature of its subject matter, 
the sociological enterprise finds itself thoroughly embedded 
into the larger societal context. Belatedly sociology is 
faced with a much heavier reliance upon its natural lan­
guage foundations. With very few exceptions (Webb et al., 
1966), nearly all the observational techniques rely, in one 
way or another, upon the ability to establish a dialogue 
between the researcher the researched. Questionnaires, 
interviews, informants and the like; all of these carry a 
heavy burden in providing the "grist" or sociological 
analysis. Indeed, the researcher often finds himself forced 
to work with the re-presentational capabilities (as given 
in the linguistic resource base) of his subjects, and, 
given this linguistic vulnerability, leaves himself open 
to the indeterminancies of the Cartesian environments 
elicited in subject generated re-presentations. Even the 
most structured interview and questionnaire formats do not 
evade this issue. The way to overcome these dependency re­
lated difficulties is not to abandon such dialogues, for the 
natural languages within "vMch they occur give us access 
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(see page 60) to the ideal, logico-meaningful context within 
which all relevant societal activity occurs. Rather we must 
seek to learn more of the nature of language, the manner in 
which it provides Cartesian environments for acts of re­
presentation, the ontological implications of such environ­
ments, and, most importantly, the manner in \riiich such 
ontological structures operate in the pragmatic context. 
When we come to the flow of L-^  posteriori forms of 
knowledge internal to the sociological community (as among 
professional peers), as a re-presentational complex, we find 
that this first set of facts confounds the problems of our 
adjustment. For it is often the case that we are re­
presenting "re-presentations" j thus getting a kind of 
ontological overlay in our re-presentational systems. 
Geertz has referred to this as the issue of "thick de­
scription" (Geertz,- 1973:3-30)* Before we can adjust to 
the internal problems of the rigors of cooperative experi­
ence, we first have to consider the implications of re­
presentations as experiences. These facts, also confounded 
with the fact that a large number of working sociologists 
harbor erroneous conceptions concerning the nature of re­
presentational systems in the larger scientific community, 
all operate against the effectiveness of the sociological 
community as a re-presentational complex. Efficiency is 
not even an issue at this point. As was noted before, the 
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only way for sociologists to overcome these difficulties 
is to get some of the methodological "stardust" out of their 
eyes and become familiar with the basic principles of 
re-presentation. 
Belatedly, as sociologists have begun to lay more 
serious claim on their scientific status, a new dialogue 
has begun; that between sociologists and policy makers. 
Of particular interest to me is the intensification of dia­
logue between social scientists and those concerned with 
national development planning.^  Correlated with this need 
for planning has been the need for social information sys­
tems. Here sociologists have been quick to claim that they 
can provide effective re-presentational contexts for con­
crete decision making activities. I am afraid, however, 
that sociologists will have much to learn about the con­
struction of such decision making environments and in doing 
so they are going to have to have some knowledge of the 
linkages between the causal-functional systems of society 
and its overarching logicoHneaningful system. The manner 
in which a social system, be it a society, bureaucracy, etc., 
S^ince June of 197^  I have had the privilege of being 
associated with the "Indicators for Social Development 
Project", a project headed by Dr. Leslie Wilcox. This con­
text has done much to influence and concretize my per­
spectives on the structure and role of re-presentational 
systems in both scientific and applied settings. 
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re-presents its environment (the complexity of re-presenta-
tional systems, etc.) is not unrelated to the operational 
capabilities of that system. Thus the problem is not 
simply that of creating a re-presentational system (a 
social information system) but also of mapping this system 
into the operation capacities of the social entity involved. 
A re-presentational system lAiich is arbitrarily constructed 
relative to the causal-functional patterns of a social sys­
tem works against, rather than for the survival or success 
chances of the given social system. The basic principle is 
that complexity in the logico-meani ngful system must be in 
a favorable balance with complexity in the causal-functional 
system and that changes in one must be accompanied by changes 
in the other. "Artificial" complexity must not be uncrit­
ically introduced. This is related to the next point of 
discussion* 
Ontologieal divergence Beyond the problem of 
linguistic vulnerability (though inextricably linked to 
it) there exists another problem which will complicate the 
process by which the sociological ccamunity adjusts to its 
dependencies on L-& posteriori forms of knowledge. This is 
the problem created by the rather strong divergence of 
ontologieal stances \^ ch survive in our enterprise (Gouldner, 
1970; Rioux, 1970:33-^ 7; War shay, 1971:23-^ 5). Kuhn (1974) 
would refer to this as a divergence of paradigms. I will 
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refrain from this usage, however, for the simple reason 
that I do not feel the divergence is truly paradigmatic. 
The primary question in instances of ontological di­
vergence concerns the "real" nature of the social realities 
in Tidiich sociologists practice their crafts. What objects 
and structures populate that social reality? What are the 
"social facts?" As Martindali (I960) has well documented, 
the history of sociology has been marked by the rise and 
fall of a number of schools which have competed to provide 
answers to these questions. Functionalism, conflict theory, 
social behaviorism, symbolic interactionism, enthnomethod-
ology; all of these schools currently seek to provide a 
secure ontological foundation for sociology. Further, they 
all face the same problem with respect to the acquisition 
and redistribution of knowledge pertinent to their per­
spectives. The researcher rào adopts a particular ontolog­
ical strategy with respect to available C-a -posterior forms 
of knowledge must be able, in the course of making the 
transformation into L-g posteriori forms, to reflect his 
ontological strategy in his re-presentational framework. 
This strategy must be concretely communicated as well. 
This brings us to consider the most apparent (or 
publicized) instance of ontological divergence operative 
in the sociological community today; one which has come to 
override other points of ontological conflict. Eiis is the 
83 
qualitative/quantitative opposition. There are many sides 
to this opposition, such as the nature of causality in 
sociological phenomena, and. I will not concern myself with 
all of them. Rather I am interested in it in so far as it 
has implications for the re-presentation of matters of ex­
perience also in so far as it has dysfunctional conse­
quences for integrity of methodology in the sociological 
community. 
I believe that ontological divergence should exist 
in the sociological community, for, if nothing else, it 
forms a sort of intellectual variety ;iôiich can serve as the 
necessary selective base for the further evolution of our 
enterprise (cf., Kuhn, 1974:92-173; Popper, 1968:4-2). A 
divergence of ontologies, such as that reflected in the 
qualitative/quantitative opposition, however, must have a 
healthier,. more informed foundation that that ^ diich cur­
rently exists. I find that the generative foundations of 
this divergence, and the recriminations which pass over its 
boundaries, both reprehensible and ill founded. The dis­
tinction itself is not even clear. What can we consider 
quantitative? Must our ontology be built on the postulate 
of continuity? Must all sociological spaces be metric? 
"What is a metric space? Are qualitative approaches sub-
metric? "What is the relation between me tri city and conti­
nuity? How many sociologists who claim to represent a 
8^  
quantitative ontological stance can even begin to approach 
such basic questions as these? Science does not adhere in 
ontology. It adheres in rigorous and systematic investiga­
tions into the "real" world. It adheres in the rigorous 
and systematic attempts to re-present the experiences thus 
gained, and it adheres in the attempt to make the re­
presentational frameworks used in such endeavors, seman-
tically effective communicative devices. It is no more, and 
no less, than common sense re-presented "large" (Popper, 
1968:22). 
The quantificationist's implication that all quali­
tative methods are nonrigorous and somehow constitute "soft" 
science is sheer nonsense. The works of sociologists such 
as Schutz (1973), Sacks (1972:31-7^ ), Schegloff (1972:7$-
119) and others, is as methodologically sophisticated as 
any work done in the quantification!st community. The works 
of ethnoscientists such as Frake (1962:72-85) and Sturtevant 
(1964:99-131) is also of the finest scientific quality. 
Indeed, many of the ethnoscience approaches to the mapping 
of alien cognitive structures run directly parallel to 
Carnap's rigorous methods of semantic investigation; the 
method of intensional analysis. 
The qualitative sociologist's belief, on the other 
hand, that all quantitative research is meaningless, or that 
quantification and statistical analysis have no place in 
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sociology, is equally fallacious. As in all matters in 
which technology is applied, it is not the technique which 
can be held blame. It is the competence of the user which 
must be questioned. As was said earlier, a tool is only as 
good as the one vdio uses it. Quantitative techniques, used 
properly, will continue to play an important and creative 
role in sociology. Like any approach to science, however, 
it must be born of something more substantial then truisms 
concerning the nature of science. Both sides of this op­
position, have been overly free with making generalizations 
about the nature of scientific activity. 
Equally fallacious is the belief, which sometimes sur­
faces in the qualitative community, lAich attributes dis-
tortionary a priorism to quantitative re-presentational 
systems lAiile viewing natural language re-presentations, 
as somehow ontology free. Ibis is naive empiricism pure 
and simple. Scientific experience is by nature L-a 
•posteriori. Once a C-a posteriori form is given its lin­
guistic re-presentation it becomes part of a broader 
ontological structure which gives it meaning. This is its 
Cartesian environment. This is as true in natural languages 
(such as Donald Ball's ethnograjflay of an abortion clinic, 
1970:17^ -185) as it is in the explicated re-presentational 
systems of the broader scientific community. One does not 
escape a priori structure by choice of re-presentational 
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frameworks; rather one attempts to control it. As A. N. 
Whitehead (1969a:18)has noted, "If we desire a record of 
uninterpreted experience, we must ask a stone to record 
its autobiography." Further to this point, Popper (1968: 
59}nl) has expressed the following perspective. 
My point of view is, briefly, that our 
ordinary language is full of theories; that 
observation is always in the light of theories; 
that it is only the induetivist predjudice 
which leads people to think that there could 
be a phenomenal language, free of theories, and 
( " >retical language; 
These thoughts raise an interesting point; our linguistic 
vulnerability is tantamount to having to deal with ontol­
ogies vÈiich may diverge from those we hold as social 
scientists. Knowledge of this fact, however, can be help 
In this section a number of points have been raised. 
First, I took the view that the sociological community is 
best viewed as a re-presentational complex; a system de­
signed for the acquisition, construction and redistribution 
of L-a posteriori forms of knowledge. This was â position 
afforded us in terms of the SOL vantage point constructed 
throughout this chapter. It is this basic function which 
unites the sociological community with the rest of the 
scientific enterprise. Secondly, I noted that, like the 
rest of the scientific community, the sociological 
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enterprise will find it necessary to adjust its linguistic 
resources to the rigors of cooperative experience. This 
adjustment is made more complex by our linguistic vulner­
ability. In terms of the entire sociological ccamaunity it 
is also made more complex by the fact that there exists a 
great deal of ontological differentiation. Such differ­
entiation means that differential modes of adjustment will 
likely have to occur as well. Thirdly, throughout this 
section I emphasized that this adjustment could only be 
accomplished in terms of an enhanced awareness of the nature 
of the language institution, the manner in \ôiich it 
ontologically structures the experiences of those dependent 
upon it as a source of knowledge (i.e., who take L-a 
•posteriori forms of knowledge as their basic experience-
review pages and footncts 1 cn page 6? in par­
ticular), the basic principles of representation. In 
my consideration of the relation between Cartesian and 
Herderian linguistics I attempted to show that such 
structuring of experience is operative in language use 
and not in language per se. I also pointed out that a 
particularly strategic place to begin the study of the 
manner in \Aiich this structuring occurs was in the re­
presentational context; i.e., in the context of the de­
scriptive act. This is also where we must seek the prin­
ciples of re-presentation which I hold as essential to the 
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methodology of sociology. This brings us to the problem 
of description. 
The "problem of description: From the vantage point 
I have repeatedly stressed, in these final sections, 
that the least form of scientific experience is L-a posteriori 
in nature. As Ludwig Wittgenstein (1921 originally; 197^ .: 
115) so aptly noted, the "limits of our world" are given in 
language. It is a limit which is extremely effective in 
the scientific community and one which bounds us on two 
sides. On the one hand there are those experiences we have 
which remain in the domain of the ineffable (Polanyi, 196^ : 
87-95)* We have no means of expressing the contents of 
those experiences to those beyond the limitations of 
ostensivs availability: Though we constantly strive to push 
these limits back, to bring these experiences to the level 
of what can be articulated, the boundary remains and as long 
as it does the experiences which fall into this domain re­
main beyond the bounds of science; beyond our capacity for 
re-presentation. On the other hand., we find ourselves 
constantly dependent upon linguistically vicarious exper­
iences. These are the substance of our enterprise and the 
"data" (Dewey, 1960:99) with which we concern ourselves. 
We depend upon knowledge -vdiich originates beyond what is 
cognitively available to us. This is the "stuff" of our 
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induction, and the building block of our theory. To be on 
one side of the boundary is quite as bad. as the other. 
The balance between C-a posteriori and L-a posteriori 
forms of knowledge is thus a delicate one and although it 
is not reducible to its C-a posteriori substrate, the 
scientific community is fundamentally conditioned by it. 
Quine (1963) made this point quite admirably and, given 
our SOL vantage point, in terms we should now be able to 
appreciate. 
The totality of our so called knowledge 
or beliefs, from the most casual matters of 
geography, and history to the.profoundest laws 
of atomic physics or even pure mathematics and 
logic, is a manmade fabric which impinges on 
experience only along the edges. Or, to change 
the figure, total science is like a field of 
force lAose boundary conditions are experience 
(italics mine) (Quine, 1963:42). 
The individual scientist is the cutting, edge of scientific 
experience (cf., Durkheim, with regard to the more general 
context of societal experience, 19652^ 2-^ 3)• It is the 
individual scientist who has access to C-^  posteriori forms 
of knowledge. It is his task to,abstract what is relevant 
from these experiences and, using the linguistic resources at 
his disposal, construct linguistic representations which 
can become an effective part of the re-presentational complex. 
The problem of description involves the indeterminacies of 
this construction, the choices involved, and the constraints 
within which it occurs. In terms of our earlier comments 
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it is a two sided problem. For the individual scientist 
engaged in the construction it is the problem of making the 
transformation from the C-a posteriori form to lAich he has 
access to the L-a posteriori form -which can be given wider 
access; it is the problem of explicating the oncological 
stance he takes to the experience; it is the general problem 
of being able to effectively re-present that which was pre­
sented to him. To the broader sociological community it is 
a concern for his re-presentational competencies; it is a 
concern for being able to clearly understand the ontological 
structure within \^ ch it was embedded. 
The problem of description is also an integrative 
place to begin in our search for the generic methodology 
deemed desirable in the earlier stages of this dissertation 
(see pages 3-11). It is integrative for two reasons. 
First, at the operational level, the problem of description 
is one which confronts every approach to sociological 
knowledge. As existing methodological perspectives have 
made abundantly clear, any theoretical endeavor which seeks 
to compete as a source of knowledge about the social world 
must at some point confront that world. Whether one ap­
proaches social reality from the verstehen school of Max 
Weber (196^ ) or Alfred 8chutz (1973), the phenomenological 
school in the tradition of Edmund Husserl (1970) and Martin 
Heidegger (1962), or the physicalist school as classically 
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described by Otto Neurath (19^ 9:282-317) of the famed Vienna 
Circle 5 at the point ^ ere perspective meets experience the 
problem of description must be fundamentally the same. 
Therefore, the problem of description becomes an important 
one. To separate, and try to understand the problem of 
representing matters of experience out of the social context, 
however, is to divorce the problem from its most meaningful 
setting; i.e., from the re-presentational context. The 
study of the descriptive act, thus, presents the problem of 
description in its most concrete form. 
Secondly, at a more abstract level, by studying the 
problem of description in the social context we will find 
that there are certain invariant, or universal principles 
of re-presentation which adhere in all attempts at 
description; regardless of ontological stance. As a result 
we will find that there is a central, or kernel ontology 
which operates regardless of any particular ontological 
posture. It is inherent in the act of re-presentation 
itself. Thus, we find a point of basic continuity and 
isomorphy in the fact of what appears to irreconcilable 
divergence. Whether we represent our facts in our natural 
language, or as an n-tuple in some abstract mathematical 
space, there is a kernel ontology i^ ch serves as a point 
of unification. Most importantly, it is here that we will 
find the basic principles of re-presentation lAiich can 
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serve as guides to our endeavors in event documentation in 
the social sciences. In these principles we will discover 
a basic.logic—the logic of indirect experience—which can­
not be corrupted without corrupting the very basis of our 
sociological community. Hopefully, by coming to understand 
this logic we will also come to understand that, as 
Wittgenstein (197^ :^ 1) implied, by the simple act of offer­
ing a description of some aspect of the empirical world, 
we "construct" that world for others, "with the help of a 
logical scaffolding." We count on the fact that this 
linguistically induced scaffolding draws a correct picture 
of the world we seek to re-present; i.e., that our kernel 
ontology is not an empty one. 
The ontological structure made apparent in a de­
scriptive act is completely contained in thrse analytical 
layers. The first layer we shall denote the primary 
ontological layer. It is in the primary ontological layer 
that the kernel ontology finds its expression. It forms 
the "Paradigmatic ontological core about which other onto­
logical forms evolve. This primary layer ontology is ex­
ternal to the description in the sense that: 
1. It operates indifferently with respect to the 
particular descriptive system employed (i.e., re­
gardless of whether we employ a natural language 
or some highly specialized '^explicated system. 
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such as a complicated measurement-system), and 
2. It is indifferent to the particular aspect of 
reality viiiich is being described, and thus re­
presented. 
Put in simplest terms, the primary.ontological level adheres 
in the re-presentation and not the representation. Three 
concepts of interest at this primary level are the notions 
of "displacement", "vacuousness", and "ideal complementa­
tion", These are core concepts to be used in our initial 
exploration of the manner in which the Cartesian environ­
ment operates at this level. 
"Atop" this primary ontological layer are the 
secondary and ternary ontological levels vdiich are concerned 
with more internal aspects of the problem of description. 
Hore specifically, the secoiadas-y layer is eorieer-ned with 
"disjunctive descriptive forms", relations of "compossi-
bility" among descriptive predicates, "descriptive di­
mensionality" . This level is also somewhat independent of 
particular ontological postures and it is at this level 
that much of the explicit adjustment of the dependency on 
L-a posteriori forms must occur. It is considerations at 
this level ^ aiich lead to. explicit (or explicated) re­
presentational systems. Above the secondary level is the 
ternary ontological layer. ' It is at this ternary level 
that ontological postures become fully articulated and 
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divergences become apparent. This ontological level is con­
cerned with the specificities of differentiation within re­
presentational systems. Concerned basically with compar­
ability structures, it is this third level in which con­
temporary treatments of measurement systems operate (Krantz 
et al., 1971; Torgerson, 1967); unaware of the fundamental 
ontological layers upon v±iich the ternary or "surface" logic 
is dependent. At the intersection of these central notions 
(the primary, secondary and ternary layers of ontological 
structuring) lies the foundations of a coherent theory of 
description; a foundation which must proceed other aspects 
of empirical analysis. 
Objectives: Focus and Plan 
"what is pursued in the remaining pages is a prelim­
inary study of the mundane act of description; the least of 
scientific activities. Yet Tsàiat is simultaneously being 
offered is the logical inner working s of the nontrivial, 
integrative methodology which is required: a naturalistic 
empiricism fundamentally consistent with the programs of 
John Dewey (1958), G. A. Lundberg (196^ ), and most re­
cently, Michael Polanyi (1964; 1970). 
This study may be considered "preliminary" in the 
following senses. In the first place the focus of the study 
will be on the exposition of the operative principles of 
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the primary ontological layer and ttie kernel ontology it 
expresses. The secondary layer will be briefly discussed 
merely for purposes of later application, \d2ile the ternary 
layer will receive no direct treatment. I feel this is . 
justified becau.se of the paradigmatic position of primary 
ontological level (i.e., because it is a point of continuity 
and kinship among otherwise divergent research strategies) 
and because it is the most neglected level in modern 
methodology. In the second place it is preliminary to the 
extent that this dissertation represents one strategy for 
explicating the basic nature of the problems and processes 
involved. At this point I cannot be sure that it is the 
best strategy for pursuing the higher ontological levels. 
But then the reader must be cognizant of the fact that a 
great deal of this dissertation has been devoted to merely 
constructing a vantage point from lAich the problem of 
description can even be seen, and in terms of wiiich the 
reader could feel some conceptual comfort in dealing with 
the problem. Although my route to this vantage point was 
an arduous one, I cannot believe, at this point, that any 
short cuts were permissible. Thirdly, it is preliminary 
because my approach to the problem is very open textured. 
Many of the highly technical arguments have been omitted in 
order that the "spirit" of the problem not be lost in 
technicalities. I have used some symbolic devices to 
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explicate my problem, but not nearly as much as would be 
necessary for a more complete exposition. Finally, this 
study is preliminary for the simple reason that I do not 
have the immediate competences to do a thorough study. As 
I noted at the onset, however, it is mainly meant to serve 
as a basic record of my thoughts at one point of my con­
tinuing intellectual development. I make no pretensions 
about its adequacy. The problem I have chosen is complex 
and multifaceted. There are undoubtedly many sides of it 
I cannot see. With these thoughts in mind I can state my 
basic plan for the remainder of this study. 
The general strategy for this study will be reflexive 
and critical in nature and, to the greatest extent possible, 
explicitly formal. In this manner, if the case is over­
stated, then at least it is stated. If there is an occa­
sion for disagreement, then I hope I offer something defi­
nite to disagree about ; for this is ultimately my concern. 
If I purport something to be the case, then the reader has 
the obligation to consider what would be the case if what is 
purported herein, is not. 
Chapter II is concerned with a more detailed analysis 
of the components of the problem than has been accomplished 
thus far. Here the descriptive act will be more thoroughly 
considered and some strategic symbolic innovations intro­
duced. Chapter II also is concerned with the explication 
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of the primary ontological layer, the notion of the Carte­
sian environment, and the development of some basic prin­
ciples of re-presentation. A number of core auxiliary 
concepts will also be introduced; including a very brief 
introduction to some basic concepts in the secondary 
ontological level. Included in Chapter II as well is a 
brief discussion of semantic stratification in natural 
languages, or metalinguisties. The results of the entire 
dissertation will then be carried over into the concluding 
chapter, Chapter III, and their application to some core 
concepts in theoretical research noted. These concepts in­
clude theory construction, data reduction, induction and 
inference. 
Finally, it should be noted that throughout Chapter II, 
we will use the modeling technique first explicitly described 
by Weber (1964:42-43, 90-112) and later more fully developed 
in the works of Alfred Schutz (1973^ 40-66); the ideal type. . 
This will be used for the purpose of motivating the under­
standing of the basic concepts. Explicitly, this technique 
involves the construction of the descriptive act in its 
simplest form. I will formulate the setting for the act, 
introduce the parties to the act (the homunculi as Schutz 
would refer to them), define the means and ends, and endow 
the actors involved with certain competencies, rights, and 
rational properties. This method allows us to "objectify" 
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the problem the description. It "greases" the wheels of 
reflexive thought and provides a standard against which 
concrete instances can be compared and through which con­
crete problems dealt with. 
Concluding Remarks 
No process is more basic to science than the activity 
of description; the process by which our "data"—the "mirrors 
of science" as R. Houwink (1970) has picturesquely denoted 
them—are created. Yet few processes are so poorly under­
stood. Perhaps, it might be said, that this lack of under­
standing is due to the apparently mundane nature of the 
topic. For no one wants to be connected with a merely 
"descriptive" science (Mises, 1951:137-138, 205-217). The 
mundanity, however, is only apparent; for as will become 
more obvious in the course of this study, there are few 
aspects of the scientific enterprise vôiich possess the chal­
lenge of semantically responsible description. Nowhere is 
there a greater need for rationality. 
Rationality in the development and responsible use of 
the tools of description, however, by definition entails an 
analytic awareness of their nature; the roles they play in 
the various stages of inquiry; the variety of such tools 
that exist ana can be generated, and their utility for given 
ends. Rationality presupposes choice. To the extent to 
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lAiich the user of descriptive techniques is unaware of these 
factors—and his responsibility in using such techniques— 
then choices are foregone and the user's potential for ra­
tional action relative to their deployment is radically 
diminished. In consequence, an important (if not determinant) 
aspect of research and theoretical activity is reduced to 
mere ritual. Convention is necessary, as Michael Polanyi 
(1970:42-62), W. V. Quine (196^ :322-3^ 5) and others (for 
instance, see Russell, 19^ 5 Reichenbach, 1938; Dewey, 
1958; Popper, 1968:^ 9-56; Lundberg, 1964) have shown. 
Ritual, however, should have no place in science. 
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CHAPTER II. THE DESCRIPTIVE ACT: 
EMPIRICISM IN THE SOCIAL CONTEXT 
Some Preliminary Remarks 
The overarching commitment of this dissertation has 
been to the principle that there is need for a nontrivial, 
integrative methodological perspective. As was developed 
in the course of Chapter I, at the heart of such a meth­
odological perspective lies the problem of description; 
the problems surrounding the linguistic representation of 
matters of immediate experience. In order to clarify the 
nature of the problems involved, the problem of description 
was embedded in the re-presentational context; i.e., in 
the context of the descriptive act. In this context we 
can see the problem as one enhancing or detracting from the 
effectiveness of the larger re-presentational complex. 
Components of the Descriptive Act 
On pages 49-51 the descriptive act was broken down 
into some major components. These major components were 
shown to reflect a system of constraints within which the 
descriptive act occurred and, in doing so, was meant to 
reflect one aspect of the sui generis nature of the so­
cietal complex. Now we confront the descriptive act in a 
new setting ; in terms of the methodologically central 
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problem of description- The nature of this problem entails 
that we take a more formal approach to the analysis of this 
basic act. As before, the descriptive act is seen to involve 
three major components; the parties to the act, the extra-
linguistic event (or experience), and the linguistic re­
source base. 
The parties to the act 
For reasons of simplicity, the parties to the act will 
involve a single observer/describer, denoted 0/D, and a 
single hearer/interpreter, B/I. (Notes In their most use­
ful context 0/D and H/I are not necessarily distinct in­
dividuals. Rather they are roles lAiich, vidaen assumed, pro­
vide a strategy for dealing with the problaas of descrip-
tion^  This should be kept in throughout Chapters II 
and III. ) The value of the symbolic abbreviations will also 
become more apparent as our thought liae develops. However, 
their primary value is that of avoiding the elliptical sen­
tence structures which often obfuscate natural language 
presentations. 
The extra! i nguistic event 
In essence, what is being discussed here is that which 
is being subject to description; the experience. As a mat­
ter of convenience the extralinguistic event will be denoted 
E. The nature of the extralinguistic event, as a theoretical 
3 
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notion, and the meaning of the adjective "extralinguistic" 
will be more thoroughly discussed in a later section when 
attention is directed to the matter of metalanguages. 
The linguistic resource base 
Denoted L, the linguistic resource base is herein 
conceived to be symbolic medium within which a description 
of E is to be "constructed". The reason for not consider­
ing the representation itself as a primary component of the 
descriptive act will become apparent as the presentation 
proceeds. As was developed in Chapter I, L is conceived 
to be the social institution within vdaich communication 
occurs. It is further viewed as analytically independent 
of any speech act produced in it, and as "rich" enough to 
bring closure on the descriptive act. 
Slightly modifying the frameworks of Vasiliu (1972) 
and Carnap (1967), L is minimally seen as being composed of: 
II:A1 A set of basic formatives (V) from vdiich ex­
pressions can be constructed. 
(The nature of these formatives may vary as to purpose. 
They may be phonemic in which case Y would be the phonemic 
base for L. They may be lexical items, in which case V 
would be the lexican for L. Finally the formatives might 
basic sentential forms as in Carnap's (1967) semantic sys­
tem or Chomsky's (1965) transformationalist grammar. Chomsky 
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(1966) terms these as "kernel" sentences. In our considera­
tion of the primary ontological layer, with its externalistic 
perspective, this latter approach may be very beneficial.) 
II:A2 A set of formation rules (FR), or syntax, 
within which: 
a. Elements of V can be combined to produce 
(or recognize) syntactically acceptable 
strings, say , a^ ,..., ;iAiich can alter­
nately be termed well formed strings or 
expressions,^  and 
b. Expressions can be combined to form more 
complex expressions, and 
II:A3 A set of re-presentational rules (KR) which 
allow for the construction and interpretation 
of expressions for the purposes of the trans­
mission of L-^  posteriori forms of knowledge. 
These re-presentational rules will be investigated more 
closely in Chapter III. In order to help understand the 
above I will now investigate some of the basic concepts. 
4co say that a string of formatives is an expression 
in L is equivalent to sayi^  that it is syntactically cor­
rect, or â well formed string. This has some independence 
from the fact of whether or not the given expression has any 
meaning. One can arbitrarily generate expressions without 
concern for their sense. 
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Strings, construction and syntax An arbitrary 
string a, as the term suggests, is simply a finite sequence 
of primitive symbols (not necessary distinct) composed of 
the elements of V, the formative s provided in L. The sym­
bols contained in a, along with their arrangement, defines 
the composition of a. The number of basic formatives which 
enter the composition of a will be termed the length of a 
and may be denoted L(a). 
The act of composing such a string we shall term the 
construction of the string a in L. The act of constructing 
a presupposes the sequential selection of the elements of V 
which define a»s composition. Table 2.1 has been "con­
structed" to suggest the number of strings of length n that 
can be constructed from a formative base of cardinality N, 
for extremely small values of n and N. These results gain 
"Cartesian" significance when one realizes that an average 
four-year old child is estimated to have a working vocabu­
lary of over five thousand words (Pei, 1966:12^ ). The 
process of enumerating possible strings at this value of N 
becomes extremely formidable for strings of even average 
sentence length. 
Now, presuming V to be of finite cardinality (a 
rather generous presumption), let Z be the class of all 
strings which can be constructed utilizing the elements 
of V. This set would include: 
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Table 2.1. The combinatorics of string construction 
Cardinality of Y 
L(a) 4 5 6 7 8 . N 
2 16 25 36 h9 64 . . 
h 256 625 9,296 2,401 4,096 . . 
6 if,096 15,625 46,656 17,649 262,144 . . 
8 65,536 390,625 1,679,616 5,76^ ,801 16,777,216 . . 
n 6^  7^  8^  
a subset 2,, composed of all strings of length 1, i.e., 
= def.{a^  ^; = 1, j=l,2,...} 
a subset = def.^ Cgj : LCcgj) = 2, j=l,2,...] 
a subset • LCGgj) = n, 3=1,2,...} . 
These subsets generated on the basis of string length would 
form a partition of 2 such that 
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h 
Z = U 2. , Z, n 2. = 0 ,V i,j 
1=1  ^ 1 J 
where 0 is the empty set and the inverted A is to be read 
"for all choices". Given these concepts we may now come to 
appreciate some features of the syntax, FR. 
In its simplest sense the syntax of a language, ^ in 
this case given in L, operates as a set of constraints upon 
what strings, -wfoen constructed, will be considered as ex­
pressions or as well formed. In essence this means that, 
if we let «£• be the class of all expressions in L (i.e., 
all strings constructed in accordance with the FR) then 
we would generally expect the following conditions, 
In general we would also expect this to be true at each 
value of string length in and 2. 
To see this in a rather concrete instance, consider 
a basic logical system, L*, with 
V = (P, Q, 1, V) . 
The complex syntactical rules of a language represent 
a set of constraints. As with all human laws or rules, such 
constraints give structure to the system and determine a 
conformity, by which predictions of behavior can be made. 
The syntactical constraints of a language ensure thatj to 
some extent, we know already •what will be said, or written, 
in a given situation or at a certain point in a speech or 
text. We do not know exactly what, but we know something 
about it (Cherry, 1970:117-118). 
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Define the basic formation rules as follows: 
A. P and Q are atomic expressions. 
B. 1 and V are junctors or expressional connectives. 
C. P and Q are expressions in L*. 
D. If T] is an expression in L*, then iq is an ex­
pression in L'. 
E. If and qg are expressions in L', then 
is an expression in L*. 
The consequences of even this simple set of formation rules 
is quite amazing. For example, since P is an expression in 
L'5 then IP is an expression in L'. Similarly, since «iP 
is an expression in L*, then TIP is an expression in L. If 
we allow l^ P to be an atomic expression P preceded by K in­
stances of the symbol i, then i^ P is an expression for all 
finite values of K. It should also be obvious that PVQ is 
an expression. Since this is an expression then i(PVQ) is 
an expression. A suggestive list of strings which would be 
considered as well formed in L* are: 
/N m-v rr r\ TwifT 
r, xsj, xrvvi, rviy 
iPTiQ, fp, fpvw, 
fP7I°^ , P7F, PVIP, etc. 
To more effectively view the constraints vdaich are 
oBerative under the formation rules given above, we will 
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consider strings constructed from V of lengths two and 
three. Ignoring the formation rules we find that we can 
p 
construct k = 16 distinguishable strings of length two. 
Thus, 2^  is given as: 
PP, PQ, P^ , PV 
QP, QQ, Qfl, QV 
IP, IQ, TI, IV 
VP, VQ, YT, W . 
This may be compared to as generated under the formation 
rules where is given as: 
IP, 1Q 
iisnce, there are quite strong constraints operating under 
this simple syntax. At string length three, however, the 
constraints are more radical. For instance, at this length 
there are = 6W- possible strings which could be con­
structed.^  This is compared to the six strings which would 
be considered as well formed under the formation rules given 
above. These would be 
T^he linguist often finds himself in the position of 
having to do the opposite of lAat we just accomplished. He 
has a collection of strings which he must suppose are ac­
ceptable, and from these he must abstract the formation rules 
under which they were constructed (see Chomsky, 1965). 
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PVP, PVQ, QVP, QVQ, TIP, 11Q . 
Of course, on top of the constraints imposed upon string 
construction "by the syntax, are those imposed "by the semantic 
aspects of language use (compare with pages 2^ 1^), or as I 
have specifically noted, the rules of re-presentation. 
Semantic stratification . Linguist Charles F. 
Hockett (1968:13) has noted that a universal feature of 
human language is its "reflexiveness". That is, in a lan­
guage one can communicate about language and about communi­
cation. Referring- to the communication patterns of Apis 
mallifera. Hockett notes "Bees dance about sites, but they 
cannot dance about dancing" (Hockett, 1968:13). The notion 
of linguistic reflexivity has also received a great deal of 
attention by mathematicians and philosophers such as Hermes 
(1973:48), Tar ski (19$"6), Watanabe (1969)5 Car nap (1967), 
Bridgeman (1959), Kaminsky (1969) and Reichenbach (1938; 
1966). In such contexts, however, the reflexive use of 
language is dealt with in terms of metalinguistics. In 
general we may define a metalanguage of-level n (denoted 
M^ 'L) as a language "vAiich takes some aspect of a metalanguage 
of level n-1 (lP"^ L) as its object. Relative to 
is extralinguistic. The term "extralinguistic" can thus be 
used in a very relative sense which, makes it compatible with 
my discussion of linguistic vulnerability on pages 77 -78. 
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It should be noted that the classification of a particular 
expression into a given level metalanguage is a functional 
one; i.e., dependent on the particular use to which the ex­
pression is being put (Carnap, 1967:1^ 5-172). Hence, we are 
not talking about the partition of L into n separate lan­
guages. These notions will become clearer as they are used. 
Construction and displacement Finally, we must 
note that any act of construction is simultaneously an act 
of displacement. That is, at the point of construction, in 
producing a string of a given composition and length, the 
actor physically displaces other strings of distinct com­
position and length which might have been constr.ucted at 
that point. This relation among the "construetable" strings 
of L will be important in later chapters. 
This is admittedly a very simplistic formulation of 
L, but for ny immediate requirements it will serve quite 
adequately. My immediate concern in not the development of 
a theory of language, but rather to point out some aspects 
of its use in a very specific form of discourse; namely the 
descriptive act. The primary requirement is that L be some 
symbolic medium, that is to be used for the expression of 
communicative intents; as a pragmatic vehicle, to use 
C. Morris' (1946; 196^ ) now classic designation. (For 
excellent discussions of language and pragmatics see, 
Rommetveit, 1968; Berlyne, 1965j Dewey, 1958. More 
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logical-philosophical presentations are provided by Kaminsky, 
1969; Carnap, 1967; Vasiliu, 1972; Reichenbach, 1966. Of 
course the classical presentation was that provided by 
Charles Saunders Peirce, 1933* In terms of explicit the­
ories of language the reader is invited to consider the 
following sources: Lehmann, 1972; Oiler, 1971; Lamb, 1966; 
Burling, 1970; Chomsky, 1965; Bartsch and Vennemann, 1972; 
and Fodor and Katz. 1964; Hopcroft and Ullman, 1969' ) 
Some Presumptions, Relations and Definitions 
Having briefly examined the fundamental components of 
the descriptive act, we may now begin to more definitely 
consider its nature. Instrumental in this study are the 
following presumptions: 
II:B1 That 0/D and H/I are both competent in L. This 
includes both linguistic competence (cf. Chomsky, 
1965^ 3-15)—that is 0/D and B/I are capable of 
a) forming expressions in L, and b) recognizing 
expressions in L—and commun!cative competence 
(see Chomsky's discussion of performance, 1965: 
3-15; Habermas, 1972:115-1^ ; and Bymes, 197^ : 
12-25); that is 0/D and H/I are capable of using 
the BR in conjunction with V and PR to produce 
meaningful expressions, understood by all mem­
bers of the speech community (Gumperz, 1968: 
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381-386). Here 0/D and H/I form a minimal 
speech community. More specifically, however, 
it is presumed that 0/D and H/I possess re-
presentational competence. 
II:B2 That E is representable in L; i.e., a represen­
tation can be constructed. 
II:B3 That 0/D had access to E; i.e., experienced it, 
v/hile 
II:B4 H/I had no access to E, 
II:B5 That 0/D constructs a representation of E, 
't(E), in L for H/I, and 
II:B6 That S/I has access to -^ E). 
It must be noted at this point, that II:B3 and II;B^  
define the particular nature of the problem as constructed 
here. In essence the consequence of these stipulations is 
that 0/D has no access to the act of ostension. This will 
be an important factor in later sections. These preliminary 
assumptions may be represented as in Figure 2.1. 
Further, it is presumed that: 
II:B7 E is prior to that is -tCE) is, for H/I, 
a form of knowledge a posteriori in the Kantian 
sense (Kant, 1966si); specifically, L-a 
posteriori. 
II:B8 That -UE) is an expression in L, and that 
113 
0/D H/I 
L 
'^(E) 
S 
Figure 2.1. A depiction of some preliminary presupositions 
Competence Competence 
Construction Access 
Access No Access 
II:B9 H/I and 0/D are aware of each other's compe­
tence in L. 
Item II:B7 is an item of interest because it precludes an­
other kind of representation which is also very important 
in scientific endeavors, i.e., the act of instruction 
wherein a nonesisting state-of-affairs is linguistically 
represented in order that this state-of-affairs might be 
produced (cf. Brown, 1972:77-78). Such instructional repre­
sentations, as is exemplified byBridgeman's (1959) notion 
of the "operational definition", lay at the heart of the 
scientific enterprise. Although I do not have the time to 
pursue this point, it is quite likely that this ability to 
reproduce a certain experience, as through experimentation, 
has served as a surrogate for inability to make all ex­
periences ostensively available to all members of the 
scientific community. Relately, and relevant to a point 
un­
considered on page 73, it is quite likely that this ability 
to work with "producible experiences" has had something to 
do with the success of impoverished linguistic forms in the 
physical sciences. When a group of individuals operate in 
a realm lAich ostensively available to all of them, it is 
quite unlikely that they will construct elaborated lin­
guistic codes to deal with that environment. Much of what 
is ineffable is still shareable in this context and there 
would be little motivation to try to push back the limits 
of ineffability. Where experiment can successfully operate 
as a surrogate for ostensive availability is quite likely 
that similar trends will occur. Physicist Norman Campbell 
(1952:84^  has made some reference to this fact as it 
operates in experimental physics. 
Further distinctions 
We must now observe the following definitional dis­
tinctions. FirstJ we shall consider the descriptive act 
to be the sharing of E by 0/D and H/I by means of 't(E), 
in L. This definition is made to distinguish the descrip­
tive act from the act of description, given above as 11:35", 
which is construed to be 0/D's construction of -t(E) in L. 
Further, both of the above are to be distinguished from 
the description itself, which is the linguistic representa­
tion 't(E); the expression constructed by 0/D in L, This 
115 
representation is viewed as having a prepositional nature, 
by -which I mean that it is an asserted, E centered predica­
tion constructed for the purpose of conveying the existence 
of a state of affairs. It has the characteristic of being 
true or false for E. The notation 't(E) has been used to 
distinguish this assertion from the simple string -t. 
Finally there is H/I's act of interpretation which brings 
closure on the descriptive act. These are critical dis­
tinctions. I must also add a terminological note at this 
point; namely, that E will be referred to, particularly in 
later sections, as the substrate of E). 
It should now begin to be obvious as to why the labels 
observer/describer and hearer/interpreter have been adopted 
to denote the two participants in the descriptive act. 
These are implied in Figure 2.1. Each element of each label 
describes the key relationships involved in the descriptive 
act. Thus, observer/describer encapsulates this partici­
pant's access to the extralinguistic event, his role in the 
construction of ^ (5), and his relationship to H/I. The 
label "hearer/interpreter", on the other hand, implies that 
the primary experience available to H/I is ^ (E), and that 
this participant's primary role is first, to receive the 
physical form of 'f'(E), i.e., to hear it (whether or not the 
actual form is auditory is not essential here; it may be 
written or in some other form—the term "hearer" is used 
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figuratively here) and, then, to interpret it. The act of 
interpretation by H/I, however, is not so well defined. It 
has a very important role, however, in our attempt to come 
to grips with the problem of description and before entering 
into a consideration of this act's nature we would do well 
to point out its role in the broader context. 
Explicating the Problem of Description . 
Using the conceptual tools developed thus far we can 
now explicate the problem of description itself, as was 
first noted in the Introduction to this study. Central to 
this explication is the bifurcation of the problem into 
two suggestive component problems: 
II:CI 0/D's problem of employing the elements, V, 
ER, and ER of the linguistic resource base L, 
to construct a representation of the substrate 
E for H/I under the conditions defined by 
II:B2-II:B4, and 
II;C2 H/I's problem of interpreting the constructed 
representation -tCE) to lAich H/I has access. 
Since H/I is the primary consumer of '^ E) and hence a funda­
mental part of 0/D's problematic, we shall begin with an 
analysis of H/I's interpretive problem first. We shall, in 
other words, seek to understand the former problem in terms 
of the latter. 
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The Problem of Interpretation: 
It's Context and Logic 
The context of interpretation: A minimal setting 
Any act of interpretation, vAiether in the confines of 
the scientific community or in the broader societal complex, 
seems to operate within the context of several principles 
and conditions which make the acquisition of L-a posteriori 
forms (and thus their redistribution) an epistemologically 
feasible activity. Relative to the situation as defined by 
items II:B1-II:B9, these are formally given as: 
II:D1 The principle of independent occurrence, or 
H/I's belief that something, E, was the case, 
independent of H/I's access to it. 
II:D2 ïï/1's knowledge that 0/T had access to E (see 
II:B3). 
II:D3 H/I's knowledge that 0/D is competent in L (see 
II:B9). 
II:D^  H/I's knowledge that 0/D constructed 4!^ (E) in L 
(see II:B5). 
With reference to component II:D3, I refer the reader back to 
Cicourel's comments concerning the "imputation of competences" 
among interacting actors (see page 32 ). II:D2 and II:D^  
should not be problematic. Some consideration, however, 
should be given to II:D1. 
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The necessity of item IIîDl stems from the rather 
simple fact that H/I, under condition II:BV, has been denied 
access to E. This fact, unless we want to bring a rather 
trivial form of closure on the descriptive act, entails that 
we equip H/I with this minimal metaphysical assumption. 
This very innocent assumption, in combination with II:D2, 
is, in a very real sense, reflective of man's commitment 
to linguistically shared experience, a commitment society 
ensures (and as is ideally exemplified by the descriptive 
within the scientific community). It is a commitment to a 
Platonic form of realism: a point which fundamentally 
underlies the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis ("Whorf, 1970:212-214-; 
Sapir, 1949:3-23). It is an assumption which undermines 
the doctrine of nominalism in all but the most restricted 
settings (Dewey, 1958:184-185). 
Assumption II:D1 has also received much attention in 
the philosophical community; albeit in more impersonal forms 
For instance Wittgenstein (iriio Ayer, 1966:4-5, credits as 
being the wellspring of logical empiricism) has noted : 
The 'experience' that we need in order 
to understand logic is not that something or 
other is the state of things, but that some­
thing That, however, is not an experience. 
Logic is prior to every experience—that some­
thing is so IAver. 1966:4-5). 
It also finds an alternative expression in Whitehead's (1971 
49) "general fact" that "something is going on; there is an 
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occasion for definition" and Dewey's (1958:1) exclamation 
"A bare event is no event at all; something happens. What 
that something is, is found out by actual study." Since 
these eminent philosophers have found it necessary to pro­
vide this assumption in their systems, it seems rather 
minimal that I do the same for H/I. However, since I must 
accord the reader the same right of denial that was accorded 
to H/I, the reader is free to explore the consequences of 
denying II:D1 (cf. page 96). 
8chutz (1973:11-12) has noted two other perspectives 
;Aich tend to operate in situations such as that involved 
in the descriptive act (specifically the act of interpre­
tation): 
i. The idealization of the interchangeability 
of standpoints: I take it for granted— 
and assume my fellow man does the same— 
that if I change places with him so that 
his "here" becomes mine, I shall be at the 
same distance from things and see them 
with the same typicality as he actually 
does; moreover, the same things would be 
in my reach which are actually in his. 
(The reverse is also true.) 
ii. The idealization of the congruency of the 
system of relevances. Until counterevidence 
I take it for granted—and assume my fellow 
man does the same—that the differences in 
perspective originating in our unique bio­
graphical situations are irrelevant for the 
purpose at hand of either of us and that he 
and I, that "We" assume that both of us have 
selected and interpreted the actually or 
potentially common objects and their fea­
tures in an identical manner, i.e., one suf­
ficient for all practical purposes (Schutz, 
1973:11-12). 
120 
Schutz immediately went on to note that "It is obvious that 
both idealizations, that of the interchangeability of the 
standpoints and that of the congruency of relevances—to­
gether constituting the general thesis of reciprocal per­
spectives—are typifying constructs of objects of thought 
Wiioh supercede the thought of objects of my and my fellow-
man's private experience" (Schutz, 1973:12). I have some­
what included these notions in my concept of re-presenta­
tional competence and they need not be formally entered 
here. It should be noted, however, that when adjustments 
are made in the linguistic resource base in the scientific 
community it is predominantly done about precisely these 
two "idealizations" (cf. Carnap, 1967:241-242). The 
secondary level of ontology is involved here. 
A final point to be noted is that all that is "spoken" 
may not be by 0/D. While -t(E) is considered to be the sole 
product of 0/D's powers of articulation in L, E/l may use 
his competence in L to aid in bringing closure on the 
descriptive act= As a point of fact, we will allow H/I 
two essential privileges: 
II:D5 The right of denial; that is the right to 
assert the falsity of -KS), and 
II;D6 Access to the interrogative form (e.g., "What 
do you mean?"). 
These two privileges form a determinant part of the context 
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of interpretation and enter into its basic logic as we shall 
view shortly. Since II:B2 and II:B3 have curtailed 0/D's 
access to the act of ostension, the consequences are that 
II:D2 must be dealt with in L. This does have significant 
ramifications. 
Items II:D5 and II:D6 define critical rights of any 
member of a scientific community and are generally only 
implicitly dealt -with in works on scientific methodology, 
where the necessary distinctions are often blurred. An 
excellent exception, however, is provided in the following 
quotation by Polanyi (1964:303). 
Epistemology has traditionally aimed at 
defining truth and falsity in impersonal terms, 
for these alone are accepted as truly universal. 
The framework of commitment leaves no scope for 
such an endeavour; for its acceptance neces­
sarily invalidates any impersonal justification 
of knowledge. This can be illustrated by writing 
down a symbolic representation of the elements 
joined together within a commitment and contrast­
ing these with the same elements, when looked 
upon noncommittally from outside the commitment 
situation. We may, for example, represent a 
factual statement 
The arrows in the first row indicate the force of 
commitment and the brackets the coherence of the 
elements involved in the commitment; accordingly, 
in the second row both these sets of symbols are 
omitted (Polanyi, 1964-:303). 
Concerning II:D6, a similarly anticipatory notion is contained 
from within as:{ confident accredited utt6rance"™^ facts ] 
and 
from outside as: subjective declaratory alleged beliefs sentence: facts. 
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in Charles H. Cooley's (1926:68) reflection that we "can 
record "behavior and handle the record by statistics but I 
can see no way of avoiding the ultimate question, What does 
it mean?" In general, however, our access to these two 
privileges is deci(%edly and practically finite. 
The logic of interpretation: Construction, displacement 
and ontology 
At the primary ontological level (the level in which 
the kernel ontology is expressed) we find a kind of primary 
logic which seems to be universal to acts of interpretation. 
When viewed from the analytically isolated perspective of 
the primary logic, every description is of a bifactual na­
ture. First there is the objective fact that the linguistic 
representation seeks to portray^  This objective fact pre­
ceded the construction of the description and presumably 
placed severe restrictions upon lAiat strings would be con­
sidered "re-presentationally well formed". Secondly, there 
is a logical fact which is given in the act of re-presentation 
itself, and in the right of ÏÏ/I to pursue that acts objec­
tive factuality, as given in II:D5 and II:D6. By virtue of 
its logical factual nature, every act of description is pre­
ceded by a space lAiich was given in 0/D*s capacity for re­
presentation; a capacity vdiich, as given on page 53? was 
ezlstentially prior to E itself. This descriptive space. 
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or linguistic uncertainty structure (see pages6^ -65 ), pro­
vides the Cartesian environment for particular acts of 
description. Such acts of description are merely realiza­
tions of what was a priori possible for re-presentation. 
It is this logical factual nature vdiich is of primary in­
terest in the following pages. 
Now, to facilitate the presentation and assuming that 
we are at least as rational as B/I, let us assume the role 
of B/I in the descriptive act. If we begin with the con­
sideration of II:D3 and IIlimiting our considerations 
to 0/D's linguistic competencies only (review page 111), 
then the following facts are given. 
First, by definition, we know that 0/D is capable of 
using the elements of V in conjunction with the FR to con­
struct an indefinite number of well formed strings or ex­
pressions. This linguistic competence, abstracted from any 
concern for pragmatics or semantics, is represented by the 
class of all well formed strings <2. By II;B1 we also have 
this competence and would require it to implement our 
privileges as given in II:D^  and II:D6. Secondly, we know 
that 0/D did construct in L, and that it is to lAiich 
we have access. This act of construction is clearly equiv­
alent to a selection from <^ . Viewed either way, however, 
as a construction or selection (construction only being 
selection at a lower level), this syntactic aspect of the 
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act of description may be properly viewed as a Cartesian 
outcome; the volitional realization of an a priori syntactic 
potential. 
From these two facts, and our knowledge of L, we also 
know that, by constructing -t, 0/D volitionally displaced 
all other expressions in L (or «ï-j see page 110) which bear 
a composition distinct from that of-i. This relation, i.e., 
that of displacement, is a relation that holds between -l and 
every other expression in <£, at the point of construction. 
The class «£, however, represents more than 0/D's 
syntactic potentials. It also represents 0/D's general com­
municative capacities; his potential for interrogation, for 
exclamation, for directive speech (Ross, 1968). Following 
Wittgenstein (1968:6e-l4e) we can view X as a kind of 
linguistic tool box at 0/D's disposal. In a more special­
ized sense, however, 2 is a reflection of 0/D's re-presenta-
tional capacity. It is in this context (and in the context 
of 0/D's re-presentational competence) that a string, 
becomes -^ (2), a representation. It is in this context that 
its construction becomes significant. More critically, 
however, it is in the context of 0/D's capacity for re­
presentation that the displacement itself begins to bear a 
semantic burden. For the kernel ontology evolves out of 
the derivative interpretive belief that this displacement 
represents something other than a linguistic fact; that the 
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displacement that occurred, bv virtue of 0/D's construction 
of -fXE), is itself a re-presentation of something. The 
description 0/D constructed for us in L, will only have 
semantic value to us, if the displacement its construction 
embodies is reflected in its semantic substrate. It is this 
kernel ontological implication -which is active in every act 
of interpretation, regardless of "higher level" ontological 
divergences, and regardless of whether the re-presentation 
is couched in some natural language (such as L is deemed to 
be) or in explicit re-presentational system which is embedded 
in a larger" natural language (a possibility not denied by 
my presentation). It is also this rather simple ontological 
implication which finds its formalization in the works of 
the pragmatists and the logical positivists (for instance, 
in the theory of veriflability). 
The kernel ontology, however, is also the generative 
source of indeterminancy in acts of re-presentation. For 
by giving semantic significance to the dlsplacement. we 
leave open questions coacer-ning the semantic organization of 
displacement relative to 0/D's re-presentational capacities. 
Alfred North Whitehead addressed the nature of this in­
determinancy quite directly in his text Process and Reality: 
An Essay in Cosmology. 
There are no brute, self contained matters 
of fact, capable of being understood apart from 
interpretation as an element in a system. When­
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ever we attempt to express the matter of im­
mediate experience, we find that its understand­
ing leads us beyond itself, to its contempo­
raries, to its past, to itg" future, and to the 
universal s in erms of which its défini teness 
is exhibited (italics mine) (Alfred North 
Whitehead, 1969a:18)-
The point is that every proposition refers 
to a universe of factuality exhibiting some 
general systematic metajdiysical character. 
Apart from this background. the separate enti­
ties which go to form the proposition, and the 
proposition as a whole. are without determinant 
character. Nothing has been defined, because 
every definite entity requires a systematic 
universe to supply its requisite status. Thus 
every proposition proposing a fact must, in 
its complete analysis, propose the general 
character of the untverse required for that 
fact. There are no self sustained facts, 
floating in nonentity (italics mine) (Alfred 
North Whitehead, 1969a:l4). 
This "universe of factuality", as Whitehead has termed it, 
is the Cartesian environment elicited by 0/D*s construction 
of '^ (E). The kernel ontology, however, only implied its 
existence and left its nature unspecified. A more "com­
plete analysis" requires that we consider the ramifications 
of ^ (E)' s prepositional nature and in conjunction with the 
elements of the contezt of interpretation; particularly the 
privileges accorded to us in II:D5 and II:D6. These con­
siderations will take us to an initial specification of the 
primary ontological level. 
Now, by II:D1 we know that something, E, was the case 
and that, by II:D2, it was cognitively available to 0/D. 
By virtue of II;D3 and II:D4- we also have reason to believe 
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that t(E) does portray "what was the case"; i.e., it is an 
effective re-presentation of E. This would lead us to be­
lieve that other possible re-presentations were displaced 
by idiat was the case. To pursue the nature of the displace­
ment, however, we may use our basic privileges. By II:B4 
we have been accorded the right to deny the accessible 
description -tCE), which 0/D asserts to be a representation 
of S. That is, we have the privilege of being able to deny 
the objective factuality of -tÇE). Therefore, we shall use 
this privilege and assert l't(E) with the knowledge that 
"^ 't(E)" is a statement which is true when ^ (E) is false 
and false when 't(E) is true. We have asserted l't(E) to be 
true and therefore must consider 't(E) to be false. 
Now recalling our earlier discussion of the reflexive 
property of language (see page 109) and the semantic strati­
fication of L it induces, we may note that our assertion of 
1^ (E) is a metalinguistic statement. More directly, if we 
view 0/D's 't(E) as being an expression in a re-pre-
sentational resource base (functionally parallel to my 
earlier notion of a "collective representation"), then we 
might view our own expression l't(E) as being an expression 
in a M^ L resource base. But by II:D1, something was the 
case. Thus, 'I't(E), by merely stating that something (the 
truth of 't(E)) was not the case seems to be lacking as a 
representation E. This is especially true if we recall that. 
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by II:B2, B is representable in L, that 0/D had the capacity 
to construct it, and. that it would be contained in Z. More 
specifically, it would be contained in the class of all 
strings construetable in M^ L. 
That is, there presumably exists, in 2 C JE., an ex­
pression -t' that vâien asserted with respect to E, say (E), 
would be true -vôienever our denial l-tCE) was true. The as­
sertion -t'CE) is said to fill the vacuum of denial and the 
assumption of its existence I shall term the principle of 
vacuousness under denial. Thus (a matter for further ex­
ploration, we seek an expression which, •vrtien asserted, is 
logically equivalent to 'I't(E), under the law of contradic­
tion, but is not identical with Such an expression 
1 
•^ nhen we deal with the notion of the denial, or nega­
tion, of an expression we generally have two approaches avail­
able. Both conform to the stipulation to the truth table 
definition of the negation of an expression as being another 
statement vSiose truth value is always opposite of the truth 
value of the statement negated. The first approach simply 
considers the negation of an expression to be the translation 
of that statement into its negative form; i.e., into a nega­
tive statement of the same metalinguistic order. For example, 
following Hintikka ( 1970a :6), define 
A = the wind is blowing, and 
1A = the wind is not blowing. 
The second approach, the one we have adopted, views the nega­
tion of an expression to simply be a statement denyi^  the 
truth of the original expression. For example, we might con­
sider 1A to be the statement "The proposition 'the wind is 
blowing' is false." While equivalent to the first strategy 
under the truth table specification this second form is bet­
ter suited to the problem of description. For example is we 
define 
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would be said to be incompatible with -tCE) in M^ L. If in 
addition to being incompatible to -t(E) in M^ L, we can con­
struct a string lAich, when asserted, is equivalent to l-tCB) 
under the law of the excluded middle, such a string would be 
termed its ideal complement in M^ L. We assume that it is 
generally the case that not all incompatible expressions in 
M^ L are ideal complements. To specify the nature of such a 
complement we will have to approach the problem of descrip­
tion form 0/D's role. From this position we can begin to 
more completely point out the nature of the primary ontolog-
ical level. Before making this transition, however, some 
conclusions may be drawn. 
In the first place we began our role as H/I with a 
consideration of the fact of 0/D's construction of -t(E) 
A = (jgf the temperature is 70 degrees fahrenheit, 
then the interpretation 
1A = the temperature is not 70 degrees 
does not seem to convey much information. 
The significance of the expression "under the law of 
contradiction" is that we are not yet ready to assert the 
universal substitutability of -tKE; for I'&CE). For ^instance 
we are not ready to assert that 't(E)V'tHE) = 
where the right side of the equivalence is a key component in 
the law of the excluded middle. Here, using the example al­
ready given, we would find the expression 
the proposition 'the temperature is 70 
degrees fahrenheit' is false, 
under the law of contradiction; i.e., AA A-^  = AA1A = 0 
(•where 0 is an ideal statement vhich is always false). It 
would not necessarily be so under the law of the excluded 
middle. For example, AVA^  does not carry the "necessary 
truth" carried by AA-iA. The truth of AVA^  is still "con­
tingent" upon experience. 
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subsequent displacement all other strings in <£. As a con­
sequence of this we noted that the kernel ontological impli­
cation was that this displacement was significant. Under 
the principle of vacuousness under denial we learned that, 
due to its prepositional nature, the construction of -CCE) 
generated a factual displacement as well. This is White­
head's factual universe. Belatedly, Whitehead (1969b:l5-
16) has noted that "every actual occasion is set within a 
realm of alternative interconnected entities. This realm 
is disclosed by all the untrue propositions which can be 
predicated significantly of that occasion. It is the realm 
of alternative suggestions, whose foothold in actuality 
transcends each actual occasion. " Further, he notes that an 
"event is decisive in proportion to the importance (for it) 
of its untrue propositions s Their relevance to the event 
cannot be dissociated from what the event is in itself . . . ." 
The Problem of Representation: 
Construction, Complement and Re-presentation 
Earlier (page 116) we noted that the problem of de-
scription could be reduced to two smaller problems. One of 
these was the problem of interpretation which we just briefly 
examined. The other was the problem of representation; i.e., 
0/D*s problem of employing the elements of V, PR, and RR of 
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the linguistic resource base L, to construct a representa­
tion of the substrate E for H/I under the conditions defined 
by We also said that this last problem could 
be better understood in terms of the problem of interpreta­
tion. We will begin this section by reflecting upon this 
point. 
At the heart of the problem of interpretation, and a 
precondition for further "understanding" vjas the necessity 
of drawing out the ontological implications of displacement. 
On 0/D's side, lAich we may now assume, this manifests it­
self as the vramatîc requirement of maintaining the valid­
ity of the displacement embodied in the construction of any 
given representation; to make sure that it is more than a 
linguistic phenomena; to make sure that it is a factual dis­
placement as well. Although I believe it to be too sim­
plistic for my overall system, the following statement by 
Richard von Mises (1951) strikes at the crux of the issue. 
A factual statement has significant meaning 
if it is possible to describe in observational 
terms two different states of the universe—one 
that takes place when the statement is true, and 
another one vhen it is not (Richard von Mises, 
1951:76). 
This pragmatic principle has all too long been viewed as an 
issue one only confronts in "hypothesis testing". If, how­
ever, it does not also operate at the level of re-presenta-
tion, then other levels of research relying on "lower order" 
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descriptive schemes are for naught. The finest statistics 
cannot salvage their utility. 
Before proceeding into an examination of the problem 
of representation (0/D's role), another point is in order. 
Those techniques iijhich rely on the use of natural language 
resources for the re-presentation of observations do gen­
erally imply significant displacement. This is perhaps due 
to our comfort in using them. Inhere they fail, hovrever, is 
in the ezplicitness of the specification of what was dis­
placed. They inform us about what the researcher confronted 
in his experience but not what he was prepared to confront. 
Because of their complexity natural languages usually suf­
fice as mediums for re-presentation but not as re-presenta­
tional systems. We will return to this in the next chapter. 
On the other hand, those which rely on "quantitative" tech­
niques for description often have well-defined ideal com­
plements for any representation constructed within them; 
they provide definitive Cartesian environments. Their fail-
4 V» f» 4 m +* Tim/4 av» TwvrwnT O C**I M CP 
^ CbiO ^ -k 6 V g * dh ci fc WW4» www** 
niques, a representation constructed in them may fail to have 
a valid displacement. As a result it fails to re-present at 
all and cannot be considered to be part of a re-presenta-
tional system. This is particularly true with regard to data 
produced under certain "data reduction" regimes which the 
sociological community has unfortunately inherited from its 
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educational and psychological kin. This, and data reduction 
in general, will also be discussed in Chapter III. One 
thing "which must be learned by student of "quantitative" 
methodology is that measurement systems are first and fore­
most re-presentational systems (i.e., systems which provide 
definitive Cartesian environments for acts of representa­
tion and ensure valid displacement). The "assignment of 
numbers to objects" never assured any enterprise of being a 
scientific one. 
Returning once again to the problem of representation, 
and in light of the comments made in the previous section, 
the problem of representation can be reduced from the problem 
of construction in L to the problem of selection from It 
was noted that construction was only a lower order selection 
procedure (see pages 103-104-, page 123). More specifically, 
if we consider M^ L to be a hypothetical re-presentational 
resource base, and «£"'• as the class of all strings generated 
under M^ L, then the problem of representation can be reduced 
to the selection and assertion of a string from <2^ . 
By II;B2 the extralinguistic event E is representable 
in M^ L; i.e., a representation can be constructed. Put an­
other way, there exists least one string in vihich would 
be true of E. It does not guarantee the uniqueness of the 
representation, however. Indeed, nonuniqueness is a neces­
sary condition under the requirements of II;D6 and pragmatic 
13^  
principle just elucidated. One cannot answer the question 
"What do you mean by 't(E)'?" by repeating 't(E). 
Expressions in which may be used to convey the 
same proposition are said to differ only "accidentally". 
Such "accidental features are those that result from the 
particular way in which the prepositional sign is produced" 
(Wittgenstein, 1968:33)* Those expressions vriaich differ 
only accidentally are said to have the same "essential" 
features,^  namely the proposition vdiich they all are cap-
2 
able of conveying. On the other hand, there are expressions 
in 2^  which may be said to differ in their essential features. 
They can be used to express different propositions. With 
"A proposition is a term capable of signifying a state 
of affairs. To define a proposition as an expression which 
is true or false, is correct enough but inauspicious, because 
it easily leads to identification of the proposition with the 
statement or assertion of it; whereas the element of asser­
tion in a statement is extraneous to the proposition as­
serted. The proposition is something assertable; the content 
of the assertion; and this same state of affairs can also be 
questioned, denied, or merely supposed, and can be entertained 
in other moods as well" (Lewis, 1971:49). 
p 
A very similar notion is contained in the transfor­
mational linguist's notion of "deep vs. surface" structure 
elements. In general a member of a language community will 
possess the ability to symbolically represent the same 
thought in a number of ways (cf., Beechhold and Behling, 
1972:122-129; Chomsky, 1965:16-17). Rather than "accident" 
differences, then, we would speak of "surface" differences. 
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these notions in mind we may ideally simplify our task by 
defining an equivalence relation on 2^  vdiich would parti­
tion into distinct classes of expressions. Within each 
class the expressions could be said to differ only acci­
dentally. Expressions taken from any two distinct classes 
would be said to differ essentially. We can produce a fur­
ther simplification by selecting a single expression from 
each class and forming a new class of expressions which we 
might denote as ). 
The newly formed class may itself be partitioned 
into two further subclasses. Of interest, here, is the 
class of expressions which can be asserted meaningfully of 
the given experience E. This new class we may denote 
E(c£^ ,E). From this class we select a single expression 
which is to serve as a representation for E. Sticking to 
our earlier notation we will denote this string as t and 
its asserted form as 't(E). Now, as before, we note that 
•t(E)'s selection displaced the selection of every other 
expression in E(.£^ .E). We now wish to locate the organiza­
tion in this displacement. In essence, in looking for the 
ideal complement of t(E) in E(Ji^ ,E), we are looking for a 
subclass of expressions, say such that 
-tCE) At^ (E) = 0 i,j=l,2,.. ,k 
-t^ CE) A^ j(S) = 0 
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and 
(^E) VC-^ g^ CE) V^ 2(B)V... V/E^ (B)) 5 A . 
"Where 0 is a special proposition vàiich is false in "all 
possible worlds" (Mates, 1972:335)? while A is a proposi­
tion which is true in "all possible worlds". By the above 
we can see that each element of the complement (a factual 
complement to distinguish it from a mere set relationship) 
satisfies the criterion established earlier; i.e., 
-tCE) ^^ (E) = -tCE) AltCE) = 0 . 
While, "in disjunctive form", the complement is logically 
equivalent to 'I't(E) under the law of the excluded middle; 
i.e., 
(^E) VC-t^ CE) V^ C^E) V... V-C^ CE)) =^ (E)Vl^ (E) = A . 
We will denote the collection 't(E), -t^ (E), ... -E^ CE) as 
EU\ E, ^ ). 
It will generally be the case, however, the E(X^ , E) 
will contain expressions which are incompatible with 't(E), 
but which are nonetheless not suitable for membership in 
E(Z^ , E, /&). To understand this we will need to take a glance 
at some concepts in the secondary ontological layer. 
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Dis-iunetive forms, compossibility and descriptive dimen­
sionality 
The concepts of the secondary ontological level can 
best be introduced if we view E(<£.^ ,E) as containing a class 
of simple or "elemental" expressions. Such expressions 
would be viewed as irreducible to combinations of other 
expressions in E(J£^ ,B) and all other expressions E(2^ ,B) 
can be viewed as complex expressions composed of these 
simpler forms. We now want to discuss some relatively 
elementary relationships vdaich can obtain between such 
strings. 
The first of these relationships is that of compos­
sibility. Two expressions are said to compossible if they 
are not incompatible. That is the truth of one does not 
displace the truth of the other (Mates, 1972:3^ 0-3^ 1)* If 
we view this set of expressions as being fairly well defined, 
then the dimensionality of a description constructed from 
that set as being the number of expressions in this set 
'wiiich can simultaneously "be asserted to be true. If, for 
instance, all expressions of the set are mutually incompat­
ible, then the dimensionality of a description produced 
under the full set would be one. If the dimensionality of 
the set were two, then the set could be partitioned into two 
subsets. Within each subset the strings would be mutually 
incompatible and with properties similar to the collection 
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E(Z^ ;E,^ ) as discussed above. Any pair of strings in vh.±ch 
one is selected from each subset, however, would be compos-
sible or logically independent. Hie number of expressions 
contained in a given dimension would be termed its power. 
Assuming that E(o£^ ,E) is p dimensional,^  with the i^  ^
dimension being of power m^ , then our selected representation 
't(E) can be assumed to have the form 
P (k) 
-^ (E) = A (V,i. ^ a. (E)) 
i=l ij 
• (k) n^  (k) 
(V^   ^a (E)) A ... A (V P 9 a (E)) 
k=o ij k=o pj 
where i=l,2,...,P indicates dimension, j=l,2,...,m^  identi­
fies the expression, and the superscript k (o <k <m^ ) is an 
enumerative index designating the number of elemental ex­
pressions contained in the i^  ^component of the disjunctive 
form. Hence a component 
n-^ , (k) 
V ^   ^a (E) 
k=o IJ 
designates a disjunctive form constructed by the successive 
disjunction of n^  ^expressions selected from among the m^  ^
By p dimensional it is meant that the class of ele­
mental expressions contained in E(2l,E) can be partitioned 
into p groups as described above. 
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expressions defining the i^  ^dimension. Such a component 
may be selected from among 
°^ i m. i^ m. (m. -1 )... (m. -n.+1 ) 
possible disjunctive forms in the i^  ^dimension. 
Then, for all p dimensions of ECX^ ,B), the expression 
-iCE), as defined above, represents a selection from (and a 
displacement of) 
P 
p % m. P m. i-o^  
n [ 2 O-)] = n 2 1 = 2^  0 
i=l n^ =o n^  i=l 
expressions. If n^ =o for the i^  dimension, i=l,2,...,p, 
4-V 
then we may say that the i""'" dimension has been deleted; 
The number of dimensions for which n^ A^) is said to be the 
effective dimensinnai i tv of the expression. 
An expression whose effective dimensionality is one 
(in the i dimension), having the form 
(k)  
 ^a (E) 
k=l ij 
can be constructed in 
m> 1 1 m. m,-1 
2 ( 1) = 2 1 
0^ =1 Ili_ 
i4o 
different ways. If in such an expression, then it 
can be said that it expressed total indifference in the i^  ^
dimension. The truth of such an expression is not con­
tingent upon experience. If n^  ^<m^ , then the expression is 
factual or contingent upon the nature of the experience. 
The class of all such expressions for which n^ =l (i.e., the 
m^  elemental expressions defining the dimension, are said 
to be maximallv contingent. An expression (whose effective 
dimensionality is one) which is neither maximally contingent 
nor expressive of total indifference is said to be simply 
contingent. There are 
m. 
2 - m^  ^- 2 
such expressions which can be selected- Finally, the comple­
ment of a one dimensional expression composed of n^  ele­
mental expressions is a disjunctive form composed of the 
remaining m^ -n^  ^elemental expressions. 
Assuming that the effective dimensionality of ^ (E) 
is q <p (and for some fixed set of dimensions—we are net 
concerned with the selection of q dimensions from p) and 
q effective dimensions are of powers m^ ,m2,. • • ,niq (assuming 
we are working with the first q dimensions to simplify mat­
ters), then -t(E) is selected from among 
1^ 1 
m. q 1 m. q m. 
f i  [  2  (  1 ) ]  =  n  (2  1 -1 )  
i=l iij^ =l i=l 
expressions of the form 
q i^-^ i (k ) 
i^(E) = A (V a (E)) . 
i-1 1=1 ii 
Such an expression is said to express total indifference in 
the q dimensions if n^  =m^  for all i=l,2,...,q. If n^  =1 
for all i=l,2,...,q, the expression is said to be maximally 
contingent in the q dimensions. Since 
ye may note that their are precisely 
n m. 
i=l 1 
such expressions. If we let 2^  = Ca^ 2,5®i2'* * *'°imi^  define 
the i^  ^dimension for all i, then the set of all expressions 
(in q dimensions) for vàiich n^  =1 for 1=1,2,...,q defines 
a special relation among the q dimensions vàiich is typically 
called their product. We have noted that the product of 
these q dimensions, then, would be a class of 
li m_. 
i=l 1 
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expressions having the form 
coj_(E) = a^ (^E)A a^ jCE) A... Aa^ (^E) 
An arbitrarily chosen component a. .(E) of such a representa-
-1-J 
tion would be said to be its "projection onto the i^  ^dimen­
sion (MacLane and Birkhoff, 1967:12). 
We may denote the collection co^ ,co25« • • 5©.^ ,^  as Q. To 
facilitate later discussions, any maximally contingent ex­
pression in q dimensions will be termed a cellular represen­
tation. Such maximally contingent or cellular representations 
are of critical import since any expression of the form 
q n-Cn. (k) 
A (V ^   ^o (E)) 
i=l k=o ij 
can be expanded into the disjunction of 
q 
• n n. 
i=l  ^
cellular representations; its expanded cellular form. A 
knowledge of this fact makes the task of complementation 
much simpler. As an example consider an expression con­
structed in a two dimensional resource base 
% ^^ ll'°12'^ 13^  
2^ " ^ 2^19^ 22'^ 23^  
1^ 3 
where the expression has the form 
(a^ iCE) Va^ (^E)) ACa^ gCE)) . 
Assuming the validity of the distributive law (AVB) AC E 
(A AC) V(B AC) we get 
(a^ (^E) Aa22(E)) V(a^ (^E) Aa^ C^E)) . 
Similarly, an expression of total indifference in these two 
dimensions 
(a^ iCEjVa^ gCB) Va^ (^E)) ACag^ CE) Va^ C^E) Ya^^iE)) 
can be rewritten as 
A E (a^ (^E) Aa^ ^^ CE)) V(a^ 3_(E) Aa^ C^E)) V (a^ (^E) A 
Og^ CE))?... V(a^ 3(E) Ao^ iCE)) VCa^ C^E) Aa^ gCE)) V 
(a^ C^E) Aa^ C^E)) 
Similarly, it is assumed, our selected representation -t(E) 
can be expressed as 
n<m. (k) 
(^E) = V  ^OX; (E) 
k=l  ^
We shall return to this shortly. A notion conceptually par­
allel to that of cellular representation is that of a point 
representation in a q dimensional cartesian product space. 
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A point representation would have the form 
A point representation and a cellular representation may be 
considered as propositionally equivalent. 
Excluding the single statement expressing total in­
difference in the q dimensions, and the 
IT m-
i=l  ^
cellular representations, there are 
q m. q 
n (2 -1) - n ni.-i 
i=i 1=1 ^  
expressions which have a contingent or factual nature. 
Should n^  =m^  for the i^  ^dimension in such an expression, 
that expression is said to express total indifference rela­
tive to that dimension. From an earlier result we know 
that there are 
q m. 
n (2 -m.-2) 
i=l  ^
expressions, among those of a factual nature, which show 
total indifference in no dimension; i.e., n^ , <mj^  for all 
i=l,2,...,q. Hence there are 
q m. q m. q 
H (2 -l) - n (2 -m.-2) - n hl—l 
i=l 1=1  ^ i=l  ^. 
expressions of a factual nature ^ daich show indifference in 
at least one (and at most q-1) dimensions, and which can be 
constructed in a resource base of q dimensions of powers 
1^ '^ 2 ' * * * '^ q* 
Now, we have assumed that the effective dimensionality 
of our selected representation -tCB) is q. To find its 
complement and determine the incompatible expressions com­
pris!^  it we simply put 't(E) in its expanded cellular 
form, comprised of the successive disjunction of 
q 
n n.. 
i=l ^  
cellular representations. Parallel to the one dimensional 
case the complement of our expression -^ (E) may be formed by 
the successive disjunction of the remaining 
q q 
H HL - n n_-
i=l ^  i=l ^  
maximally contingent expressions. Each component cellular 
representation in this complement would be incompatible with 
-tCE) and the class of cellular representations in the 
complement augmented by 't(E) would define E(jl^,E,^). Be­
cause of the obvious central!ty of Q in the analysis of the 
1^ 6 
displacement properties of any description generated in its 
q dimensions, we may consider Q the re-presentational 
system we would seek to specify. 
Notes on indifference^  uncertainty and the validity of dis­
placement 
Throughout the previous pages I have used the concepts 
of uncertainty and indifference quite frequently. Due to 
the ambiguity of the concepts, however, this distinction re­
quires a brief examination. The essence of the distinction 
lies in temporal ordering and the purpose of the description. 
Now the linguistic resource base E(<£^ ,E) was noted to 
exist prior to the described experience and thus prior to 
the description itself. In this context an expression of 
"""" p m, (k) 
B(E) = A (Y ^  a (E)) 
i=l k=l ij 
can be viewed as a statement of total readiness of 0/D to 
describe the experience E; it is an inventory of what 0/D 
could say in E(<£."^ ,E) concerning E. In listing what can be 
said about E, prior to the occurrence of S, it is said to 
express 0/D's linguistic uncertainty structure. 
On the other hand, if we are given an expression of 
the form 
1^ 7 
p (k) 
B'(E) = A (V ^   ^a (E)) 
i=l k=o ij 
as the description (i.e., as a form of L-a posteriori 
knowledge) then we may say that 0/D is displaying some 
indifference with respect to the exact nature of E (as 
specifiable in E(J£^ ,E)). 
A description in the form of B'(E) also represents 
some critical decisions on the part of 0/D. The first con­
cerns the decision to specify such an indifference structure 
at all; to treat certain possible descriptive forms as some­
how equivalent or not meriting distinction. The second realm 
of decision concerns the effective dimensionality of the 
expression and harkens back to Schutz's concept of the 
"idealization ox the coagi-aency of the system of r-elevanees" 
(see pages 119-120). irfhy should certain dimensions be in­
cluded in the descriptive form while others are deleted. 
These decisions are critical and can impact the validity of 
displacement in descriptive acts. This is especially true 
of decisions concerning indifference. 
Pragmatics and Displacement in 
Re-presentational Systems 
The success of the act of description, be it in a 
natural language or in a euclidean n-space, is predicated 
upon the validity of the displacement "vdiich that act embodies. 
1^ 8 
Such occur in all acts of description. Unless the displace­
ment is more than an artifactual property, however, the act 
of description cannot be considered as a component of the 
larger re-presentational complex. The necessity of the 
scientific community's dependence on L-a posteriori forms 
has led it to not only seek valid displacement (as was re­
flected in Mises' pragmatic principle) but also to specify 
the nature of the displacement as well. The specification 
of this displacement occurs at three ontological levels; 
the primary, secondary, and ternary. The effect of speci­
fication at the primary and secondary levels is the creation 
of a re-presentational system. Such a system allows the 
researcher to not only convey what he did experience, but 
also -what he was prepared to experience. It provides an 
effectively determinant Cartesian environment for any act of 
re-presentation. This it does by two stages. At the primary 
level, for a given act of description, it specifies the 
nature of the displacement in the external form of its ideal 
complement. At the secondary level it becomes concerned 
with the internal organization of the displacement. 
Within a well-defined re-presentational system the 
pragmatic principle must be altered from one only concerned 
with the displacement of factuality (as in Mises, formulation) 
to one concerned with the validity of specific displacements 
within the system; all possible displacements, in fact. This 
1^ 9 
generalization is the direct ramification of the principle 
of vacuousness upon the pragmatic principle noted earlier. 
If a particular displacement cannot be defended in the man­
ner specified by the pragmatic principle, then the displace­
ment is pragmatically trivial and may be considered as a 
point of indifference for those who rely upon the observer/ 
describer's use of the system as a source of L-a posteriori 
knowledge. 
Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter I have pursued a very elementary study 
of the descriptive act and the problems it engenders. The 
treatment was naive and incomplete. Many technicalities 
were omitted "which would be necessary for a thorough analysis. 
For instance, following Watanabe (1969) it could have been 
shown that the logic of re-presentation can be viewed as a 
model for certain algebraic structures; in particular Boolean 
and non-Boolean lattice structures (MacLane and Birkhoff, 
1967:482-20?). All acts of description imply the existence 
of such structures through their kernel ontology. Their 
form is simply indeterminant in many cases. Belatedly, 
and associated with our concern for the "validity of all 
possible displacements", there is a great need to explore 
the combinatorial properties of finite re-presentational 
systems. Although we may like to believe otherwise, all 
I50a 
works in sociology have been based in discrete, finite re­
presentational systems. If we ever want to become adept 
at "data reduction", we must also gain expertise in enumerat­
ing the possibility structures such data reduction pro­
cedures produce and the manner in lAich they effect dis­
placement properties. 
Regardless of the "preliminary" nature of this chapter, 
however, I have introduced certain notions which will be 
useful in the next chapter. Here the concept of re-pre­
sentational system will be embedded more deeply into areas 
of methodological concern. Specifically, we will become 
concerned with the role of re-presentational systems in 
theory construction, induction and "data" reduction. The 
notion of -valid displacement" will be critical throughout. 
Figure 2.2 has been constructed to schematically summarize 
the results of this chapter. 
The Descriptive Act 
Act of Description Act of Interpretation 
Linguistic Resources 
Linguistic (d ca 
Resources 
C-jâ posteriori 
"knowledge 
O 0) 
•H-P 
•P w q 
The occurrence 
of E 
0/D's and H/I's 
competence in 
L=def(V,FR.RR.c£) 
as a linguistic 
resource base 
0/D's articulation 
of -t(E) and subse­
quent displacement 
of other strings 
in £• 
0/D's construction 
(and ontological 
specification) of 
'tCE)(the descrip­
tion) 
H/I's reception 
of UE) 
H/I's interpretation 
of 't(E); ontological 
implications of dis­
placement considered. 
L-_g. posteriori knowl­
edge produced 
4 k 
M 
vn 
§ 
Temporal Flow 
Figure 2.2. The major components of the descriptive act and their sequential 
relationships 
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CHAPTER III. FINAL NOTES CONCERNING THEORY, REDUCTION 
AND RE-PRESENTATIONAL SYSTEMS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
. . . all the concepts of theoretical knowledge 
constitute merely an upjer stratum of logic which 
is founded upon a lower stratum, that of the 
logic of language. 
All theoretical cognition takes its departure 
from a world already performed by language; the 
scientist, the historian, even the philosopher, 
lives with his objects only as language presents 
them to him. 
Ernst Cassirer (1953b:28) 
Some Preliminary Remarks 
Throughout the first two chapters of this dissertation 
I have explored the nature and ramifications of the simple 
descriptive act. I have noted that this act was an integra­
tive starting point for any attempt to develop a generic 
methodology, one capable of articulating, in a nontrivial 
way, the close-knit kinship of the entire gamut of existing 
methodological techniques- Its integrative natiire was said 
to stem from the facts that: 
1. The least form of scientific experience is L-a 
•posteriori in nature, 
2. The problem of description confronts all approaches 
to sociological knowledge, and 
3. That the descriptive act expresses a core ontology 
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(the kernel ontology) about which other (di­
vergent) ontological forms evolve. 
In Chapter II we examined the extent to which these facts 
lead us to a concern for re-presentational systems. When 
we begin to conceive of the sociological community as a 
system designed for the acquisition, construction and re­
distribution of L-a posteriori forms of knowledge we can 
see that such re-presentational systems play two major 
roles. First, they provide a systematic basis for communi­
cations concerning idienomena of theoretical interest. This 
they do by providing definitive Cartesian environments for 
acts of description; environments with well-defined dis­
placement properties. Built upon the foundations laid by 
this first role is the second; such re-presentational sys­
tems provide a contingency bese for higher order theoretical 
activity. In this chapter we will give a very exploratory 
analysis of this second role, and discuss its implication 
for theoretical activity in the social sciences. 
Theory and the L-a posteriori: 
Some Basic Principles 
Theoretical activity arises out of the necessity of 
being able to anticipate occurrences in the real world: It 
arises out of perceived uncertainties concerning future ex­
perience. A theory, in essence, i£ a system for anticipation 
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(Popper, 1968:32; Lundberg, 1964; Meehan, 1968; Bridgeman, 
1959; Dubiiij 1969:5-9; Lewis, 1971). In terms of the need 
to anticipate future occurrences, set goals and engage in 
"meaningful" behavior, the ability to theorize is a neces­
sary precondition for human existence. 
If we accept the premise that scientific experience 
is li-a posteriori in nature, then scientific theoretical 
systems are constructed around the task of anticipating in 
L-a priori uncertainty structures. In the scientific com­
munity the first order of business is not the development 
of propositions or formulae (in the sense in which these 
terms are used in the "theory construction" manuals), but 
rather the specification of the nature of the uncertainty 
itself. This leads us to the problem of description and 
the broader problems of re-presentational complexes. For 
although a theory meets experience at the "cutting edge" 
(see page 89), strictly speaking theory is not "about" ex­
perience, but about mechanisms for re-presenting experience— 
linguistic systems. Such re-presentational frameworks are 
the "factual windows" of the re-presentational complex. 
It is the facts, as given in re-presentatipn, to which 
a theory addresses itself; reality is addressed only in­
directly (this being the lesson of both logical positivism 
and pragmatism). Properly speaking (a point to be elabo­
rated in the next section), -vôiat is typically termed theory 
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in current discussion is, in actuality a metalinguistic 
phenomena. This point was well made in the leading quota­
tion of this chapter, as was expressed in Cassirer's text 
Language and Myth (1953a). To be meaningful it depends upon 
the existence of a language of a lower order. It is the role 
of this lower order language which is filled most system­
atically by re-presentational systems; Quine's "man-made 
fabric" (Quine, 1963^ 2^). 
Theoretical anticipatory systems : A metalinguistic formula­
tion 
As a system for the anticipation of experiences, any 
well defined theory can be expressed as a semantically 
stratified pro-positional system. At the lowest level, and 
antecedent to all other theoretical activity, is an 
ontologically specified re-presentational system; the M^ L 
anticipatory system. Consistent with our work in Chapter 
II, we may denote this M^ L system as This may be termed 
the inductive base of the theory. Operating on G is the 
M L anticipatory system T(&), which forms the inferential 
core of the theory. The specification of Q is antecedent 
to all other theoretical activity; including the specifica-
2 tion of M L systems. 
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The M^ L anticipatory system As the base of the 
theoretical structure the M^ L anticipatory system can be 
viewed as fulfilling three major functions; a Herderian 
function, an epistemic function, and an inductive function. 
We will briefly examine each of these. 
In its Herderian function a re-presentational system 
is a device which allows for the "structuring and distribu­
tion of -meaningful orientations' towards the objects of 
scientific inquiry." In this role they define the re­
presentational capacities of those who use them and allow 
the study of the structure of displacements which occur in 
them. This last feature becomes extremely critical when we 
come to the analysis of "data" reduction procedures. They 
essentially impose constraints upon the constraints already 
imposed by the natural languages within which they occur. 
In its epistemic function we are not so much concerned 
with the structuring and distribution of meaningful orienta­
tions, as we are with the orientations themselves; i.e., 
with the Weltanschauung they provide. For it is necessary 
that such systems not only contain the potentialities of 
the observer/describer, but also the possibilities of the 
phenomena they are used to describe. In this prime antici­
patory function it is critical to note that re-presentational 
systems (and natural language re-presentations) contain both 
more and less (along different dimensions) than is contained 
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in the experiences they absorb. Less, because at the point 
of re-presenting some matter of experience any re-presenta­
tion will represent it incompletely. The theoretician con­
fronts a descriptively inexhaustive reality with a finite 
set of means and intellectual capacities. Further, a great 
deal of simplification is a necessary precondition for being 
able to share an experience, as is the case in the descrip­
tive act. 'The re-presentational system vrithin Tsâiich a re­
searcher confronts that reality is a reflection of these 
constraints. More critically, however, a re-presentation 
contains more because, as was implied in a previous discus­
sion, through its re-presentation the matter of immediate 
experience is extracted from its qualitative immediacy in 
the C=a -posteriori and given a definitive status within a 
universe of factuality. This universe of factuality is the 
heritage of L-a posteriori knowledge, regardless of the re­
presentational framework within which it occurs. In re­
presentational systems it is only made more definitive. 
The aim of theoretical thinking, . . -, is 
primarily to deliver the contents of sensory or 
intuitive experience from the isolation in which 
they originally occur. It causes these contents 
to transcend their narrow limits, combines them 
with others, compares them, and concatenates them 
in a definitive order, in an all-inclusive con­
text. It proceeds "discursively", in that it 
treats the immediate content only as a point of 
departure, from which it can run the whole gamut 
of impressions in various directions, until these 
impressions are fitted together into one unified 
conception, one closed system. In this system 
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there are no more isolated points; all its mem­
bers are reciprocally related, refer to one an­
other, illumine and explain each other. Thus, 
every separate event is ensnared as it were, by 
invisible threads of thought, that bind it io 
the vdiole. The theoretical significance iidiich 
it receives lies in the fact that it is stamped 
with the character of this totality (Cassirer, 
1953b:32). 
This brings us to the inductive function of re-pre­
sentational systems and requires the specification of some 
further notions. At the interface of a re-presentational 
system, say Q, and the real world it seeks to describe is 
a relation of admissibility. An experience is said to be 
admissible in Q if it is possible to construct a repre­
sentation of it in Q. An admissible experience is said to 
actualize Q. Such actualizations are the grist of Q-based 
induction activities and signal the first step in the induc­
tive process. Since not all experiences, past, present or 
future, are considered to be actualizations of a, those which 
are considered to be its actualization may be said to con­
stitute its empirical domain; a domain which they enter by 
decision. It is this point of decision which gives the in­
ductive process its nonlogical and nearly mystical nature. 
Belatedly, every admission signifies the occupation of 
some point or cell in the M^ L anticipatory system and any 
admissible experience (or sequence of experiences) marks the 
partitioning of the system into two classes; occupied and 
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empty cells. Experiences which come to occupy the same cell 
may be said to be Q-equivalent. Any sequence of experiences 
is said to distribute itself in the system. Through the no­
tions of admissibility, occupation, Q-equivalent and dis­
tribution, representational systems may be said to provide 
a recurrence structure for experience. The possibility of 
recurrence marks the possibility for induction. 
Inductive activity is based on the fundamental prem­
ises that, first, the inductive base 5 will be useful in the 
re-presentation of future experiences (i.e., there will 
exist experiences admissible to Q), and secondly, that knowl­
edge of what has occurred in Q will be useful to the speci­
fication of viiat will occur in future cases of admissibility. 
Any system of propositions, T(Q) ^ich generates expectations 
2 
concerning Q-based experiences is an M L anticipatory system; 
its existence is quite literally predicated upon the 
existence of Q. 
In relation to the M^ L anticipatory systems we may say 
that Q-based experience (as a form of L-a posteriori knowl­
edge) makes two contributions. First they participate in 
the specification of such systems by providing a "fact net" 
(Churchman, 1971:19-41). By examining the patterns of oc­
cupation the researcher hopes to garner information relative 
p 
to the specification of a hypothetically préexistent ML 
inferential core. This inferential core may be anything from 
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the specification of a probability distribution to rules or 
norms guiding described linguistic or general social action. 
Secondly, M^ L anticipatory systems aid in decisions regarding 
2 the viability of any M L anticipatory system formulated with­
in its domain. The truth of a given proposition in the M^ L 
system is "contingent" upon lAat is true in its inductive 
base. 
As a metalinguistic system T(Q) takes elements of Q. 
as its extralinguistic substrate. As such the basic logic 
p 1 
of the M L anticipatory system conforms to that of its M L 
re-presentational base (as discussed in Chapter II). Thus 
in a parallel manner any proposition in the M L system must 
represent a significant displacement (this is the classical 
application of the pragmatic principle). Those proposi­
tions in M^ L that are displaced by a given hypothesis are 
said to compete in Q. Indeed, the inductive base provides 
the context of corroboration or falsification for any 
inferential core predicated upon it. 
Ill general we can see any M^ L anticipatory system as 
2 
allowing for an indefinite number of M L systems, although 
a given M^ L system would have a restricted range of M^ L 
anticipatory systems as its operative base. That is, an 
p 
M L anticipatory system must in some manner, conform to 
its M^ L anticipatory base. The specification of the "con­
formance" relation, however, is dependent upon the 
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specification of the three layers of ontology and is "beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. 
Two theoretical systems are said to be in ontological 
conflict if they operate in distinguishable M^ L anticipatory 
systems. Such conflict is generally not resolvable by 
strictly empirical or logical means. It represents what 
Hans Reichenbach (1938:9-16) has termed a volitional 
bifurcation (see also page 7). Usually, for a given area 
of research, a particular ontological stance will dominate 
(in well-defined sciences) by convention (Kuhn, 197U-). If 
and vôien a competing ontology comes to supersede a previously 
accepted M^ L systan, then as Kuhn has noted, we may speak 
of a scientific revolution. It is important to note, how­
ever, that ontological equivalence means equivalence at all 
three ontological levels. Two approaches may agree at the 
ternary ontological level (say by viewing all dimensions as 
well ordered fields) but disagree at the secondary level 
(say, by disagreeing about •wtoat dimensions are to be in­
cluded ). 
Two theoretical systems can only be said to be in 
empirical competition if they share the same M^ L anticipatory 
2 
system and have divergent M L anticipatory systems. In 
other words, given and Tj(&^ ), to say that T^  com­
petes with Tj is to say that It is only under the 
condition of equivalence in the M^ L anticipatory system that 
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"critical experiments" can be carried out. If an experience 
is both admissible to U and subject to an M^ L anticipatory 
system, say T^ (Q), that experience is said to be a realiza-
p 
tion of that M L system. 
An actualization may be said to be the least unit of 
inductive interest while the realization is the least unit 
of inference. A realization may be said to contain informa-
2 tion about the M L system and seems to be the integrative 
core of all inferential systems; ethnographic or statisti­
cal. For instance, when the ethnolinguist collects some 
corpus of linguistic data he assumes that each piece of 
data incorporates information concerning the grammar which 
generated it; i.e., it is a realization of the grammatical 
system. Similarly, in statistical analysis^  we say that we 
It is in statistical analysis that semantic strati­
fication finds its most formal specification. Statistical 
techniques and tests are centered around the specification 
of probability distributions. But probability (an exceed­
ingly enigmatic entity) can only be "distributed" into an 
a priori available re-presentational system. Thus prob-
ablist William Feller notes: 
Any theory necessarily involves idealiza­
tions, and our first idealization concerns the 
possible outcomes of an "experiment" or "ob­
servation". If we want to construct an abstract 
model, we must at the onset reach a decision 
about what constitutes a possible outcome of 
the (idealized) experiment (Feller, 1968:8). 
Sociologist have long underplayed the importance of re­
presentation systems, often reporting the results of their 
"observations" in terms of correlations, slope coefficients, 
etc. Yet this overlooks the fact that these are estimators 
used for the specification of probability distributions 
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have obtained a "sample", this is equivalent to saying that 
we have obtained n realizations of n equivalent stochastic 
processes. This reformulation, in fact, may be preferential 
to the concept of sample since it shows that the sample is 
indeed the culmination of a sequence of n decisions con­
cerning the extent to -ydiich a given experience is a realiza­
tion of some common (or equivalent) stochastic process(es). 
It is this common inferential core «hich allows us to use 
the n realizations to extract information about the in­
ferential system itself. In general an inferential core 
can be applied to any experience which realizes it. There is 
no reason \diy the empirical domain of any theory should be 
considered finite. 
Q-modification a.nd reduction processes 
Related to the specification of the M^ L anticipatory 
system is the notion of Q-modification. The process of Q-
modification essentially involves the transformation of 
the given M^ L anticipatory system Q. into another system, 
say Q*, A particularly interesting type of Q-modification 
procedure is Q-reduction or "data" reduction. Relative to 
and probability must be attached to something. Sociologists 
must take a more theoretical glance at statistics. If they 
do they will find that statistics do not merely provide "tool 
"tools" for testing hypothesis or theories, but are in fact 
very rich theories in and of themselves. Much of what has 
been termed the "gap between theory and research", is really 
a gap between theories. 
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a given base Ù, any data modification procedure could be 
considered a reduction if the transformation it produces 
also results in a reduction of the power of Q. An important 
point to remember is that any type of transformation must 
take a re-presentational system into a re-presentational 
system. The validity of displacement must be preserved in 
any such if the resultant system is to be considered a re­
presentational system. The initial ontological structure 
may change but the validity of the kernel ontology must 
remain invariant. 
The intent of this dissertation is not to make an 
exhaustive study of reduction procedures. However, before 
passing on to other topics we might note two possible forms 
which reduction procedures might take. The first are 
deletion procedures. Procedures considered as such would 
be cellular deletion and dimensional deletione Belatedly, 
in the broader context of modification, we may see increases 
in the power of Q as by dimensional or cellular augmenta­
tion. Such modifications (deletions and/or augmentations) 
could occur for a variety of reasons. For instance, a re­
searcher may start with a tentatively indeterminant M^ L sys-
1 2 tem in the belief that both an M L and anM L system exist 
but remain to be specified. Hence, upon exposure to some 
sequence of admissible experiences the strains of applica­
tion may necessitate such modifications. Analysis techniques 
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differentiate as to the extent to ^ ich they allow modifica­
tions of this nature. 
The second class of reduction procedures would include 
those procedures which impose an indifference structure^  on 
Q through the use (implicit or explicit) of disjunctive 
descriptive forms (see pages 136-138). This is by far the 
most common form of reduction procedure. More definitively, 
a reduction procedure may be said to impose an indifference 
structure on Q. if and only if that procedure takes Q. into 
another system S2* such that 
1. If m* is the power of Q* and m is the power of Q, 
then m* <m, 
2. Each cellular component of i2*-, say cù*(i=l,2,... ,m*) 
can be expressed as a disjunctive sequence of 
cells in Q, say cû^ (i=l,2,... ,m); thus, having the 
form 
. k (r) 
coT = V ÛÛ k<m(i.e. ,0)^  is factual) 
r=l j  ^
and 
3. An expression of total indifference in Q*, when 
I^t is necessary to distinguish between two forms of 
indifference; re-presentational. \daich we are considering 
here, and effectual indifference as would be illustrated by 
economic studies of substitutability of commodities. It is 
important to note, however, the re-presentational indif­
ference automatically produces effectual indifference. 
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put in its expanded Q. form, gives an expression 
of total indifference in Q. 
The essence of the third condition is that Q* partitions Q 
into m* mutually exclusive classes of expressions. Ex­
amples of common techniques which impose indifference 
structures on initial M^ L anticipatory systems are rates, 
ratios, and composites. Each form imposes its unique kind 
of indifference structure. Their nature and displacement 
properties, however, have not adequately studied in the 
sociological community. Other techniques imposing logi­
cally (but not intuitively) equivalent forms of indif­
ference structures would include those which indifference 
structures within dimensions (such as the imposition of 
age, income or population categories). 
Since we have not dealt with the nature of the ternary 
ontological level, it would be advantageous to mention it 
here. The ternary ontological layer is essentially con­
cerned with the structure of comparability among incompat­
ible expressions in an M^ L anticipatory system. Examples of 
comparability are ordered classes, metricity or continuity^  
T^hroughout this manuscript I have implicitly dealt with 
finite, discrete re-presentation systems. This is primarily 
because I feel such systems have almost universal use in the 
sociological community. "Continuity of nature" postulates, 
however, assert that between comparable forms there always 
exist intermediates. Transformed into re-presentational sys­
tems, this postuate necessitates indefinite construetability. 
It in no way. however, invalidates the basic concepts we have 
been developing here. 
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in the M^ L system. The two major concepts are "compara­
bility relations" and "comparability under concatonation". 
Under given comparability structures any string in the M^ L 
system, by virtue of its prepositional nature and someiiAiat 
independently of its effective dimensionality, may be com­
pared to any string in its complement (compared as in, 
"greater than" or "distance from"). Now, in relation to 
reduction procedures we might note that some procedures 
which produce indifference in 12, thus, transforming it to 
some other M^ L system Q*, often create such indifference 
structures to induce comparability. In other words power 
is sacrificed for comparability. Rates and ratios (such as 
velocity express exactly this property. Almost all "di­
mensional combination procedures" in the physical sciences 
strive towards this goal of increased comparability (Bridge-
man, 1922; Krantz et al., 1971:4-$^ -$44; Weitzenhoffer, 
1951:387-406). 
Since the notion of "reduction by indifference" is a 
rather abstract one it may be helpful to illustrate its 
meaning in the use of a data reduction procedure familiar 
to most behavioral scientists; the use of simple composites. 
Other than linear modeling techniques, there are few re­
search practices vrtiich are as pervasive as the use of com­
posites. Such techniques are generally said to "summarize 
the results" or, more exotically, to capture the multi­
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dimensional "essence" of the "concept", or "underlying 
factors", they are said to "tap". Though I find myself 
critical of "automatic" composite usage (i.e., without 
concern for consequences or as a tradition), to generalize 
against it usage seems unwise for there are many settings 
(particularly in dealing with cardinal valued variables) 
in which the technique does have value. Therefore, we shall 
simply study a couple of simple composite generated indif­
ference structures and suggest some rules which might be 
useful in any reduction procedure. 
Consider a situation in vAiich we are given n dimen­
sions, each of power five; i.e., 
1^ ~ (Oii? i^2' ***' °i$') 
for all values of i=l,2,...,n. We now desire to use a 
composite to take our n dimensional space, Q =  ^
... into a one dimensional space Q*. A description 
in the initial space Q would have the form 
0^ 2 ""  ^^ il ' ^2 j ' * * * ' '^ nk^  i~-i-  ^
while a description in Q* would have the form 
k (r) 
5 V CÛ j=l,2,...,P(G*), k<P(Q) 
 ^ r=l j 
Table 3*1 gives the relative powers (given above as P(Q) and 
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Table 3«1- Power reductions generated by composite trans­
formations 
No. of Dimensions P(&) P(£2*) 
1 g 5 
2 25 9 
3 125 13 
h 625 17 
5 3,125 21 
6 15,625 25 
7 390,625 29 
8 1,953,125 33 
9 17,578,125 37 
10 87,890,605 hl 
n 5"^  n^+l 
?(Q-)) of the initial and transformed re-presentational 
systems. Table 3-2 displays the structure of indifference 
as generated for a two dimensional Q, lAile Table 3.3 gives 
a display for a three dimensional Q. 
To make these figures significant the reader might 
consider an interpretation in which a respondent is given 
a questionnaire composed of n five point Likert style items. 
Here the power of Q gives the number of distinct question­
naires the respondent can return. Hence, for 10 items the 
respondent could generate nearly 90 million different ques­
tionnaires. The researcher then codes questionnaire and 
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Table 3*2. A composite generated indifference structure in 
two dimensions 
k (r) 
V 00 
r=l j 
2 (1,1) 
3 (1,2)7(2,1) 
4 (1,3)V(3,1)V(2,2) 
5 (l,i+)V(if,l)V(2,3)V(3,2) 
6 (l,5)V(5,l)V(2,l+)V(if,2)V(3,3) 
7 (2 5)V(5 2)V(3;^ )V(if;3) 
8 (3 ?)7(? 3)V(4 4) 
9 (if 5)7(5^ -) 
10 (5 5) 
1 
2 
3 
2 
1 
Total 25 = P(Q) 
The task of specifying the nature of the indifference 
structure for higher values of dimensionality would ob­
viously be a tedious task. Similarly the task of determin­
ing r-he breadth of indifference (i.e., the valus of k) for 
a given value in the range of the composite would also be 
formidable. For instance, we might like to ask the number 
of ways in which one can obtain a "score" of 20 for 10 
Likert style items= I' believe a solution to this problem 
is within reach, however, if the basic question is reformu­
lated into the "terms of a classical occupancy problem. Un­
der this reconceptualization we consider each item, as a 
cell into which balls can be placed. Thus, for 10 items 
we have ten cells. We are now given 20 bails which we are 
to distribute into the 10 cells under the restriction that 
no cell is to remain empty and the number of balls placed 
in a given cell is not to exceed five. This is not a 
simple occupancy problem, however, and its solution exceeds 
my competencies at this point. It is a point of further 
research. For an introductory treatment of occupancy and 
related combinatorial problems, see Feller (1968). For a 
more advanced (and difficult) treatment, see Riordan (1967). 
Table 3.3, A composite generated Indifference structure in three dimensions 
Cû* 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
1 (1,1,1)] 
(1.1.2)V(1,2,1)V(2,1,1)] 3 
(1.1.3)V(1,3,1)V(3,1,1)3V[(2,2,1)V(2,1,2)V(1,3,3)] 6 
(l,l,lf)Y(l,M-,l)V(lf,l,l)]V[(3,2,l)V(3,l,2)V(2,3,l)V(2,l,3)V(l,2,3)]V (2,2,2)] 10 
k 
3)V(^ ,3,^ )V 
15 
(^ ,^ ,2)v(5,2,5)V(2,5,5)M(5,it,3)V(5,2,'t)V(if,5,3)V('t,3,5m3,5,'t)v(3A.?)]Vio 
(9!g!3)V(?,3,9)V(3,9,?)]T[(4,4,5:)V(^ ,?,^ )V(F,4,4)] 6 
(?,9,4)T(5,4,$)v(4,5,9)] 3 
(5,5,5)] 1 
Total 125 =P(G) 
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forms a composite "score". With 10 items he is now able 
to discriminate among 4l different questionnaires. The 
reduction of power, from 90 million to 4l does seem ap­
preciable. Under this interpretation, Tables 3.2 and 3»3 
give the indifference structures generated for two and 
three items respectively. 
« 
I thiïik a key question, and an obvious one, is what 
would lead a researcher to display such indifference? Is 
the kernel ontological belief maintainable under such an 
indifference structure. For instance, from Table 3.3, if 
a researcher re-presents some sociological phenomena by a 
value of 9, is the displacement of a value of 8 really sig­
nificant? What displacement in the semantic substrate is 
represented by the displacement of 8 by 9? How about the 
1 
displacement oT 7 by 9, or- even 1 by 9*"^  And since an 
O^bserve closely the ordered triplets which compose 
the indifference form defining each composite value in 
Table 3»3* Note that composites are indifferent to all 
permutations and some combinations of dimensional values. 
Thus ($\3,1) and (1,3,5) both yield a "score" of 9. Con­
sider now the use or the Euclidean distance as an indi­
cator of similarity. Computing the distance for the two 
triplets given above we get a value of 5«65' But the sim-
' ilarity of (5,3,1) and (1.1,1) is given by ^ .2^ . Hence, 
; under this measure of similarity, the point (1,1,1) is more 
similar to (5,3,1) than is the point (1,3,5)» Yet the latter 
two points receive a representation of 9 under the composite 
(i.e., they are treated as re-presentationally equivalent) 
while (1,1.1) is given the value 3- Similarly the simi­
larity or (^ ,3,1) and (5,3,1) is given by 1.0 (the smallest 
possible distance in the integer format). Yet the former 
receives a value of 8 which implies it is less similar to 
the point (5,3,1) than is the point (1;3;5)' I leave it to 
the reader to determine the conditions under which such 
considerations would be ignored. 
17ksi 
experience only comes to occupy a cell in Q* by means of 
the occupation of a cell in Q, if we define some sort of 
comparability structure on what are the implications 
of this for the structure of comparability in Q? For in­
stance, if in Q we judge 8 >7, then can we say (5,2,1) > 
(1,3,3)? These and other similar questions must be con­
fronted in any attempt at reduction. The imposition of 
any indifference structure should not be imposed arbi­
trarily. The key to any scientific endeavor is to be 
able to represent the rich variety it confronts in its area 
of inquiry. To reduce that variety through reduction 
processes is a most serious endeavor. 
These questions and considerations, however, lead us to 
the following general guidelines for the specification and/or 
modification of r-e-pr-esentational systems. The first of 
these guidelines involves the adoption of the general strat­
egy developed throughout this dissertation; i.e., to con­
sider one's self as a key component in a broader re-presen­
tational complex (the sociological community) in which one's 
task is the acquisition, and redistribution of experience. 
Adopting this strategy means first developing the ability 
to place one's self in the conceptual intersection portrayed 
in Figure 1.2 (page ^ 0). From this general standpoint one 
can begin to ask meaningful questions concerning the re­
presentational adequacy of a given re-presentational 
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framework. 
To specify the nature of these questions we may begin 
with a re-presentational framework Q' defined by the col­
lection of cellular components cjù£, o^ . The col­
lection Q' may be a re-presentational framework generated 
by questionnaire responses (wherein an arbitrary would 
be a possible response to a sequence of K items); a frame­
work generated by imposing an indifference structure on a 
préexistent re-presentational system; or it may be some 
system which remains to be specified. 
Now, in accordance with the pragmatic principles dis­
cussed in Chapter II (especially on pages 146-1^ 9), the 
first order of business becomes that of establishing the 
validity of the variously possible displacements. That is, 
if through a given act of description, comes to displace 
col (through the selection of co| as a representation for the 
particular experience), then that displacement should have 
some empirical or factual significance as well. The dis­
placement must be factual as yell as linguistic. Thus, if 
through a composite, say, we represent a particular ex­
perience by a 28 rather than a 29, we should be able to 
believe that a score of 28 stands for one cognitively dis­
cernable state of affairs while 29 stands for another. 
Moving into the more general setting once again we 
must seek to specify the organization of the displacements. 
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In essence this means the specification of the dimension­
ality and the structure of comparability as well. The 
questions raised about the composite on pages 173 and 17^  
adequately portray the general nature of inquiry at this 
level. 
Another factor affecting the "meaningfulness" of a 
given re-presentational framework stems from the considera­
tion of the nature of the "parties to the act." An im­
portant case for consideration here is that involved in 
applied research situations where displacements occurring 
within a re-presentational framework must not only be 
"factually significant", but "practically significant" as 
well. That is knowledge produced through the use of a 
given re-presentational system must be significant in terms 
of a user's activity as well. The existence of such knowl­
edge must be a difference in terms of the user's behavior. 
If it does not (or cannot) the displacements generated in 
the re-presentational framework are practically insignifi­
cant; even if they are factually significant. Factual sig­
nificance may be considered a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for practical significance. Perhaps it would be 
wise to draw a distinction between "applied research" and 
"applicable research." 
In conclusion it must be noted that there are no cut-
and-dried procedures for evaluating the re-presentational 
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adequacy of a given re-presentational framework or a par­
ticular reduction procedure. One cannot legislate against 
all uses of composites, nor say that all rates or ratios 
are somehow a priori valid. The questions are not all that 
easy nor the answers that obvious. The key strategy comes 
from an acquired ability to evaluate re-presentational frame­
works in terms of their core function—the communication 
(re-presentation) of experiences. Thus, if there is any 
single guide to decisions concerning the specification (or 
adequacy) of a given re-presentational framework, or the 
use of reduction procedures, it should be that the primary 
task of the researcher is to bring acquired experiences back 
to the scientific community in as clear and meaningful a 
manner.as is possible. The researcher's commitment is not 
to the "measurement of variables", but to the portrayal of 
empirical variety. If a case can be made for the use of 
\ • 
compositeN^ tternsT such as those given above, then that 
case should "be made. Indeed, it is our obligation to make 
that case—to specify the validity of displacements occurring 
within such a fram^ H^ r^ k. If it cannot be done our re­
presentational framew^ k does not qualify as a re-presenta­
tional system and higher order theoretical activity cannot 
justifiably use it as an inductive base. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
This dissertation is decomposable into two major 
sections. The first section dealt with the sociology of 
language and was written to establish a vantage point from 
which the central problem of description might be viewed. 
Through this initial section three objectives were pursued. 
First, I sought to develop a conceptual platform in terms 
of which we could inquire into the nature of our language 
institutions and their role in the context of society. 
Secondly, I expressed the belief that by understanding the 
language institutions, students of the methodology of 
sociology might acquire a more realistic feeling for the 
role of language in the scientific community and realize 
that a basic functional isomcrphy exists between language 
use patterns in both social contexts. Thirdly, I wished to 
develop a framework within which the problem of descrip­
tion could be usefully formulated. 
The second major section of this dissertation was es­
sentially organized around this reformulation. In this ssc= 
tion the problem of description was embedded into the social 
context by reformulating it in terms of the problem of 
"re-presenting" experiences which found their original 
"presentation" to those for whom the experience was not 
cognitively available. In terms of this perspective the 
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sociological community was viewed as a system for the 
acquisition, construction, and redistribution of L-a 
posteriori forms of knowledge. Such L-a posteriori forms 
were noted to be the least form of scientific experience 
and it was asserted that much of the evolution of the 
scientific enterprise could be viewed as an adjustment to 
this fact. 
It was pointed out that the problem of description 
was a methodologically integrative place to begin. This 
was said to be so for two reasons. First, because the 
problem of description was one which confronted all ap­
proaches to empirically based sociological knowledge, and 
secondly, because by studying the problem of description 
in its social context we found that there was a core 
ontological structure which adheres in all acts of de­
scription; regardless of "surface" ontological divergences. 
Chapter II was primarily oriented towards the analysis of 
this core ontological structure and its implications for 
the existence of the Cartesian enviroments of acts of 
description. Here a semiformal analysis of the descriptive 
act led us to formulate the concepts of displacement, kernel 
ontology, vacousness and ideal complement. Some basic 
combinatorics in such ideal systems were also examined as 
well as the pragmatic requirements engendered by the speci­
fication of re-presentational systems. Some general concepts 
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in "indifference" were also introduced in Chapter II. 
Chapter III was offered as a very exploratory appli­
cation of the developed concepts of two areas of interest 
to students of the methodology of sociology; theory and 
data reduction. Theory, as it is currently discussed was 
viewed as a metalinguistic phenomena, an "inferential 
core", which was built on, and contingent upon, a lower 
order "inductive base". The inductive base is a re­
presentational system. Reduction procedures were viewed 
as being of two types; "deletion" procedures and those 
procedures which impose an "indifference structure" on the 
inductive base. An illustration was given in terms of the 
indifference structure generated by a simple composite. 
In conclusion, I must first reaffirm what is already 
obvious. This is a "preliminary study". A more thorough 
study must strike harder at the points at which the various 
tools at the sociologist's disposal seem to show basic kin­
ship. I do believe, however, that all ontological stances, 
qualitative, quantitative, enthnomethodological, etc., must 
gravitate toward the use of re-presentational systems. This 
is not merely because it is "scientific" to do so, but be­
cause of the collective nature of the sociological community 
as a re-presentational complex (or, as Holzner, 1968:60-71, 
would call it—an "epistemic community"). Science, it seems, 
tends to impose a more Herderian set of constraints upon 
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those who claim membership in the scientific community. 
This it has done by the elimination of "accidental dif­
ferences" in its prepositional systems, by the clarifica­
tion of displacement structures in its language, and by 
the "perfection" of what Schutz (1973) termed the "ideali­
zation of the interchangeability of standpoints" and the 
"idealization of the congruence of the system of relevances". 
In other words it strives toward "observer equivalence" 
(Holzner, 1968). 
The use of re-presentational systems, as explications 
of what is already linguistically available, are means to 
this end; the elimination of pragmatic (personal) effects 
in communication (Cherry, 1970:219-257)• Re-presentational 
systems are essentially devices for the structuring and 
distribution of "meaningful orientations" towards certain 
empirical domains. They are the evolutionary products of 
the task that has been given the members of the scientific 
system. They must be put into perspective however. 
In the first place ^ the conmiijmications which occur 
through the use of re-presentational systems compose only 
a small portion of the communication which flows through 
the scientific community. Indeed, as the various elements 
of the scientific community have come to rest on more and 
more stable inductive bases, a greater and greater portion 
of dialogue comes to concern the specification of the 
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higher order theoretical systems. Although this has al­
ready happened in sociology, I do not "believe we are ready 
for such complacence in the sociological community. In 
the second place such systems must continue to be subjected 
to evolutionary forces. We must adopt research strategies 
i i^ch allow the "real world" to "object" to the "pictures 
we draw of it". As I said earlier, such systems are not 
meant to simply contain the potentialities of the user, 
but also the possibilities of that which he seeks to 
describe. Like language in general, these symbolic sys­
tems must be allowed to change through the strains of ap­
plication. Thirdly, the use of re-presentational systems 
should not be confused with any kind of "standardization" 
of descriptive systems. Their construction and specific 
form must be given by the creativity of the user. The 
only demand is that they be available in such a manner that 
displacements within them can be subjected to analysis. 
The variety of such systems, as produced by innovation, is 
also a key evolutionary force for our discipline. 
Beyond these points, there remains much to be ac­
complished. First, what has been developed here in pre­
liminary form must be made more precise and rigorous. 
Secondly, it must be applied in a number of settings. 0^  . 
point of application, in particular, is to the study of '.lie 
problems which respondents encounter when they attempt t. 
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use our re-presentational systems to describe the ex­
periences to which they have privy. More studies must 
also be made of a wider range of data reduction procedures 
and their natures specified. Thirdly, the ternary on-
tological layer remains to be specified. Here academic 
areas such as abstract algebra and topology can be of 
great utility. I believe that sociology must begin to 
make stronger demands of, and stimulate more development 
in, the mathematical sciences. Finally, there is the 
issue of descriptive efficiency which tends beyond that of 
descriptive effectiveness. The constraints of time and 
cost must be incorporated. For instance, %hen a researcher 
must record what he experiences in an ongoing social action 
system, he must be able to find systems which allow him to 
spend a maximum amount of time in observation and a minimum 
amount of time in documentation. In conjunction to this 
last point it would be useful to consider the implications 
of "Zipf's Law" (Cherry, 1970:103-108). 
As much as remains to be accomplished, I do feel that 
several things were accomplished which mark a set of unique 
contributions to the sociology of language and the method­
ology of sociology. With respect to the sociology of lan­
guage I hope that my work on the concept of the "collective 
representation" might stimulate further research into this 
potentially critical area. My work on the notion of the 
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descriptive act provides an important starting point for 
such research. Further it provides a starting point which 
I feel is consistent with Durkheim's original theoretical 
intent. By demonstrating the manner in which the descrip­
tive act can be embedded within a larger set of Herderian 
constraints, I feel I have also made an inroad into an 
empirically relevant specification of the analytical re­
lationship which obtains between, a society (as a reality 
sui generis) and the actors which comprise it. 
In terms of the methodology of sociology I believe 
a number of contributions should be apparent. At the tech­
nical level I offered a meaningful reconceptualization of 
the concept of the "negation of a proposition" (pages 127-
129) which both sustains the validity of the laws of con­
tradiction and the excluded middle, yet clarifies the role 
of negation (or denial) in multivalued logics. Much 
criticism of the validity of the above mentioned laws comes 
from the confusion of the negation of a proposition with 
the ideal complement of that proposition. My metalinguistic 
reformulation overcomes this confusion. Also at the tech­
nical level, I believe my treatment of "data" reduction 
procedures provides a unique and valuable mode of evaluat­
ing such procedures; especially those emploj^ ng "indifference 
structures." 
Belatedly, but at a more general level, I feel that 
I8l 
the general concept of viewing the sociological community 
as a re-presentational complex within which we participate 
provides a unique vantage point from which many difficult 
methodological questions can be reevaluated. The problems 
of re-presentation and reduction are only starting points 
for analysis. Analysis at these points, however, has 
far-reaching consequences for other forms of research 
activity, such as theoretical specification. 
Sociology is a young and vital discipline. It will 
play a vital role in the shaping of our global enterprise 
as it can begin to come to grips with some of its more 
serious problems. I believe the problem of description 
is at the head of the list. To come to grips with this 
problem we must approach it as sociologists. 
There is a whole science i^riaich must be 
formed, a complex science which can advance 
but slowly and by collective labor, and to 
which the present work brings some fragmen­
tary contributions in the nature of an at­
tempt (Durkheim, 1965^ 33)' 
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APPENDIX: SYMBOLS USED 
Symbol Interpretation 
ACS A is a subset of B 
AUB The union of A and B. (An element is a mem­
ber of the union of the sets A and B if and 
only if that element is a member of A or a 
member of B, or both.) 
AnB The intersection of A and B. (An element is a 
member of the intersection of the sets A and 
B if and only if that element is a member of 
A and is also a member of B.) 
_U^ Aj_ A^uAgU.'.UA^, 
k 
n 
i=l 
Aj_ A^n A^n ... n 
ip Given a proposition P, this symbol may be read 
"not-P", or as the "denial of P". 
P A Q P and Q 
P VQ P or Q, or both 
k 
i=l 
A P^  P^  A P2 A ... A P^  
V p, p^  VP.v...VP, i=l 1 12 K 
Z + X2 + ... + (the k-fold sum) 
k 
n X. Xt • X. • ... • X^  (the k-fold product) 
i=l 1  ^  ^  ^
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Number of combinations of m things taken 
at a time. 
